

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Monday, March 25, 1985

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. James David Ford, D.D., offered the following prayer:

May the miracle that we experience each new day—the miracle of life and hope—continue to sustain us and keep us always in Your grace. As we seek to alleviate the strains and pains that people know, so then may we be open to the presence of Your spirit in our hearts and lives, that by helping others in their concerns, we truly help ourselves. May Your blessing be upon us this day and may Your benediction never depart from us. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Sparrow, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed a bill of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested.

S. 630. An act to provide for the payment of rewards to individuals providing information leading to the arrest and conviction of persons guilty of killing or kidnapping a Federal drug law enforcement agent.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER

The SPEAKER. The Chair desires to announce that pursuant to clause 4 of rule I, the Speaker signed the following enrolled bill on Friday, March 22, 1985.

S. 689. An act to authorize appropriations for famine relief and recovery in Africa.

INSURANCE INITIATIVE

(Mr. MONTGOMERY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, in a continuation of my announcement of a series of initiatives designed to enhance the readiness of our Guard and Reserve Forces, I wish to speak on the servicemen's group life insurance [SGLI] program for our military forces.

I am introducing today a bill to increase the maximum coverage of Government insurance for our All-Volunteer Forces and for the members of

the National Guard and Reserve Forces. The bill would increase the maximum from \$35,000 to \$50,000 and would extend coverage for the first time to members of the individual Ready Reserve and the inactive National Guard.

This is a self-supporting program, which costs the taxpayers nothing, with all expenses paid from premiums collected from the servicemembers. (The availability of SGLI coverage serves as an aid in the recruitment and retention of members of the Armed Forces and the Reserves.) By extending this benefit to members of the individual Ready Reserve and inactive National Guard, we will be providing another incentive to these individuals to retain their reserve status and thus remain in the pool of individuals available to serve our country in times of national crisis.

The Veterans' Affairs Committee has included this item in its legislative agenda for this year and I expect to be bringing this proposal to the floor in the near future.

MX IS NOT A BARGAINING CHIP

(Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, today I rise to speak in opposition to continued funding for the MX missile.

The MX is not a bargaining chip nor will it ever be. Instead the production and deployment of the MX will lead to a new round of the arms race which will be both dangerous and expensive. Rejection of the MX would demonstrate to the Soviet Union that we have the good sense to invest our defense dollars in weapons that meet our strategic needs without destabilizing the nuclear balance. The MX will add nothing to the U.S. defense capabilities while destabilizing the nuclear balance of terror.

The MX has already cost the American people billions of dollars. Justification for further funding cannot be made especially in light of the tremendous shift in budget priorities this administration has made to defense at the expense of vital domestic programs. America's greatest threat is not a foreign missile, but our Federal budget deficit.

The burden falls upon the Congress to resist weapons systems which are, from the standpoint of military capability, unnecessary. The MX is such a system. In order for the MX to be an

effective military deterrent, it must be launched on warning of a Soviet attack. That type of defense policy is not smart, but very dangerous.

One final point, America can destroy the world 50 times over with nuclear weapons. That's not defense—that's overkill. The MX is an unnecessary weapon and should be defeated by the House of Representatives. I urge my colleagues to oppose this resolution.

ONE MORE DAY WITH NO REPRESENTATION FOR EIGHTH DISTRICT OF INDIANA

(Mr. STRANG asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STRANG. Mr. Speaker, I rise to observe that 1 more day has gone by and the Eighth District of Indiana still does not have a representative seated in this body.

The Eighth District of Indiana sent us a representative, Rick McIntyre, who was certified by his State. There has never been a contest in this election and that district has been deprived of representation by a capricious outrage of this body.

Mr. Speaker, I wish we would undo that. That is very serious.

THE ADMINISTRATION IGNORES RURAL AMERICA

(Mr. SKELTON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, last year I made a number of speeches throughout my congressional district charging the administration had ignored rural America. Further, I charged the administration with "insensitivity" and "lack of understanding" of farmers and their economic problems.

Today, Mr. Speaker, I must say that the remarks I made last year were not strong enough to adequately describe the attitude of this administration toward farmers and rural America. I should have used terms like "callous" and "crass." President Reagan's supposedly humorous remarks to the Gridiron dinner last weekend when he said, "I think we should keep the grain and export the farmers" are only the latest example in a line which includes David Stockman's now infamous comments. Perhaps of more significance was the President's shortsighted and

□ This symbol represents the time of day during the House proceedings, e.g., □ 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

● This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor.

ill-advised veto of emergency farm legislation which had passed Congress overwhelmingly. The figures upon which that veto was based were repudiated by USDA within a week.

Mr. Speaker, to kick someone is one thing. To kick him when he is down is quite another. The people that the President jokingly wants to "export" are in serious financial difficulty. Many are facing the loss of farms that have been in their families for generations. These are the people I represent and the people I love. I believe they deserve better than they have been getting from the Chief Executive of their Nation.

CONGRESS SHOULD ADOPT RECOMMENDATIONS OF SCOWCROFT COMMISSION ON PEACEKEEPER MISSILE

(Mr. McEWEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Speaker, this month Members of the House and the Senate will cast one of the most critical votes of this Congress regarding America's national defenses.

I rise today to remind this body of its decision in the 98th Congress to adopt the recommendations of the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission concerning the deployment of the MX Peacekeeper missile.

Mr. Speaker, we have a clear choice in this matter. If Congress fails to adopt the MX, we run the risk of crippling American negotiators in Geneva before the arms control talks have had a chance to work.

Additionally, if the Congress cancels the Peacekeeper, we undercut our allies who have made the critical decisions to maintain NATO deterrents by accepting the Pershing and cruise missiles on their home land.

Finally and most importantly, the Congress should approve this missile because it adds to the security of our Nation. The Peacekeeper strengthens our aging, obsolete portions of the strategic triad as a whole.

Mr. Speaker, this is our chance to demonstrate to our adversaries that the United States is resolute in our commitment to ensuring a more secure peace, not only for America, but the free world.

I urge my colleagues to do what is right for the forces of freedom during the 1990's by replacing our corroded missile system with the new MX.

ADMINISTRATION WANTS TO EXPORT FARMERS, NOT GRAIN

(Mr. WATKINS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. Speaker, I have the greatest respect for the Presidency

of the United States, but I lose respect for the President when he jokes that we should export our farmers instead of our grain.

Mr. Speaker, if the President of the United States was with me in the Budget Committee Friday night, he would have heard testimony from my farm people, and especially one lady, Mrs. Brock, whose husband today is in the hospital with a heart attack. Due to the stress of financial strains in the farm families, today, we have more percentage of increase in suicides and heart attacks out there in rural America than ever before since the Great Depression.

Mr. Speaker, we are exporting, unfortunately, our farmers and our cattle people because they are committing suicide and we have more ministers trying to work with farm families.

I think it is a disgrace for that kind of joke to be placed upon the burden of the American farmer today, when they feel like no one cares.

□ 1210

I think and I call on the President, Ronald Reagan, today to apologize to the widows of the people out there in the farming community, and to those children whose fathers have committed suicide, and the many of them that are in the hospitals today because of financial stress.

Mr. President, I think that you should apologize to the farm people in rural America.

BRING HOME OUR POW'S

(Mr. HENDON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HENDON. Mr. Speaker, I read in the press this weekend where our friend and colleague, Mr. MRÁZEK, has urged Congress to post a \$1 million Federal reward for Nazi war criminal Josef Mengele. I applaud the gentleman's actions and take heart in the fact that at least a half dozen agencies of the Federal Government are now pursuing Mengele. Mr. Speaker, anything we can do to assist in bringing this monster to the bar of justice will reflect well on this body.

You know, Mr. Speaker, there are a number of important topics receiving our attention these days: The return of Mengele, the tragedy of missing children, the tragedy of drunk driving, the tragedy in South Africa, but what about the tragedy of our POW's being held in Vietnam prisons, who, according to retired Chief of Military Intelligence in the Pentagon, Gen. Eugene Tighe, are still being held against their will in Communist prisons in Southeast Asia. Mr. Speaker, don't our POW's deserve the same outpouring of concern and action that we have cor-

rectly shown on these other important issues. It's a little past noon here in Washington, a little past midnight in Southeast Asia. Isn't it time, Mr. Speaker, to bring these brave men home?

THE REAL JOKE IS ON THE PRESIDENT

(Mr. BEDELL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BEDELL. Mr. Speaker, according to this morning's paper, the President tried to joke at the Gridiron Club's dinner about farmers who are pleading with him for some help out of their financial crisis. The Washington Post quoted the President as saying, "I think we should keep the grain and export the farmers."

I realize jokes are often made at the Gridiron about sensitive subjects, but the current farm situation is no joking matter. For the President to joke about it is another slap in the face to family farmers of our country.

Mr. Speaker, my farmers are good people. Many of them are in serious financial trouble. I could ask the President to apologize, but they deserve more than an apology. They deserve a change in attitude by this administration.

Asking for help when you're in need is apparently out of fashion. In effect, the President said I wish you people would go away. You're spoiling the image that everything's OK in America. If you're going broke, don't bother me.

Mr. Speaker, so far, the administration has tied the debt program in knots. Only about 100 farmers nationwide have received any help. The administration says it doesn't expect to help more than about 5,000 to 6,000 farmers.

Meanwhile, USDA reports that in January this year, 93,000 farmers were technically broke or moving rapidly toward insolvency. USDA says that figure will rise if prices don't increase in the next few years.

What's the President's answer? A farm bill that even USDA says will cause prices to drop even lower in the next few years.

That's not funny, either, Mr. President. That's sad.

FUNDING THE MX

(Mr. HERTEL of Michigan asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, today the House is in session to begin 10 hours of debate today and

tomorrow on the MX missile. You will hear in this debate no facts in favor of the MX missile being placed in the very same silos that Secretary Weinberger told us just 2 years ago would be too vulnerable to survive an attack.

We heard no facts in defense of the MX in the long Senate debate last week. We will hear no facts today as we heard no facts in the Armed Services Committee last week because there are no facts to support the MX missile.

It would not be survivable, we know that from the administration itself. Therefore it could only be dependable in a first-strike effort which we all oppose.

People say we have to have the MX missile to carry on the negotiations, when we all know the Soviets came to those negotiations because they fear the deployment of the cruise and the Pershing missiles with our NATO allies in Europe.

The administration and proponents today will be asking us to begin down the road that will cause us to spend \$40 billion plus on the MX. They talk about hardening silos when we know that the survivability rate will still be nil with that extra great expense.

We ask you to remember common sense. We ask you to remember that great problem with the deficit. And instead, strengthen our conventional forces and, instead, accelerate the deployment of the mobile missile, and to vote no on the MX missile when there are no factual arguments on the side of the MX missile; 21 today will lead to 48 and eventually 100 MX missiles tomorrow.

FUNDING THE MX

(Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Speaker, although more than 100 congressional districts are suffering from desperate structural unemployment, we have almost closed the door to any discussion of new initiatives to create jobs for the long-term unemployed. We said that the money for jobs is just not there. We must first take care of the deficit.

And yet today this House will begin the debate on the MX missile which for the next installment alone this year will cost another \$1.5 billion. This worthless missile, which should be more accurately named the Wastemaker or the Budget-Buster adds nothing significant to the defense of our country. The only argument we are left with to support the MX missile is that the President wants it.

While I sympathize with the fact that the MX is the President's pet weapon, I do not think that it is a valid reason to waste another \$1.5 billion. That \$1.5 billion can provide

funding for more than 200,000 jobs for the long-term unemployed.

I urge my colleagues in the House to reject this funding of this pet weapon, and instead of the Wastemaker and the Budget-Buster, let us spend the \$1.5 billion to create jobs for the unemployed.

PRESIDENT'S JOKE COVERS UP COLD AND CYNICAL HEART

(Mr. ALEXANDER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, it has been stated today that the President said at a Gridiron Club annual award dinner last Saturday evening, "I think we should keep the grain and export the farmers."

It is not funny because it is true. The policies of the Reagan administration have priced the American farmer out of the world market and the President's policies are in effect exporting the American farmer while he is keeping his grain.

And if Ronald Reagan could have seen the tears in the eyes of the witnesses that appeared before the Budget Committee during hearings over the past weekend in Missouri, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and South Carolina, he would know that it is not funny.

The American farmer can only be rewarded to know that the warm and jovial smile of the President is a face which covers up a cold and cynical heart.

FUNDING THE MX

(Mr. MARKEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, soon we vote on the Edsel of weapons systems, the MX missile. The MX is to military systems what the Ohio Savings & Loans is to the banking system.

We all know about the merits of the MX. It has none.

It is a missile without a mission—a weapon without a home.

It is a \$41 billion exercise in weakening American security and reducing nuclear stability.

Unable to argue for MX on its merits, the administration is trying to give it a sugar coating of arms control—to bathe it in the glow of Geneva.

Now, President Reagan has ordered Max Kampelman to abandon the arms talks at Geneva to come to Washington to push for MX production.

Our chief arms control negotiator may miss sessions in Geneva in order to lobby for more missiles.

That says it all.

Mr. Speaker, President Reagan is telling the truth. The MX is not a bargaining chip for Geneva.

Geneva is a bargaining chip for the MX.

Mr. Speaker, the MX missile is making a mockery of the Geneva talks.

And the story this spring is the same as it was last summer. Promise them arms control but give them the MX.

□ 1220

PRESIDENT IS PRESIDING OVER LIQUIDATION OF OUR FARMERS

(Mr. WEAVER asked permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WEAVER. Mr. Speaker, I have a message for our President. Our farmers are being forced to abandon their farms while you do nothing but pressure the Congress for more bombs.

In 1930 Stalin murdered the farmers in Russia in cold blood. Soviet agriculture has never recovered.

They cannot sufficiently feed their own people to this day.

Mr. President, you are presiding over the liquidation of our farmers and the result will be the same as Stalin's brutal act; broken men, though still alive, will not come back to the farm.

The farmers, Mr. President, should not be shipped overseas. We need them here. What we do not need, Mr. President, is more nuclear weapons. We do not need the MX.

If you cannot see past your obsession to the real condition of the American people today, to our farms and our industries, then we in the House of Representatives must be your eyes. We in this body must resolve to send a signal to our own President that it is not the MX the country needs, but a concern for our own people and their livelihoods.

THE EXTENDED AMERICAN FAMILY—AND THEIR DEBTS

(Mr. PORTER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, because of the early position I took in support of a 1-year freeze on all Government spending, I have received quite a lot of mail from senior citizens.

Many, I am pleased to say, share my concern about the debts we are passing on to their grandchildren. These senior citizens are more than willing to bear their fair share of the sacrifices necessary to keep the American dream alive for their grandchildren.

Others are upset about having their COLA's frozen. I can understand how this will mean real hardship for some people, but I see no way to avoid this.

When I write them back, I ask them to reflect on one statistic.

Today's typical senior citizen has paid, over his or her lifetime, roughly \$5,000 in extra taxes to pay the debts of the previous generation. Today's child will have to pay \$100,000—20 times as much—to pay the interest on the debts we are passing on to them.

Mr. Speaker, we have to be fair to Americans of all ages, including our children.

HOUSE MEMBERS SHOULD SPEND MORE TIME ON THE FLOOR DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS

(Mr. DORNAN of California asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, let justice be done, please seat our colleague Rick McIntyre of Indiana.

Mr. Speaker, today we are going to begin over 2 days, 10 hours of debate on modernizing one of our strategic systems for the defense of not only the United States but the free world. The Peacekeeper missile program involves only one-third of one percent of our Federal yearly budget.

I hope no one on either side of the aisle indicates that however we vote tomorrow has anything to do with patriotism. Everybody who serves in this body loves our country or he would not be here serving at such a difficult time in the history of our Nation.

But this debate will involve judgment. I would ask all the Members who can rearrange their schedules, as I have tried to do today in order to spend as much time as possible on the House floor so that we can speak among ourselves privately at the back of the Chamber in addition to engaging in those valuable colloquies and dialogs on the House floor.

Please be here as much as possible today and tomorrow. I know everybody is going to be watching the floor debate on their television sets in their own offices and I agree that sometimes that gives you even more of an intense focus on the Member's floor remarks. However, come on over to the House floor; this is a very, very important moment in American history, and I think that there should have as many of us physically in the Chamber as possible, so that we make the right decision with our precious votes.

I thank the Speaker.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM HON. WILLIAM H. BONER OF TENNESSEE

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communications from Hon. WILLIAM H. BONER of Tennessee:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, March 20, 1985.
Hon. THOMAS P. O'NEILL, Jr.,
Speaker of the House, H-202, the Capitol,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: This is to inform you, pursuant to Rule L(50) of the Rules of the House of Representatives, that Walter Hunt, a constituent caseworker in my Nashville office, has received a Subpoena for Civilian Witness issued by a Special Court Martial of the United States, Naval Legal Service Office, Naval Base, Norfolk, Virginia.

After consultation with the General Counsel to the Clerk of the House, I will inform you of my determination as required by the House rule.

Sincerely,

BILL BONER,
Member of Congress.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, March 21, 1985.
Hon. THOMAS P. O'NEILL, Jr.,
Speaker of the House, H-202, the Capitol,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By letter dated March 20, 1985, I informed you that Walter Hunt, a constituent caseworker in my Nashville district office, had received a Subpoena for Civilian Witness issued by a Special Court Martial of the United States. After consultation with the General Counsel to the Clerk of the House, I have determined that compliance with this subpoena is consistent with the privileges and precedents of the House.

Sincerely,

BILL BONER,
Member of Congress.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following communication from the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

WASHINGTON, DC,
March 25, 1985.

Hon. THOMAS P. O'NEILL, Jr.,
The Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Pursuant to the permission granted in Clause 5, Rule III of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, I have the honor to transmit sealed envelopes received from the White House as follows:

1. At 3:15 p.m. on Thursday, March 21, 1985 and said to contain a message from the President whereby he transmits the 17th Annual Reports on the Administration of the Highway Safety and National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Acts;

2. At 4:10 p.m. on Friday, March 22, 1985 and said to contain a message from the President whereby he transmits the 8th Special Message for Fiscal Year 1985 under the Impoundment Control Act of 1974; and

3. At 4:10 p.m. on Friday, March 22, 1985 and said to contain a message from the President whereby he transmits the Fiscal Year 1984 Annual Report of the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Council on the Arts.

With kind regards, I am,

Sincerely,

BENJAMIN J. GUTHRIE,
Clerk, House of Representatives.
By W. RAYMOND COLLEY,
Deputy Clerk.

ANNUAL REPORTS ON ADMINISTRATION OF HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT AND NATIONAL TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY ACT—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation and the Committee on Energy and Commerce:

To the Congress of the United States:

The Highway Safety Act and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, both enacted in 1966, initiated a national effort to reduce traffic deaths and injuries and require annual reports on the administration of the Acts. This is the 17th year that these reports have been prepared for your review.

The report on motor vehicle safety includes the annual reporting requirement in Title I of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of 1972 (bumper standards). An annual report also is required by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, which amended the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act and directed the Secretary of Transportation to set, adjust, and enforce motor vehicle fuel economy standards. Similar reporting requirements are contained in the Department of Energy Act of 1978 with respect to the use of advanced technology by the automobile industry. These requirements have been met in the Eighth Annual Fuel Economy Report, the highlights of which are summarized in the motor vehicle safety report.

In the Highway Safety Acts of 1973, 1976, and 1978, the Congress expressed its special interest in certain aspects of traffic safety, which are addressed in the volume on highway safety.

I am pleased to report that traffic fatalities have dropped for the third year in a row. The 42,584 fatalities recorded in 1983, while still unacceptably high and a tragedy to the Nation both in terms of lives lost and the economic consequences of the deaths, represent a 3-percent decrease from the preceding year, and a 17-percent decrease from as recently as 1980 when 51,091 people died in traffic accidents.

In addition, despite large increases in the number of drivers and vehicles, the Federal standards and programs for motor vehicle and highway safety instituted since 1966 have contributed to a significant reduction in the fatality rate per 100 million miles of travel. The fatality rate is a measure of the risk of death that a person is exposed to when travelling. The rate has de-

creased from 5.5 in the mid-60's to the present level of 2.57, the lowest rate ever recorded. This means that motorists can drive more miles today with less risk. If the 1966 fatality rate had been experienced in 1983, more than 91,000 persons would have lost their lives in traffic accidents.

A substantial number of deaths and injuries on our roadways can be traced in part to some human factor: the driver or passenger who was not wearing a safety belt; the drinking driver who continues to be involved in more than half of the Nation's traffic fatalities; speeding; or the habitual offenders whose privileges to drive have been revoked, but who continue to drive irresponsibly.

I am especially proud that in 1983 we had the safest Christmas holiday season since the late 1940's. The national outrage over drunk driving, combined with tougher State laws and stepped-up enforcement, apparently have caused some people to refrain from driving after they have been drinking.

We will continue to pursue highway and motor vehicle safety programs that are most effective in reducing deaths and injuries. We are placing greater emphasis on the human aspects of traffic safety, reflecting the national concern that emphasis be on those activities that have the most realistic prospect of success, and which yield the maximum safety gain per dollar invested.

I am encouraged by the significant fatality reduction this Nation has experienced over the past three years and am convinced that even more progress can be made to ensure that American motorists and pedestrians will enjoy the greatest level of personal safety possible.

RONALD REAGAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 21, 1985.

EIGHTH SPECIAL MESSAGE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1985 UNDER IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 99-44)

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, I herewith report five new deferrals of budget authority for 1985 totaling \$121,544,000 and three revised deferrals now totaling \$162,677,884. The deferrals affect the Departments of Energy, Health and Human Services, Interior, and Transportation.

The details of these deferrals are contained in the attached report.

RONALD REAGAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 22, 1985.

□ 1230

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS AND THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE ARTS FOR 1984—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States, which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Education and Labor:

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with the provisions of the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, as amended, I transmit herewith the Annual Report of the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Council on the Arts for the Fiscal Year 1984.

RONALD REAGAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 22, 1985.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 5, rule I, the Chair announces he will postpone further proceedings today on the motion to suspend the rules on which a recorded vote or the yeas and nays are ordered, or on which the vote is objected to under clause 4 of rule XV.

Such rollcall vote, if postponed, will be taken on Tuesday, March 26, 1985.

APPOINTMENT AS MINORITY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE COMMISSION ON CONGRESSIONAL MAILING STANDARDS

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the provisions of section 5(b), Public Law 93-191, the Chair appoints as minority members of the House Commission on Congressional Mailing Standards the following Members of the House:

Mr. FRENZEL of Minnesota;
Mr. TAYLOR of Missouri; and
Mr. LEWIS of California.

APPOINTMENT AS MINORITY MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 25, 99th Congress, the Chair appoints as minority members of the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families the following Members of the House:

Mr. COATS of Indiana;
Mr. FISH of New York;
Mr. BLILEY of Virginia;

Mr. WOLF of Virginia;
Mr. BURTON of Indiana;
Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut;
Mr. MCKERNAN of Maine;
Mrs. VUCANOVICH of Nevada;
Mr. MONSON of Utah; and
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire.

APPOINTMENT AS MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE & CONTROL

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 22, 99th Congress, the Chair appoints as members of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control the following Members of the House:

Mr. RANGEL of New York, chairman;
Mr. RODINO, New Jersey;
Mr. STARK, of California;
Mr. SCHEUER, of New York;
Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois;
Mr. AKAKA of Hawaii;
Mr. GUARINI of New Jersey;
Mr. MATSUI of California;
Mr. FAUCETT of Florida;
Mr. FAUNTROY of District of Columbia;

Mr. HUGHES of New Jersey;
Mr. LEVINE of California;
Mr. ORTIZ of Texas;
Mr. SMITH of Florida;
Mr. TOWNS of New York;
Mr. GILMAN of New York;
Mr. COUGHLIN of Pennsylvania;
Mr. SHAW of Florida;
Mr. OXLEY of Ohio;
Mr. PARRIS of Virginia;
Mr. CHAPPIE of California;
Mr. HUNTER of California;
Mr. DIOGUARDI of New York;
Mr. STRANG of Colorado; and
Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut.

NEW GI BILL AMENDMENTS OF 1985

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 752) to amend title 38, United States Code, to ensure an orderly transition to the new educational assistance program established by chapter 30 of that title, as amended.

The Clerk read as follows:

H.R. 752

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "New GI Amendments of 1985".

SEC. 2. ELIGIBILITY FOR NEW ACTIVE-DUTY GI BILL.

(a) ACTIVE-DUTY PROGRAM.—Section 1411(a)(1)(A) of title 38, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in the matter preceding clause (i)—

(A) by striking out "July 1, 1985," and inserting in lieu thereof "the date of the enactment of the New GI Bill Amendments of 1985"; and

(B) by striking out "first" both places it appears; and

(2) in clauses (i) and (ii), by inserting "after such date of enactment" after "who" the first place it appears in each clause.

(b) **ACTIVE-AND-RESERVE PROGRAM.**—Section 1412(a)(1)(A) of such title is amended—

(1) in the matter preceding clause (i)—

(A) by striking out "July 1, 1985," and inserting in lieu thereof "the date of the enactment of the New GI Bill Amendments of 1985"; and

(B) by striking out "first" both places it appears; and

(2) in clause (i), by inserting ", after such date of enactment," after "serves".

(c) **CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.**—

(1)(A) Section 1411(c)(1) of such title is amended by striking out "initially enters" in the second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof "enters, after the date of the enactment of the New GI Bill Amendments of 1985".

(B) Section 1412(d)(1) of such title is amended by striking out "initially enters" in the second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof "enters, after the date of the enactment of the New GI Bill Amendments of 1985".

(2) Section 1413 of such title is amended—

(A) in subsection (a)(2), by inserting "after the date of the beginning of the period for which the individual's basic pay is reduced under section 1411(b) of this title, in the case of an individual described in section 1411(a)(1)(A)(ii)(I) of this title, or after June 30, 1985, in the case of an individual described in section 1411(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I) of this title" before the period at the end; and

(B) in subsection (b)—

(i) by inserting "after the date of the beginning of the period for which such individual's basic pay is reduced under section 1412(c) of this title, in the case of an individual described in section 1412(a)(1)(A), or after June 30, 1985, in the case of an individual described in section 1412(a)(1)(B) of this title" in clause (1) after "individual"; and

(ii) by inserting "after such date" in clause (2) before the period at the end.

(4) The text of section 1416 of such title is amended to read as follows:

"(a) A member of the Armed Forces who—
"(1) becomes a member or enters on active duty as a member of the Armed Forces after the date of the enactment of the New GI Bill Amendments of 1985;

"(2) completes at least two years of service on active duty after the date of the beginning of the period for which such members' basic pay is reduced under section 1411(b) or 1412(c) of this title;

"(3) after such service, continues on active duty or in the Selected Reserve without a break in service (except as described in section 1412(b)(2) of this title); and

"(4) but for section 1411(a)(1)(A)(i)(I) or 1412(a)(1)(A)(ii) of this title would be eligible for basic educational assistance,

may receive educational assistance under this chapter for enrollment in an approved program of education while continuing to perform the duty described in section 1411(a)(1)(A)(i)(I) or 1412(a)(1)(A)(ii) of this title.

"(b) A member of the Armed Forces who—
"(1) as of December 31, 1989, is eligible for educational assistance benefits under chapter 34 of this title;

"(2) after June 30, 1985, has continued on active duty or in the Selected Reserve without a break in service (except as described in section 1412(b)(2) of this title); and

"(3) but for section 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) of this title would be eligible for basic educational assistance,

may receive educational assistance under this chapter for enrollment in an approved program of education while continuing to perform the duty described in section 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) of this title."

(5) Section 704 of the Veterans' Educational Assistance Act of 1984 is amended—

(A) by inserting "(a)" after "Sec. 704.", and

(B) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(b) No individual who becomes a member of the Armed Forces or enters on active duty as a member of the Armed Forces on or after the date of the enactment of the New GI Bill Amendments of 1985 may enroll in the educational assistance program described in subsection (a) before July 1, 1988."

SEC. 3. ELIGIBILITY FOR NEW GUARD AND RESERVE GI BILL.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Sections 2132 and 2138 of title 10, United States Code, are amended by striking out "July 1, 1985," and inserting in lieu thereof "the date of the enactment of the New GI Bill Amendments of 1985".

(b) **CONFORMING AMENDMENT.**—Section 705(b) of the Veterans' Educational Assistance Act of 1984 is amended by striking out "July 1, 1985," and inserting in lieu thereof "the date of the enactment of the New GI Bill Amendments of 1985".

(c) **TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.**—Section 2131(c) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting "(or the equivalent thereof in part-time educational assistance)" before the period at the end of paragraph (2).

The **SPEAKER**. Is a second demanded?

Mr. **HAMMERSCHMIDT**. Mr. Speaker, I demand a second.

The **SPEAKER**. Without objection, a second will be considered as ordered. There was no objection.

The **SPEAKER**. The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. MONTGOMERY] will be recognized for 20 minutes and the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT] will be recognized for 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. MONTGOMERY].

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, it is with great pleasure that I rise in support of H.R. 752. This legislation was jointly referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs and to the Committee on Armed Services, and I am pleased to advise my colleagues that the measure was approved unanimously by these committees on March 7 and March 20, respectively. I want to thank my colleagues for their support and would especially like to commend the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN], the chairman of both the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation and the full House Armed Services Committee, for agreeing to expedite consideration of this important piece of legislation. Also, the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT], the ranking Republican member on the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, for his total support. Also, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HILLIS], the ranking Republican member of the Subcommittee on

Military Personnel and Compensation as well as the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Veterans' Affairs Committee, deserves a special vote of thanks.

Last year, in the Defense Authorization Act, Congress enacted a new GI bill for both the Active Forces and the Selected Reserve to assist in the recruitment and retention of high quality personnel for the Nation's Armed Forces. The new GI bill is a 3-year program that will apply to those who enter military service between July 1, 1985, and June 30, 1988. Frankly, I thought that the program should be implemented as soon as possible, but the Senate insisted on a delayed date of July 1, 1985. As expected, that July 1 date is causing problems.

As a result, I introduced H.R. 752. H.R. 752 does two things: It moves back the effective date for the new GI bill from July 1, 1985, to the date of enactment of H.R. 752, and it extends eligibility to prior service personnel returning after a break in service to be covered under the GI bill.

Over the past few months—and as recently as last Wednesday during hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation—the services have expressed substantial concern to me about the impact of waiting until July 1. The new GI bill is a much more attractive program than the current contributory Veterans' Educational Assistance Program [VEAP] and, as a result, the services are worried that potential recruits will wait until July 1 for the more generous benefit. Such a last minute surge of entrants could swamp the training base in the final quarter of fiscal year 1985 and the early months of fiscal year 1986, straining school seats beyond capability and resources. Because of this same concern, Larry Korb, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, has indicated his support for backdating the effective date in a letter to me dated March 1.

Currently, the new GI bill applies only to those who first enter active duty after July 1, 1985. The services, however, recruit on a selected basis a limited number of prior service personnel returning after a break in service to fill shortage skills and meet specific requirements. I think it makes sense to treat these returning prior service young people like new recruits for purposes of the new GI bill. H.R. 752 would, therefore, extend coverage to the prior service, thus maximizing the impact of the new GI bill in attracting high quality military personnel.

During Armed Services Committee deliberations, H.R. 752 was amended to include my second bill, H.R. 886, which affects the Reserve and National Guard educational assistance program and falls solely within the

Armed Services Committee's jurisdiction. H.R. 886 makes an identical change in the effective date of the Reserve and Guard program—in other words, moves it back from July 1.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues' favorable action on H.R. 752 this afternoon. There is little cost involved but it will result in more efficient operation of this educational. This legislation makes even better a vital investment in the future of our Nation's Armed Forces—the new GI bill.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. TRAFICANT). The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT].

Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, as ranking member of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs and as a cosponsor of H.R. 752, I rise in strong support of it.

Last year, when we passed the new GI bill, which I also cosponsored, it contained a Senate provision which delayed its implementation until July 1, 1985. The delayed date presents a practical difficulty for the Armed Forces which should be remedied as soon as possible. In a nutshell, the major problem is that some potential new recruits are holding back until they are eligible this coming July for the attractive new GI bill. The Armed Forces are rightly concerned about a large number of recruits hitting the pipeline all at once, rather than having an orderly flow which does not overburden training facilities. I understand that the volume of recruits is dropping off now, but that there is time to avoid a serious disruption if we act promptly.

The remedy is straightforward: Change to the date of enactment of this legislation the effective date of the new GI bill benefits. A steadier flow of new recruits would result.

A second difficulty is that the new GI bill is written in such a way that it does not allow eligibility for former service members who would like to go back into military service. This operates as a disincentive for them and may cost the military services opportunities to regain experienced men and women who already have expensive training and needed skills.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 752, under the exceptionally able leadership of our chairman, Mr. MONTGOMERY, was unanimously reported by the Veterans' Affairs Committee. It is not controversial, and I believe that any expense, which would be small, would be more than offset by benefits to the military services.

Mr. Speaker, it is also thanks to the effectiveness of the chairman of the Education and Training Subcommit-

tee, Mr. DASCHLE, and the subcommittee's ranking member, Mr. McEWEN, that this legislation has come to the floor without delay to meet an important national need.

I also congratulate and thank Mr. ASPIN and Mr. HILLIS for their important role in reporting this bill from the Armed Services Committee.

I join in urging my colleagues to give favorable consideration to this needed legislation.

□ 1240

Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McEWEN], a member of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs and the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Education, Training and Employment.

Mr. McEWEN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, as the ranking Republican member of the Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee on Education, Training and Employment, I rise in strong support of H.R. 752.

This bill was unanimously reported from the full House Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

It corrects an unanticipated result stemming from the creation of the peacetime GI bill last year.

The new GI bill is designed to be an effective recruitment and retention tool in strengthening our military manpower.

When this legislation was approved by this House last year, it contained a provision establishing October 1, 1984, as its effective date.

Unfortunately, the other body insisted upon the date of July 1, 1985, the date ultimately agreed to in the conference report to the legislation.

A result of the July 1 date, as was explained by Chairman MONTGOMERY and Representative HAMMERSCHMIDT, is that military recruitment officers are finding that some prospective recruits are delaying their entry into the armed services until after July 1 so as to guarantee their eligibility for later important educational benefits.

The legislation before us today has as its principal focus changing of the effective date of the new Education Assistance Program to the date of enactment of this bill. This change is essential if we are to prevent disruption in our military recruitment efforts. In fact, certain branches of our Armed Forces tell us they have encountered some recruitment difficulties as a result of the present eligibility data.

Another provision of H.R. 752 will allow former service members to be eligible for the benefits of the new GI bill. This will help attract former service members which have skills currently in short supply.

As a final note, Mr. Speaker, I commend to my colleagues the leadership on this issue shown by Chairman MONTGOMERY of our committee and

the ranking minority member of the committee, our good friend, JOHN PAUL HAMMERSCHMIDT. They both, along with Representative HILLIS of Indiana and Representative ASPIN, worked diligently to shepherd this peacetime GI bill through the Congress.

We are also indebted to the gentleman from South Dakota [Mr. DASCHLE] for his efforts as the chairman of the Education Subcommittee for working to bring this legislation to the floor in such an expeditious manner.

Passage of H.R. 752 is important to our military recruitment goals for the coming months. I urge my colleagues to join with us in approving this important legislation.

Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON], a distinguished member of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs and who was ranking minority member of this subcommittee of jurisdiction in the last Congress.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Arkansas for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, like my colleagues from the Veterans' Affairs Committee, I rise in strong support of H.R. 752 and to urge its immediate adoption by the House.

I was proud to have been an original sponsor of the legislation creating the new peacetime GI bill last year.

I was also honored to have been appointed as a conferee on the defense authorization bill which established our new Educational Assistance Program for the armed services.

It was during that conference, however, that the other body set the effective date for eligibility at July 1, altering the October 1, 1984 date contained in the House version.

We prevailed in many other areas of the legislation; the other Chamber had passed a markedly different Educational Assistance Program, but under the leadership of our chairman, SONNY MONTGOMERY, and our ranking Republican Member, JOHN PAUL HAMMERSCHMIDT, we fought hard to protect the House position, and I am proud to say we won most of the major battles.

The effective date, however, was established by the other Chamber.

As a result of that effective date, we are now faced with immediate recruitment shortfalls.

Many of our young men and women, recognizing the value of the new GI bill benefits, are deferring their enlistment date to ensure their eligibility for benefits.

I might add, Mr. Speaker, that this demonstrates a sophistication and awareness on the part of our new recruits that is very encouraging.

As a former marine, I am particularly distressed that the Marine Corps in

particular, is experiencing enlistment delays which are preventing the corps from meeting its short-term recruitment goals.

Passage of this bill will move the effective date for eligibility up to the date of enactment of this legislation.

It will also permit prior service members who rejoin, to be eligible for the new GI bill.

This will aid in bringing skilled individuals back into military service.

H.R. 752 is not controversial.

It was unanimously approved by the Veterans' Affairs Committee.

Mr. Speaker, I commend our Education and Training Subcommittee Chairman, Mr. DASCHLE, and our ranking Republican member on the subcommittee, my good friend Bob McEWEN, for their hard work in helping to bring H.R. 752 to the floor in such a timely manner.

I would also like to remind my colleagues once again of the debt we all owe to SONNY MONTGOMERY, our chairman of the full committee, and to the ranking minority member, JOHN PAUL HAMMERSCHMIDT, for their untiring efforts over the years in bringing about this peacetime GI bill.

The whole Nation owes these two fine Americans a great deal for unfailing patriotism and leadership on this and all other matters of importance to our Nation's veterans—present and future.

Mr. Speaker, I urge immediate passage of H.R. 752.

Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT. Mr. Speaker, this bill was jointly referred to the Committee on Veteran's Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services. As I mentioned earlier, under the distinguished leadership of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN], of the Armed Services Committee, and the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee of Jurisdiction, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HILLIS], this bill is before us today. I now yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HILLIS].

Mr. HILLIS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague, the gentleman from Arkansas, for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join with the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. MONTGOMERY] in urging passage of H.R. 752, the New GI Bill Amendment of 1985. The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. MONTGOMERY], who is both the chairman of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs and a senior member of the Committee on Armed Services, deserves the full measure of credit for his tireless efforts last year to enact a new GI bill for our Nation's men and women in uniform. The measure we are considering today is basically a fine tuning of that initiative.

At the insistence of the Senate, last year's Defense authorization confer-

ence delayed the effective date of the new educational assistance program until July 1, 1985, in order to give the services adequate time to rework their recruiting and advertising campaigns and bring recruiters up to speed on the new program. The services soon found, however, that the long delay in implementation could cause more problems than it would solve. They feared a feast and famine situation in recruiting: famine until July 1 followed by a massive influx of new recruits after that date. This post-July 1 feast of new accessions could overwhelm the capability of the training base to provide a sufficient number of school seats in the final quarter of fiscal year 1985 and the early months of fiscal year 1986.

In recognition of this problem, H.R. 752 will broaden the eligibility time window by backdating the effective date of the new program from July 1, 1985, to the date of enactment of H.R. 752. Those few extra months will provide a much smoother transition, thus facilitating more orderly management of recruit training.

In addition, H.R. 752 will increase the attractiveness of the new GI bill as a recruitment incentive for high quality accessions by permitting prior service personnel who return after a break in service to be treated like new recruits for purposes of eligibility under the program. We are talking about a very small number of people here whom the services recruit to fill specific skill and shortage requirements.

H.R. 752 makes good sense, the slightly expanded eligibility costs little, and I urge my colleagues' favorable consideration.

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HILLIS. I yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. FRENZEL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, there is nothing wrong with H.R. 752. It simply makes changes of an effective date and of eligibility, which are apparently needed. I rise, however, to restate my objections to the entire program which Congress passed last year. We have created a program here which provided a great incentive for people to leave the service at a time when we are trying to get better people to stay in the service and to join our various service components.

It seems to me that when we are complaining about a large defense budget, when we are complaining that our retirement program does not do for us what we would like it to do, it is a strange thing that we create a rather new program, an expensive one, which gives people an incentive to get out of our armed services.

□ 1250

I still object to the original program, but I cannot object to the committee's determining that whatever we have here would better serve our recruitment needs by a change in the effective date.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

● Mr. GRAY of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 752, to revise the eligibility criteria for the new GI bill.

As a member of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs I would like to give some background on this important bill.

First, the new GI bill applies to individuals who between July 1, 1985, and June 30, 1988, initially enter on active duty or agree to serve for a minimum of 6 (or six more) years in the Selected Reserve.

The reason for the delayed effective date was to allow adequate time for the services to revise their advertising and recruiting literature and educate recruiters on the new program.

Second, potential problems envisioned by the services with the delayed effective date. Because the new GI bill is much more attractive than the current educational assistance program, recruits may wait until after July 1, 1985, to enlist.

A flood of new recruits after July 1, 1985, could swamp the training base.

The Army has already added 4,000 seats to the training base in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 1985 in anticipation of the increased requirement.

Third, recruiters should advise potential recruits of the more lucrative program available after July 1 to avoid later charges of recruiter fraud.

Fourth, need for extension of active duty benefit to prior service personnel. Services generally recruit prior service individuals on a selective basis to fill in shortage skills and meet specific requirements.

Including prior service personnel returning after a break in service will maximize the impact of the new GI bill in attracting high quality personnel.

Fifth, provisions of H.R. 752—

Would move back the effective date of the new GI bill from July 1, 1985, to the date of enactment of H.R. 752; and

Would also extend eligibility for the active duty program to prior service personnel returning after a break in service.

Sixth, Department of Defense position. DOD supports the backdating of the window of eligibility for the GI bill.

Seventh, cost of H.R. 752. CBO projects an increase in the accrual charge to defense of \$20 million in fiscal year 1985.

Mr. Speaker, I commend my friend, the distinguished chairman of the Veterans' Affairs Committee, Mr. MONT-

GOMERY, and my friend the ranking minority member, Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT, for their outstanding efforts on this and other matters pending before our committee.

Thank you. ●

Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate what my colleagues have said pertaining to this bill, and I would like to commend the members of both the Veterans' Affairs Committee and the Armed Services Committee for their quick action and for the kind words said by Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT, Mr. HILLIS, Mr. SOLOMON, and Mr. McEWEN.

I feel I need to answer part of what the gentleman from Minnesota said. It was reported that a number of career military personnel would get out of the service if we did not provide educational assistance benefits for them after 1989, the termination date of the Vietnam-era GI bill.

Under the new GI bill that was enacted in 1984, those career service members with eligibility for the Vietnam-era GI bill may participate in a program of education under the new chapter 30 program after December 31, 1989. This program will keep the service personnel in the service.

So instead of forcing them out, under the bill we passed in 1984, we are going to keep them in. The gentleman was really on the wrong track when he said this will force people out of the service.

Also, we have what we call supplemental benefit. If an individual comes into the service on or after July 1, 1985, he is covered under the new GI bill. If he wants to stay in, he can get additional educational benefits that will keep him in the service for another 5 years.

We have a lot of problems with retention in the service. Of the persons who sign up in the military services, in all branches of the services, 35 percent of them never complete their first enlistment. We train them and then they get out. It costs a lot of money. We think the GI bill will keep these people in the service, and therefore, it will cover the cost for educating a young American.

Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. MONTGOMERY] that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 752, as amended.

The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.

The title of the bill was amended so as to read: "A bill to ensure an orderly transition to the new active-duty and Guard and Reserve GI bill educational assistance programs provided in the Veterans' Educational Assistance Act of 1984."

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the bill just passed.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?

There was no objection.

LEGISLATION INTRODUCED TO REQUIRE AMERICAN-FLAG VESSELS TO CARRY U.S. MAIL

(Mrs. BENTLEY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. BENTLEY. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing a bill to require that U.S. mail transported by sea be sea carried on American-flag vessels, because such a requirement is badly needed to help promote our declining U.S. merchant fleet and because our national security is involved.

Historically, the carriage of U.S. mail had been reserved exclusively for American-flag vessels, and this was a tradition for centuries. These provisions were also included in the Merchant Marine Acts of 1928 and 1936, but the requirement has gradually eroded during congressional revisions of the postal statutes.

Finally, this congressional mandate was totally eliminated in 1970, when Congress completely revised postal statutes and created the U.S. Postal Service (Public Law 91-375). No provisions for U.S.-flag preference regarding the carriage of mail was included, and no explanation was given. Despite this omission, the Postal Service continued the cargo preference policy on U.S. mail through a regulation in its postal contracting manual; however, in 1981 the Postal Service deleted this regulation from its manual without any explanation or notice, and without expressing any concern about the adverse impact this action might have upon our national security and our need to maintain a viable merchant fleet.

Mr. Speaker, the national security implications of this situation can best be emphasized by noting that, since 1981 when the Postal Service dropped

its cargo preference requirement, the international transport of U.S. mail by sea has been virtually monopolized by foreign operators, including Soviet bloc vessels. During fiscal year 1983, foreign flag ships were awarded 37 of the 45 contracts let by the Postal Service. Recent information indicates this trend is continuing.

It is bad enough that foreign-flag ships of friendly nations are allowed to carry U.S. mail, but I think it is a national disgrace that the privilege to carry this important cargo is now enjoyed by Soviet bloc vessels. Until recently, a Warsaw Pact operator known as Polish Ocean Lines carried U.S. mail between New York and Bremerhaven, Germany. This is just one example of what has become a common practice: the abdication of this sensitive, essential service to foreign and unfriendly powers.

On many occasions, during times of national emergency—and especially during the Vietnam war—the United States was made painfully aware that it could not depend on foreign vessels to carry vital cargo, so it is important for our Nation to rely upon our own merchant ships and to make certain that we maintain a fleet adequate enough to meet our national defense and economic needs.

The purpose of this bill is to require the U.S. Postal Service to use U.S.-flag vessels exclusively for the international sea transportation of the U.S. mail—unless no U.S. vessels are available at the time; or unless no U.S. vessels can provide service sufficient to meet the actual needs of the Postal Service.

Practically every other major trading nation practices the policy of reserving cargo exclusively for its own vessels, and I think it is now time for the United States to protect and promote its own merchant fleet by shipping American mail aboard American-flag vessels.

THE EAST IS BACK

(Mr. DOWNEY of New York asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, today we will be discussing the MX missile, and we would like to think that the country's thoughts are focused on this debate. It is clear to me that the country is much more interested in the "final four." I want to point out to the Members who are here today something about the final four.

Just one basket kept Boston College from defeating Memphis State and then they would have inevitably defeated Oklahoma, and we would have had four teams from the Big East, ladies and gentlemen, four teams from

the same division in the final four. Incredible. I do not know what this has to do with the MX missile, but I know it has something to do with the fact that the East is back, my colleagues. The East is back. It is where the great basketball players come from, and it is about time that the teams that represent this great portion of the country are represented in the final four.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks]. The "Huskies," Mr. Dicks.

Mr. DICKS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I want to compliment the gentleman from New York. I think I have got this on proper authority, that Patrick Ewing is for release of funding for the 21 missiles.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. He is, but none of the St. John's players are for the MX. We have surveyed the St. John's team and none of them are for it.

TO AUTHORIZE RELEASE OF FUNDS FOR MX MISSILE

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Public Law 98-525, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the House joint resolution (H.J. Res. 180) to approve the obligation of funds made available by Public Law 98-473 for the procurement of MX missiles, subject to the enactment of a second joint resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN).

The motion was agreed to.

□ 1256

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the joint resolution, House Joint Resolution 180, with Mr. NATCHER in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the first reading of the joint resolution is dispensed with.

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to section 110d, Public Law 98-925, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN] will be recognized for 5 hours, and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] will be recognized for 5 hours.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN].

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, is it true that there is an agreement that we will do 6 hours of the total 10 hours of debate today? Is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. ASPIN. So in the debate today there will be 3 hours allocated to me

and 3 hours to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT]; is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understands that that is the agreement between the parties. That is the agreement.

Mr. ASPIN. With that understanding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield half of my time to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON].

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman. It is for that purpose that I rose to my feet to determine what would be the apportionment of the time. That is satisfactory. Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, it is now my understanding that the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] this afternoon has an hour and a half; I have an hour and a half; and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] has 3 hours. Is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. STRATTON].

Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, today we are moving once again into a debate that has been taking place over some 8 years. We have been fighting the battle of the MX ever since the Carter administration in 1977. I think that during that debate, and particularly in the last few months, particularly here in 1985, we have had all kinds of statements on the MX which are, many of them, exaggerated, some of them are demagogic. I would like to begin this particular debate on behalf of those who are in favor of the MX missile, to try to make just a few simple, plain, understandable points.

In the first place, Mr. Chairman, there seems to be an atmosphere that the MX missile is something that has been conjured up by the Reagan administration as some kind of a giant, military extravaganza that has gone far beyond what would be considered appropriate in any national arsenal.

The fact of the matter is that the Carter administration is the father of the MX missile; not the Reagan administration, although it appears, based on the leadership of the House of Representatives and on the statements against the MX that are being made, that it is the Democrats who are opposing the MX missile and who are accusing the Reagan administration of all kinds of chicanery in connection with that missile.

□ 1300

But it was President Carter who recognized, and I think we ought to pay tribute to him for it, that there was a definite imbalance in the land based

nuclear deterrent that existed in the United States in 1977 and the nuclear deterrent land-based in the Soviet Union. As a result of that imbalance it had been determined that with the size of the Soviet arsenal, because of the tremendous throwweight of the Soviet missiles, and because of the fantastic accuracy of the Soviet missiles, the SS-18 and the SS-19, it was theoretically possible for the Soviet Union to wipe out 90 percent of the American land-based arsenal, the Minuteman III, and at the same time have adequate missiles remaining to respond to any counter strike that the United States might throw against the Soviet Union.

So, President Carter requested his newly appointed Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, to travel to Moscow and see if he couldn't get the Soviet Union to do something about the terrific threat posed by the SS-18's and the SS-19's. Secretary Vance is reported to have met with the Soviet leaders in the Kremlin and to have suggested to them that if they would be willing to eliminate the SS-18 and the SS-19 we would withdraw the proposals that had been made in the Pentagon to create a weapon that was a vast improvement over the Minuteman III and to some extent would have the same capabilities as the enormous weapons in the Soviet arsenal, the SS-18 and the SS-19.

The story is told that when Mr. Vance made that proposal to the Soviet leadership in the Kremlin, he was laughed out of Moscow. They said, "Do not be so ridiculous to think that after all of the effort we have gone through and all of the money that we have spent on building these weapons that we are going to destroy them simply on the promise that you will not do something that you say that you plan to do."

I am not sure whether this is correct, but it is reported that Mr. Vance came back to Washington in a state of semishock at the negative response he had received from the leaders of the Soviet Union. It was at that point, with the recognition that the Soviets had no possible intention of joining in eliminating all of these hard-target capable missiles that the Secretary of Defense in the Carter administration Harold Brown a Democrat, a well-respected Democrat, who had distinguished himself as Secretary of the Air Force in the Johnson administration, started down the road that led to the development of the MX missile.

So I think that we ought to recognize that the MX debate should not be a partisan matter. We are dealing with a weapon that was created by a Democratic President. The Carter administration proposed the MX, developed the MX, and then found, as later administrations have found, that the

question of basing the MX was a difficult one. The selected alternative on the part of the Carter administration was what was known as the racetrack; the MX missiles were to be carried around an oblong type of track where there would be deep holes along the way into which each missile could be placed.

The purpose of the racetrack was that the MX missiles would be very hard targets to knock out because the Soviets would not know in which of these holes the missiles were located in at any particular time. This was the multiple protective shelters program [MPS]. The only difference that the Reagan administration made in the MX program when they came into power was that they felt that that racetrack basing was not effective, that there were flaws in it, that it was overcomplicated, and most of all, to be blunt, the States that were scheduled to receive those racetracks, Utah, Nevada, were unwilling to accept the racetrack proposal, and as a result of political considerations, it went down.

Now let me try to explain what heavy land-based missiles, they play in the matter of arms control. There is a generally accepted belief that the best way to achieve arms control is to have first of all a balance between the competing countries. If both countries have basically the same level of weapons, if there is an equality in those weapons, then it will be far more difficult for one side to attack the other side.

□ 1310

That was in fact incorporated in the first arms control developments and negotiations [SALT I] that were carried out under the Nixon administration, in the amendment offered by the late Senator from Washington Senator Henry Jackson, provided that no arms agreement should be concluded that did not include this measure of equality. If you can achieve that equality—and one of the problems of SALT II was that it did not achieve that equality—the next step would then be to reduce the weapons down to lower levels.

That is precisely what the proponents of the MX are seeking to do, to create in place of the Minuteman III—and that is the major part of the U.S. nuclear defense deterrent—to replace the Minuteman III that went into operation some 10 or 15 years ago with a weapon that is equal in its explosive power and also in its accuracy to the SS-18's and the SS-19's of the Soviets. That is what the MX is designed to do. All it does is to make it possible for us to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that we have achieved this equality in land-based missiles.

In fact, to hear some of the people who have lately talked about the MX, one would think that we were building

a vast arsenal of these missiles under the terms of this resolution, a kind of doomsday machine. Whereas in actual fact the Soviet Union, with its SS-18's and its SS-19's, and now moving into SS-24's and SS-25's, has 800 of the MX-type missiles. All we are asking in this resolution, which has been called up by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services for just 21 missiles, with the funds for these 21 missiles to be unfenced under formula developed in the 1985 legislation developed by the Speaker of the House and the then majority leader of the U.S. Senate, Senator Howard Baker.

So what we are proposing today is really nothing more than what the Jackson amendment of prior years required that we do. Notice that we have not even begun to think of trying to match the Soviet Union with its 800 MX-type missiles; we are simply just getting under way in a very modest way.

One of the speeches made here in the well this morning by one of the Members of the House said it was insane for us to spend all of this money, all of these millions of dollars on the MX and then put them in the ground and not use them. But actually all we are dealing with here, as someone else pointed out, in this particular resolution, is \$1.5 billion, a very minor portion of the 1986 defense budget itself.

Let me point out that is what we have always done with our missiles since the nuclear age opened, by putting them into the ground. We put the Minuteman II in the ground and we put the Minuteman III in the ground. We have it now in a number of silos in the Middle West section of the country, and we have never fired a single one of those missiles in anger. But their position in the ground has in fact not been wasted money. It has preserved the peace over the longest period of time in modern history. We have had over 40 years of peace. Shortly after the bomb was dropped on Japan the pundits were predicting that there would soon be another war using these weapons because in modern history, once a new weapon had been developed, it has always been used in short order. But because we put millions of dollars into those Minuteman missiles and put them in the ground that did not mean that this money was wasted because they have preserved this peace that we have enjoyed for such a long period.

I remember some years ago what a member of our committee, the Committee on Armed Services, used to say when we took trips abroad to visit military installations. Occasionally, when our plane would land on a rather primitive airfield, that member would shout out, "Mutual of Omaha wins again." But we were glad to have Mutual of Omaha winning again. Be-

cause then we can live to take another trip to some other airfield. You are glad to have Mutual of Omaha win again.

That is exactly what we have been doing here. What we are doing with the MX is simply modernizing our nuclear land-based deterrent that has preserved our peace and bringing it into conformity with the provisions set down in the amendment provided by the Senator from Washington, the late Senator Jackson.

I believe one other point should be made because there has been a good deal of concern over the fact that our negotiations are going on in Geneva in a sincere effort to try to achieve some kind of an agreement with the Soviet Union. Mr. Chairman, many of the people who have been opposing the MX and who have accused the administration of some kind of chicanery by bringing back the chairman of the negotiating team in Geneva, turn out to be the same people who, in the last election, were criticizing the administration for never having negotiated an agreement on arms control with the Soviet Union. President Reagan was accused of having somehow neglected to achieve an agreement, although none of these critics ever bothered to mention that the Soviets were the ones who walked out of the arms talks. It was not the Americans, it was the Soviets who walked out. Well, now we have finally gotten the Soviets back to the arms talks in Geneva. We have gotten our negotiators in place, a very able crew headed by Ambassador Kampelman, a Democrat. And yet strangely, the same people who urged us to get the negotiations going are now unwilling to pay any attention to what our negotiators have told us, that not to fund the MX would pull the rug out from these negotiations. For the House of Representatives to vote down the MX this week would demonstrate that the Congress of the United States and the President are not united on this important issue to the Soviet side. That would gravely harm our negotiating posture. And we would also be sending a message to the Soviet Union that as far as the House of Representatives is concerned, we are willing to give away this very effective missiles that is designed to equal the heavy missiles that the Soviets have without getting a single concession out of the Soviet negotiators at the bargaining table.

How do we expect to achieve any effective arms agreement without demonstrating that the United States does not intend to do all the giving. We are going to insist on equal strength on both sides, and eliminate the imbalance that currently exists between the Soviets and ourselves.

□ 1320

Let me make two additional points. One is that we heard some remarks on the floor this morning that we needed to increase our jobs, that there are many people who are unemployed. Certainly we all want to do something to help those unemployed; but I would like to emphasize that I put in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a couple weeks ago a detailed list of the jobs that would be created by the MX, the jobs that would be lost if the House of Representatives were to wipe out the funds set aside for the MX and presently fenced for 21 missiles. Thirty-two thousand jobs a year in manufacturing centers in companies from California to the shores of Massachusetts Bay; 32,000 would be lost if the money is voted down. And if the money is approved there will be 32,000 new jobs retained in areas of unemployment, and there are many of these around the country. I don't think any Members can ignore those jobs.

One final point, Mr. Chairman. It seems to me that if we vote this week to fund the MX missile, as the Senate has done on two successive votes, we will be in effect posting on our Nation's borders some of the signs that are similar in many areas in suburban Washington, which read as follows: "Warning: Neighborhood watch. All suspicious activities are reported to 911, the Montgomery County Police."

By funding just 21 minutes, we are putting the Soviets on notice that we intend to defend our turf and protect our citizens. We do not intend to be less alert and less prepared to the threats to our security contained in the SS-18's, the SS-19's, the SS-24's, and the SS-25's.

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. STRATTON. I would be glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I am a little puzzled by the jobs issue the gentleman raises. If we follow that threat of logic, would the gentleman conclude that a successful arms treaty would threaten economic development?

Mr. STRATTON. Well, I think as I said, the most successful type of arms control is when you have an equality of weaponry between the two world powers that are involved. We do not have that equality at the present time and, therefore, it is hard to see how you can have any effective arms control without first having that equality.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may require.

Mr. Chairman, it would be a sad day if this important issue were to be tied

to jobs. Really, I have great difficulty in understanding anybody arguing that you ought to build a nuclear weapon because of the jobs that it produces, when its ultimate end would be to wipe out the lives of many, many people, if it were ever effectively used. I do not think questioning jobs is a way to approach this matter.

Now, since the gentleman from New York has made speeches on this subject, some of my constituents have written to me about this and have urged that maybe I should think several times about trying to end the MX because they did not want to see the jobs end; but really, actually, they do not thoroughly understand my position on this, because they do not realize that what I am trying to do is to see to it that we do not plan to have a nuclear war.

It really is a tragic thing that a country dedicated to higher principles, as is the United States of America, would do what amounts to planning for a nuclear war, and that is what we are doing, because we are seeing to it that we do not have sufficient conventional strength in Europe and our leaders over there have told us that we would be overrun within a matter of days and would have to go to nuclear war.

Now, that is not because we cannot get enough conventional strength. It is simply because we have not appropriated for it and made it available. We have the manpower. We have the resources. We have the money. So we would not have to have a situation of that nature.

We are living in the past. That is what it amounts to. After World War II, we had a monopoly on nuclear weaponry. We could tell the rest of the world that if they did not behave, that we would just drop nuclear bombs on them and they would have to behave. Well, that situation changed when Russia got the nuclear weapon and Russia has exceeded us to some extent in those nuclear weapons; but that is not a question of a problem about encouraging them to war on account of nuclear weapons, because actually they do not want a nuclear war any more than we do.

And actually, there is not going to be a nuclear war unless we ourselves start it, in my opinion, because we are the ones who are most threatening the world by not being strong enough, as we could be, in conventional weaponry in Europe. That is where I would like to see the money from the MX missile go. And it could go very effectively in that field to see to it that we do not have to have a nuclear war; since with these funds for conventional weapons we could actually win a conventional war in Europe.

I would like to address for a moment the question of unity and the question of overall strength and its relationship

to the MX issue. I say this because I have received several letters from the President. I have been invited to the White House. I have been down to the White House and talked to the President orally upon this matter and he has always stressed two things. He has stressed unity and he has stressed the overall strength of our country.

Of course, he could not very well stress a bargaining chip with regard to the MX, because he himself has said that it is not a bargaining chip, and so have the Russians said that it is not a bargaining chip. The Russians said, "We won't go to the bargaining table because of the MX. We might go for other concerns we have, such as the Trident submarine, the cruise missile, and other things of that type, or the SDI, the outer space star wars we are talking about now." And when the star wars mounted its course, then they were willing to go back to the bargaining table, but it was not because of the MX, because they repeatedly said that it is not a bargaining chip, and the President says it is not a bargaining chip. The Secretary of State says that, the Secretary of Defense says that. So why is it then that it is so important with regard to the conversation going on in Europe?

The President explains that by saying that it is a question of showing our overall strength. Well, our overall strength could be better shown by having a strong conventional war power ability in Europe instead of just adding to the redundancy that we presently have with regard to our nuclear ability.

The Achilles heel of our freedom and security today is the degenerate position of our conventional NATO forces in Europe. There is no such tragic failure with regard to strategic weapons at all. Both sides have a great redundancy in the field of nuclear weapons. Neither side can win a nuclear war, regardless of who starts it. And both sides know it.

A more meaningful way to stay strong in 1985 or to become strong would be for the United States to come out for its ability and the ability of NATO forces to adequately fight a conventional war in Europe, thus forestalling a nuclear war, not planning for one.

That could be achieved by building up our conventional weaponry, still retaining our nuclear deterrent, or by reducing the Russian and Warsaw Pact weaponry by some sort of mutual agreement, perhaps also involving nuclear weapons; but it cannot be achieved by building a new, faulty weapon, a very vulnerable weapon.

Why do we not seek a first strike prohibition against each side in both conventional and nuclear weaponry and maintain credible forces in both conventional and nuclear weaponry,

but on a lower scale than we now have? That would be a real thrust for the strength of freedom and the NATO forces and a package that would be good for both the NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations.

The President's letter to me on unity and standing together in a strong national defense got my attention, the one I received this morning. It is one of several that he sent. The answer, however, is not to construct additional nuclear weapons, but to see to it that we do not have to use them at all.

I want to refresh your memory by quoting from what Gen. Bernard Rogers said to us about our status in Europe last year. He has repeated it twice this year, essentially that within days we would have to go to a nuclear war there.

His precise quotation was:

NATO's major weakness is in the conventional leg of the triad * * *. If Allied Command Europe were attacked conventionally, NATO political authorities would face fairly quickly the decision to authorize the release of theater nuclear weapons * * *. Such heavy reliance on early first-use does not provide a credible basis for deterring what I believe to be the most likely threat the Alliance faces: Soviet intimidation and coercion of West European nations resulting from the threat of massive conventional military superiority.

□ 1330

I also read the other day a quotation in the newspaper by the President which really distressed me. It was implied there that those who opposed the MX were in some way less patriotic, and that is implied by other supporters of the MX. It is not my purpose to downgrade the patriotism or courage of anyone. It is my purpose to say, however, that I have yet to meet a person or hear one quoted who has had very much frontline combat experience, and who has been an enthusiast for the MX or still is an enthusiast of the MX. I do not know one. There may be such people, but I have never talked to one personally.

The ones that I have heard speak do not seem to have much enthusiasm for the weapon, the ones who have actually had combat experience. A weapon is supposed to do injury to your enemy. That is what it is supposed to be for. This one is faulty for its vulnerability.

I know that personal references are sometimes in poor taste. I do not claim to be any great hero, but I do think I should share with those who do not know me that I served for 5 years in the infantry in World War II, both as an enlisted man and as an officer. I fought in hand-to-hand combat in New Guinea and in the Philippines. And there I lead about 1,000 guerrillas in combat against the Japanese. I have been awarded the Silver Star, the Bronze Star, and the Filipino Legion of Honor which is the highest award that the Filipinos give to someone who is not a Filipino.

I do not claim any great credit for this, and there are undoubtedly many here in the House of Representatives who have served more and with more distinction than I have, and have done things better for their country, I am sure. But when I read statements made about patriotism and courage for one's country being tied up with support for a faulty, vulnerable weapon it not only disgusts me, it makes me furious.

I am voting "no" on the MX, and I certainly hope that the President is not questioning my patriotism. A "no" vote on a wasteful program should never be construed as anti-American or soft on defense, particularly when you advocate that every penny of it and more yet be spent for conventional weapons in Europe which would prevent a nuclear war.

Weapons are supposed to, as I say, do injury to the enemy. This very vulnerable weapon is much more likely to do injury to ourselves. There are tremendous needs of weapons for our country and they are mostly conventional weapons in Europe where the Warsaw Pact has three times the numbers of tanks, three times the artillery, and twice the armored personnel carriers, for example, and there are many other discrepancies. There is absolutely no excuse for this.

The truth is if Russia decided to march through Europe today it could have Europe within a matter of days unless we retaliated by the use of nuclear arms. What credibility is there to our defense strength in this? And yet the President says to us that we ought to stand for a strong national defense.

I have said very little about the merits of the MX because, admittedly, the debate has shifted away from the merits and the demerits for the simple reason that there are not very many merits to the MX and everybody knows this.

Secretary Weinberger said in his confirmation hearings, and I quote:

I would feel that simply putting it (the MX) into existing silos would not answer two or three of the concerns that I have: namely, that (the location of) these are well known and are not hardened sufficiently, nor could they be, to be of sufficient strategic value to count as a strategic improvement of our forces.

He was joined by Gen. Lew Allen, the head of our Air Force, in similar comments, and even Senator JOHN TOWER, who now heads the delegation at the peace talks in Geneva said, and I am quoting:

By stuffing the MXs into fixed silos, we are creating just so many more sitting ducks for the Russians to shoot at * * *. True, the MX missile itself will be more powerful, more accurate—and we need that kind of weapon. But it is of little use to us unless the Soviets are convinced that it can survive an attack. Without that, the Russians will have no incentive to start serious arms control talks.

I must add that in testimony we had before our committee this year there was talk of strengthening the silos and making them stronger. But there was no talk of a calendar for that and no real talk about a dollar figure for it. I have heard dollar figures mentioned. The best dollar figure I have been able to get on it is something in excess of \$21 billion. That is the lowest figure I have heard. I have heard much higher figures than that. It actually will cost more to put these 100 missiles in hardened silos than to build the missiles, if it can be done at all.

But you know it was intriguing the thing that happened before our Armed Services Committee, which was that a lot of people talked about the hardening of silos, and their vulnerability, because everybody knows they are vulnerable. And what did they say? We had about five people talk and there were five different ways in which they said they were going to be more vulnerable, and they had not even gotten together to discuss it. They had not had a caucus to decide which position they were going to present to the Congress. Finally one man seemed to think that it was all a matter of communications. I never could follow him in that, and that is as hard to follow as some of these things about arms control. These were all different kinds of ideas and they were all on hardening, but it speaks pretty eloquently that nobody estimates the hardening will take place before 1990 and nobody knows how much it is going to cost. But they said at least \$21 billion. And I think the \$21 billion is probably arrived at very arbitrarily because they do not really know how they are going to do it.

What has changed since those quotations that I made? Well, something has changed. All that has really changed is that there is a Machiavellian group of people, a very fine group, but a Machiavellian group of people who obeyed the White House dictate to find a way to produce the MX. They were told to find some way to get the MX and so they combined it with their ideas about arms control, and they put together an absolutely absurd package which Congress regrettably passed. It passed it in a way in which it could be brought to an end, which was done. But, anyway, that is the only reason that it came before us.

The only thing that saves us from that package is the fact that we are voting today to kill it.

I sat with the Scowcroft group when they told senior Members of Congress what the plan was. I did not hear a single person, and these are all personal, intimate friends of mine that I have had over a period of many years, I did not hear a single person say that they really favored the MX. In fact, I heard some of them testify this year

that they do not favor the MX in this basing mode.

Now, they favor, the MX as a missile, as I did in the years in which we were seeking a place to move it around, and we thought we could find one, and that is, to address the gentleman from New York, what Mr. Carter favored. He favored some sort of a way in which it could be protected by moving it around in some way. And when we got down to the fact that the only way in which we could do it was to put it in these particular missile silos, all of the authorities, without exception, without exception, all of the authorities say that it is a mistake. The only thing that saves them is that some time, a decade or so hence from now, they are going to have a way to harden these things. And, incidentally, by the time they get around to hardening them we are going to have Midgetman, because that is supposed to come in in 1990. And nobody suggests that these things are going to be hardened before 1990. They do not know how to harden them, and they expect \$21 billion, that is \$21,000 million, to be spent in doing this if they can do it at all.

So all I heard at this meeting was that the MX could be obtained for the President by putting together some arms control language. That is all I heard. So a combination of two very faulty objectives were put together and passed by the Congress, and the only protection we and the American people and the world have in this matter is that we are now voting on whether or not we are going to kill the MX. This we certainly should do, and end that package, and end all dream of a weapon which is so highly vulnerable and so expensive in this period of history.

I would like to say something about the U.S. Congress as I close these remarks. I will talk later perhaps, if I am stimulated to do so, since not a lot of people are asking to speak today. I love this Congress; I love its roots. I am a student of history and I have written two books about the American Revolution.

One thing is clear, and that is that when our Constitution was drafted a few years after the Revolution, which was conducted 100 percent by Congress, without an executive, just a one-House Congress, and that is who ran the war. When the Constitution was put together they had some thoughts about it. One thought was that they did not want the militia and the Continentals under Washington to be separated as they were during the war. So they gave us the President, they created an executive, and they gave him the power to be the Executive Officer over the military in time of combat. He is the Commander-in-Chief. But they did not dream of giving him the war powers, giving that to the Presi-

dent of the United States. No way. They made that real, real clear. They gave the power to declare war only to the Congress, not to the President. And the Constitution provides in article I, section 8:

The Congress shall have power * * * to raise and support armies * * * provide and maintain a Navy * * * make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces.

Nothing could be clearer than that the framers of the Constitution wanted the Congress to make decisions about war, whether to get into it, and the type of weaponry we should use.

So when you talk about unity, when you had a Congress split almost half and half last year, how does the President come to Congress and say "Be unified by joining me?"

Well, he does not have the authority. The authority rests with the Congress. It is Congress' responsibility to do the very thing on which the President is saying "Join me and be unified."

There is no way you are going to get unified on that because the Congress is not unified behind the thing he wants them to do, and the Congress has the responsibility for it. And the Congress ought to get on with it, in seeing to it that our country is not faced with a nuclear war, as we presently are, because we are not in a position to win a conventional war in Europe.

We ought to hold that truth in our heart. When we stood up to become Members of Congress we put up our right hands and we swore under God that we would uphold the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution is calling on each of us today to reavow that, and vote no on the MX.

The no vote is a vote of common sense. The money saved should be put into conventional weapons in Europe to prevent a nuclear war from occurring.

This is a patriotic vote. It is a patriotic vote that every soldier who has served his country, who has been shot at and has taken life should be proud to cast.

□ 1340

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I would just like to ask a few questions about the gentleman's statement to the effect that the Congress was meant to be independent of the President in weapons programs, developing weapons programs, and was not necessarily to be a yes-man.

Mr. BENNETT. I did not say independent; I said it was their responsibility, not the responsibility of the President.

Mr. HUNTER. I understand that.

Mr. BENNETT. There is a difference.

Mr. HUNTER. You know, in reflecting on the gentleman's statement, I think that we face some new elements today that we did not have in those days. I cannot think of a time when the U.S. Government, whether it is the Congress or the President, through the last several centuries had any arms talks on, for example, reducing or slowing development of repeating firearms, the Gatling gun or anything else.

Mr. BENNETT. The gentleman's memory is not very good, if the gentleman is a student of history, he would realize arms control talks have been taking place since our so-called war with France in the 1790's.

Mr. HUNTER. I would say this, treaties have been taking place.

Mr. BENNETT. I did not say treaties, I said talks about arms.

Mr. HUNTER. I cannot recall any of our arms developers being slowed by government action from developing the most effective weapons, rifles and then machine guns, that they possibly could develop.

Mr. BENNETT. They did not have a prohibition against weapons, no, but they did talk about arms control and that is what I thought the gentleman was talking about.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, if I could continue, today we have a situation in which we have the Geneva talks ongoing right now and they were not timed by this Congress, they were not in fact timed by the President; they were timed by the Soviets. And they happen to be taking place at the same time this vote is coming forth.

I can recall in reading about the last World War, a time when Mr. Churchill had to go before his Congress, if you will, in the middle of the war, after the fall of Tobruk and withstand a vote of confidence against his government.

At a time when he was very much pressed by Hitler's troops and the Nazis were winning victories throughout Europe, Mr. Churchill had to divert his resources from opposing the enemy and had to place those resources into defending his own government.

Mr. BENNETT. I do too; I see a parallel between me and Mr. Churchill.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, we did not time the arms talks, we did not time Geneva. But in fact we have people like Paul Nitze coming before us who are not any part of any Machiavellian gang; he has been an arms control expert and an arms control negotiator for a number of Presidents.

Mr. BENNETT. He was not all that enthusiastic about the MX. The gentleman is really making a speech out of my time so I am going to cut him

off. I liked Mr. Churchill. I met him once; when I came back after World War II and got well enough to go out on the street and start practicing law again my mother said to me: "Well, I am going to see Mr. Churchill."

I said, "Momma, you've never been out of Georgia. Why are you going to see Mr. Churchill?"

She said, "Well, he was such a magnificent man and you and MacArthur and Churchill won that war, I am going to take him 2 dozen fresh eggs," because they had a shortage of eggs in England then. So she did that.

We all worshipped Churchill and just mentioning his name makes all of us feel patriotic about that magnificent man. I am not going to yield to the gentleman further.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. The gentleman has time to make his own speech. I want to follow up with a few words to kind of polish off what the gentleman said because he seems to be implying what I think the President is implying by some of the things he said, at least some of the things he has been quoted on and some of the things which he wrote me about, which have to do with patriotism.

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman will yield.

Mr. BENNETT. I am not going to yield. The gentleman can make his speech on his own time, but I am not going to yield, I am going to make my speech and sit down after I have yielded to him.

The gentleman has plenty of time on his side.

I just do not want to be needled here.

What takes courage today, do you think it takes courage today to vote for the MX? No; what takes courage today is to be opposed to it.

I come from a district which is a very hardnosed strong district about everything about national defense. I am very suspect about this in my district. I will not pick up a single vote with this. A lot of people will question me. I am likely to have an opponent because of it. That takes courage. Being for the MX would take no courage at all. I am doing what I think is courageous and the right thing to do.

Now, I may be wrong, I may be dumb, I may not see it like I ought to see it but I see it as a very vulnerable weapon that is going to cost us over 30 billions of bucks. With that 30 billions of bucks you could put it into conventional warfare and see to it that if we did not win a war at least we would postpone having to go to nuclear war for 6 months in Europe.

In 6 months, if we had 6 months of being able to hold them back in Europe, we would I think be able to get the world to come to a logical conclusion how not to have a nuclear war.

So what I am saying to you, my dear friend, is something that takes courage. I am not saying I am a great courageous person, but I am saying the Lord gave me the opportunity to stand here and talk before the people of the United States and they know, if you do not know, that it takes courage to buck the President of the United States, coming from a district which gets great support from the national defense, and gives a lot to it.

In the gentleman's mind, perhaps, my medals are tarnished, maybe in the mind of the President they are tarnished; maybe they are tarnished, maybe I did not win them. At least I earned the right to speak on the floor of this House.

And I want to tell you something, I feel the MX missile is a waste of money, I think it is taking money away from other places where we ought to have it in our national defense.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] has consumed 22 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON].

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, these pending two votes on the MX Peacekeeper missile are probably the most important two votes we might cast this year. I will rise tomorrow to speak at greater length as to the contribution the MX will make to deterrence. As has been pointed out, we will have a truncated session here on the debate, we have 6 hours today and 4 hours tomorrow.

Today, however, I would like to make some introductory remarks that I hope will help set the stage for the debate. Over the next 2 days you will hear a great deal about stabilizing and destabilizing weapons systems, about systems that have or do not have first-strike capabilities.

This issue before us has everything to do and nothing to do with these issues because the Soviets already possess a destabilizing first-strike capability with 600-plus SS-18 and SS-19 missiles.

The balance of strategic nuclear power that has existed for 40 years has been disturbed, disturbed and upset by the Soviets due to their massive deployment of these missiles capable of delivering a devastating first strike to our retaliatory capabilities.

Stability is the prime reason that we are here today. The President, our Commander in Chief, has determined that this system, the MX, is vital to our national interests and will contribute to stability. It is not coincidental that he has the support of so many Members of Congress. Many of us have seen the same intelligence data that he has seen and have come to the same conclusion as has this President.

We need the MX to stabilize the nuclear balance. In fact, this system has received bipartisan support from the last four Presidents.

Four Presidents have determined that this system is vital to our national interest, Republicans and Democrats alike.

Congress has never denied a President a strategic system he has judged to be in the highest national interest.

Let us make sure the 99th Congress is not the first one to deny the President this system that contributes both to stability and deterrence.

Now, tomorrow and through the balance of this day I am sure we will get into more of the technology involved, the fact that we are not going to put these into hardened silos, that the Soviets have put theirs into hardened silos; but what we must keep in mind, Mr. Chairman, is that since we deployed our last ICBM the Soviets have deployed two new systems, the SS-18 and the SS-19.

The SS-18 has the capability we are talking about putting into the MX.

□ 1350

We debate and they deploy. Not only have they deployed the two systems and put them in place while we talk, they have also gone forward with a new shorter range system called the SS-20. They have averaged one per week since the late 1977, one per week putting a system in place, each with three warheads. They have over 400 SS-20 missiles in place, enough to target every major target in Europe and into Asia.

We talk, they deploy. That is what we are continuing to do now. But aside from the technology involved and aside from the numbers of missiles, this particular vote boils down to a political vote.

Last year the Speaker of this House and the majority leader in the Senate got together and came up with some arguments dealing with our conference on the Defense authorization bill. There were three elements that had to be agreed on. One required this administration to go forward affirmatively and seek arms negotiations talks, and we did this. Another was to go forward with a new concept; a small, mobile missile called Midgetman; and we did that.

And the other was to go forward with the second buy of 21 MX missiles which we fenced in conference. We put a fence around it and said "OK, we will authorize, and we will appropriate this money for these 21 missiles, but we will not authorize you to go into production until we have a vote in the new Congress, and the offhand chance that there might be a new President."

Well, we have gone forward in good faith, and we have set up the negotia-

tions; the talks are ongoing in Geneva; we are going forward with research and development for the small missile, and now it is time to keep the total package and the bargain, and unfence the money that we did fence contingent on these other two things.

So I think it is very essential that we serve notice on the Soviets that yes, we are willing to talk, we are anxious to talk, we are anxious to come to some agreement on arms control, to a build-down in our nuclear forces on both sides, have some sort of verifiable system to show both sides we are willing to do this.

But in the meantime, we are going to do more than just talk. If this Congress serves notice on the Soviets that we are not going to build and deploy this system anyway, there is very little for them to negotiate about, because you cannot get something for nothing.

So I would hope that this Congress in its wisdom and this House in its wisdom will follow the other body and serve notice by unfencing these funds. This will show that we are willing to go forward until the Soviets show us through the negotiation process in Geneva that they are willing to take serious steps toward enhancing stability and doing away with the need to have deterrence on nuclear missiles.

So, Mr. Speaker, I would urge everyone here, all the Members, to vote to unfence the money and let us show a unanimity of purpose and support for the President who, after all, has the ultimate responsibility of setting the course of this country, both as to international relations as well as the defense.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] has consumed 8 minutes.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. ROBINSON].

Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. Chairman and fellow Members of Congress, the military need for the MX is clear in light of the qualitative and quantitative Soviet buildup over the last two decades. The Soviet Union has deployed the latest fourth generation ICBM, the SS-19. This missile is the latest in a line of offensive strategic weapons that the Soviets have fielded since the Kennedy administration, including the SS-18, the largest ICBM in either nuclear arsenal. The SS-18 is twice the size of the MX and is capable of carrying 10 MIRV'd warheads. The only ICBM to be classified as "heavy," the SS-18 is more accurate than the Minuteman, thus gravely endangering our ICBM force; 308 of these awesome weapons have been deployed in hardened silos. Along with these missiles already deployed, the Soviet Union has two even more formidable weapons in development now—the SS-X-24 and the SS-X-25. They are capable of being based in mobile launchers as

well as in hardened silos, thus enhancing the survivability of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. It disturbs me to think that 50 percent of the Soviet nuclear force is less than 5 years old, while 80 percent of the U.S. force is 15 years or older.

Because of the integral relationship between U.S. national security and the strategic triad, the development of the MX is especially crucial. The U.S. triad has, along with U.S. efforts at the bargaining table, been the prime deterrent to nuclear confrontation in the last 30 years. Our triad is comprised of land- and sea-based missiles and strategic bombers. This system is based upon the idea that a diverse, mobile force is more survivable. The dispersal of the U.S. nuclear arsenal presents overwhelming difficulties to Soviet war planners. They would have to track, detect, and destroy the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet; prohibit the launch of land-based ICBM's, and finally, destroy enough U.S. air bases so U.S. bombers could not retaliate. It is easy to see the interdependence of each leg on the others. Each leg of the triad has unique characteristics which require equally unique and well-timed methods of attack in order to defeat them. Each leg of the triad complements the others in terms of survivability. The strength and survivability of each leg merely adds to the strength and survivability of the other two. However, while each leg shares the strengths of the others, they also share the weaknesses. If one leg is weak, the entire triad is weakened.

Today, it is our land-based ICBM's that weaken the rest of the triad. The United States has not deployed a new ICBM since the Minuteman III in the early 1970's. The cost, and time that we must devote to the upkeep and modernization of these missiles grow with every year they remain in their silos. I believe it is more prudent to deploy a new, more accurate, missile—one that we can trust to perform should there ever be a need. As much as I dread the thought of war, I dread even more being held hostage by the nuclear arsenal of another nation, when the means to protect ourselves are in our grasp. An upgraded Minuteman system just cannot provide the same deterrent capability needed to prevent a Soviet attack. The MX provides this capability.

Some have argued that the MX should be abandoned in favor of a small ICBM, the Midgetman. This is worse than skipping MX in favor of Minuteman modernization. The Midgetman exists only on paper, and could not be ready for deployment until the mid-1990's, the MX has been flight-tested and proven capable. As with the triad itself, the Midgetman could be developed to complement the MX, not replace it. The MX will cure the short-term problem posed by our inferior po-

sition to the Soviets in land-based ICBM's.

Another argument posed is that the Trident D-5 missile could serve the same purpose as the MX. Once again, the Trident program could complement the MX, not replace it. SLBM's do not offer the same hard target capability as the MX. Neither do they address the short-term problem of the U.S. lag in ICBM's. Reliance solely on our nuclear submarine force brings us back to the same problem faced in reliance on only two legs of the triad—decreased flexibility, and survivability. The need for a strong land-based ICBM force is obvious. It is the only leg of our triad that has the accuracy to strike hard targets in the Soviet Union. They can be communicated with easily by command authorities. Their time from launch to target is short, and they can be retargeted rapidly. But most importantly, the land-based ICBM is on alert and ready to be launched 100 percent of the time, while our sea based missiles are only alerted about half that time. Bombers will take 12 or more hours to reach their targets. The MX in Minuteman silos would have all of these advantages, as well as being part of an increasingly sophisticated command, control, and communication system that would help ensure that the Soviets could not count on preventing the launch of the MX. The MX is also survivable in terms of the triad as a whole. This fact helps avoid a Soviet first strike. The Soviets know it is not militarily prudent to attack when there is a chance of retaliation. The MX gives us this retaliatory capability.

In October 1984, the 98th Congress voted a moratorium on the \$1.5 billion for fiscal year 1985 MX funding with the hope that this would be an invitation to the Soviets to return to Geneva. There are once again talks in Geneva, but we can't be sure that it was because of the moratorium on funding.

Our changes of achieving an arms control agreement on multiwarhead land-based ICBM's rests on whether the 99th Congress continues funding for the MX. I believe it is first necessary to realize that the MX was not created solely for the purpose of bolstering our aging ICBM's, or for strengthening our triad. It was designed to be an integral player in U.S. long-term arms negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The MX, as part of the overall strategic modernization program, contributes to arms control in two ways. First, it demonstrates to the Soviet Union that the United States is willing to take whatever steps necessary to nullify Soviet superiority in nuclear arms, while not seeking superiority ourselves. It also provides the Soviets

with the chance to move toward an arms control agreement that is equitable for both sides. The MX is not a "bargaining chip" in the ordinary sense of the word. When deployed, it will become an integral part of a greater whole—the strategic triad itself, which is our ultimate bargaining chip. The MX will increase U.S. leverage in Geneva. A "no" vote on MX would send a message to our arms negotiators that we are not willing to support them to our fullest capability. It would also send a message to the Soviets that we are unwilling to stop their unprecedented advances and buildup. Finally, a no vote on the MX would project divisiveness instead of the bipartisan unity that is especially needed now.

The role of the MX in the renewed START talks is based in a long held truth that it is far easier to negotiate from a position of strength. Because the MX will eliminate the imbalance that exists in ICBM's, the U.S. position in Geneva will improve. Simply put, a fraction of the Soviet ICBM force can effectively threaten the entire number of U.S. land-based missiles. Without the MX there is no incentive for the Soviets to agree to a reduction in ICBM's. They realize that we cannot strike their hardened targets. This is the heart of the problem. The deployment of the MX would put Soviet silos at risk, but would not give the United States a clear cut superiority.

There is no historical precedent to lead us to believe that the Soviet Union will unilaterally agree to arms reductions without our deployment of, or at least the threat of the deployment of, a modern, accurate, survivable missile. The Soviet Union respects only strength. They have shown this time and time again through history. It is generally agreed that the countries in the Eastern bloc could have been freed if the allies had presented a united front in the postwar years. Soviet movements into Afghanistan, Central America, and Africa could have been prevented, or at least mitigated, had the United States shown strong resolve to halt Communist expansion. The United States and the Soviet Union are not the only historical examples of this lesson. Nazi Germany could have been halted, had the allies not consented to Hitler's wishes. How long must we stand aside and watch the Soviets advance their cause at the cost of freedom around the globe. The United States has a duty to protect its interests around the world. We cannot let ourselves be constantly constrained by the fear of the awesome Soviet nuclear arsenal. We should not seek superiority, but parity. The type of parity that has kept the world from nuclear conflict for 30 years.

□ 1400

In closing, I believe our duty is clear. The time has come to put this issue behind us. We have hesitated far too long. This body has a great history of making difficult decisions. We must continue this trend by voting for the MX missile. I, for one, intend to do just that. Since the dawning of the modern nuclear age, the United States has depended on its strategic nuclear triad for protection. In playing partisan politics, we have, in effect, weakened our defense.

Let me close by saying something. It was referred to earlier that it does not take any courage to vote for the MX missile. Well, let me tell you something: When I see all of my distinguished powerful colleagues, some of them, if not most of them, what I call the real powerhouses in some circles, opposing the MX missile, it takes courage for a freshman to walk on this floor and stand tall for America. This is what this vote is all about. It is about doing what is right for America. This is not a vote on the budget. This is not a vote for or against the President. This is not a vote for or against the Democratic or Republican leadership. This is a vote for America. This is a vote for my children and your children and their secure future.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota [Mr. DORGAN].

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Let me thank the gentleman from Florida for providing this time.

Let me say that I listened intently to his opening remarks, and I thought that they were extraordinarily thoughtful remarks about a very complex subject. There was not much sloganeering or that sort of thing. He described why he took the position he did on the MX missile. The gentleman from Florida has taken leadership on the floor of this House to vote against a strategic weapons program called the MX. I am going to vote the same way, for my own reasons, many of which match the reasons of the gentleman from Florida. But let me say I appreciate the leadership the gentleman has given.

Now, I come from a State that has a lot of armaments. We have two strategic air command bases, one slated for B-1's, the other, for cruise missiles; both have B-52's and KC-135's. We have 300 underground Minuteman III missiles with advanced MK-12A warheads. We know something about arms in North Dakota. We are ground zero, as a matter of fact, because of the prime targets in our State.

But I am here to oppose the MX missile today because it does not make any sense. I cannot endorse throwing billions of dollars that we do not have at a weapon system we do not need, one that will provide nothing in the

form of additional security for this country.

In the early 1980's we heard President Reagan say one of our problems is that we have a land-based missile system that is vulnerable to Soviet attack. Well, now several years later the President is saying, "What I would like you to do, Congress, despite a \$1.7 trillion national debt and another projected deficit this year of \$180 billion to \$200 billion, I want you to come up with some \$14 billion more so you can build a bigger missile with a bigger bang and more accuracy and put it in the missile silos that I have told the American people are vulnerable to Soviet attack."

Is that going to frighten the Soviets, that kind of an arms program? Are the Soviets going to get upset by the American people spending money they do not have for a missile they do not need and putting that missile in a silo that is vulnerable?

Oh, no, I do not think so. I think the Soviets would see the same sort of illogic in that argument that some of us in Congress do.

Now, we have a nuclear triad, as the previous gentleman described. We have a sea-based strategic force, we have an air-launched strategic force, and we have a land-based strategic force. We have a very strong nuclear triad. And you listen to the debate on some of these issues and you start getting a little frightened because you have people come to the well of the House here that suggest somehow that America is a second-class power, somehow we do not have the nuclear strength to put at risk the Soviets in the event that they would launch a nuclear attack. That is nonsense. Of course we do. We are far stronger than the Soviets, far stronger than the Soviets in overall strategic strength. We have a much stronger triad than they do. And they know it.

That triad defends this country. We do not need to build another land-based, multiple-warhead missile to defend this country, especially one that defies logic, such as the MX.

Well, the President says, now, the reason we have to vote for the MX is we are at the bargaining table in Geneva. Six months ago the President said the reason we had to vote for the MX was the need to get the Soviets to the bargaining table. Now we are back here, 6 months later, and the President says the reason we need to vote for the MX is because the Soviets are at the bargaining table.

Now, I do not quite follow the President's logic. It is not unusual. That has been true on a number of things. The President says the route to deficit reduction is to spend more money on the military and reduce taxes. It did not make any sense to me. It does not to most people.

□ 1410

I do not understand his logic on the MX missile either. Why spend money we do not have for something that we do not need and put it in holes that he said were vulnerable?

Let us analyze the MX. Mr. STRATTON said, I think correctly, that the MX has a better component of accuracy. I accept that. Of what value is that at this point? Well, I assume, based on the remarks that I have heard that if we have a missile with a higher component of accuracy, we can put at risk a Soviet silo. Now, would those who want to put the Soviet silo at risk want to put at risk an empty silo? No, I expect that they are talking about putting at risk a Soviet silo that has an SS-18 or an SS-19 housed in the silo.

Does that suggest to you as it does to me that there are people talking about first-strike potential? Of course it does. What else can they be talking about? Can anyone in America describe to me conditions under which America would launch a first strike? If so, I would like to hear it today during this debate. Anyone? Can anyone describe a reason that we want to develop a first-strike nuclear capability? I bet they cannot. I bet you will not hear it during this debate.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from North Dakota [Mr. DORGAN] has expired.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 additional minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. BENNETT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a point if I may. That is, there is a lot of confusion in the public about first strike, and he is referring to first strike. First strike is, technically speaking, the ability to knock out the opponent so that he cannot return fire. There is a difference between that and being the first to use nuclear weapons.

Our President, the Scowcroft Commission, and the leaders of our military have said that we will use the nuclear weaponry first. We have repeatedly said that. That is not a first strike; that is "the first use of" nuclear weapons.

As between first strike and "first use of," obviously, the most immoral of those two is the "first use of." First strike merely means that you are going to wipe them out so that they cannot come back at you. "First use of" means you are going to be the first to use this weapon which would plunge this world into a chaos.

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. I thank the gentleman for yielding the additional time.

Mr. Chairman, I understand the gentleman's point, and that distinction is raised by those who are experts in arms control. In my judgment, in large respect, it is a distinction without a major consequence. I think most of us on this floor understand that if there is any kind of nuclear attack, if there is any kind of a nuclear strike at all, we are not going to have a civilization.

Nuclear war must be prevented. We cannot survive one. There is not a survivable or a winnable nuclear war. There will not be a limited, survivable nuclear war. Those are the terms that have not only surprised me, but very much frightened me in the last several years as they have been bandied around this town.

Let me conclude by talking about something that is also important. We are talking about a weapons program that I think adds nothing to this country's security. If I thought it did, I probably would be inclined to support it. I do not think the MX can be demonstrated to provide anything in addition to this country's present security and present strength. But it can significantly weaken this country. If we stopped the MX missile program today, a program we do not need, we save \$14 billion.

Let me ask the American people what they think threatens this country. Well, there are a number of things, one of which most of the American people understand, is a Federal deficit that is out of control. A Federal deficit that this administration and this Congress cannot seem to manage. Fourteen billion dollars of additional spending is what we are talking about for a missile we do not need.

Where are the stout-hearted men and women who continue to talk daily about the need to save money; about the need to restrain Federal spending? Where are they when we talk about the MX missile, a missile we do not need? They are nowhere around because to oppose something like the MX missile, which some sort of wrap in the flag and say, "You must support it because it is patriotic to do so," to oppose that puts them at risk politically.

Look, in my judgment, the risk politically, and the risk economically to this country is to continue spending blindly on these kinds of projects that we do not need and increase the Federal deficit which mortgages this country's future and chokes America on red ink. That is one of the dangers to this country that we must address.

Let us begin addressing it when programs come to this floor of this House that we do not need by saying "no" to those programs; "no" whether they are domestic or military programs.

I have said before and I say again, I sometimes think that this administration wants to do anything the Soviets do; it does not matter whether it is

smart; it does not matter whether it is poor judgment. They just want to do what the Soviets do. If our intelligence community found tomorrow that the Soviets were going to resurrect the cavalry unit, we would have this President requesting that we go out and buy a million horses. Just as long as the Soviets are doing it, we want to be sure we are doing it.

What we ought to do is invest carefully in defense systems we need and defense programs that work. If we make those kinds of investments, careful investments, that make this country strong, we are going to prevail, we are going to prevail against our adversaries around the world.

But if we throw money away because someone believes if we vote no on these sort of boondoggles, we are not standing tall, we are not going to prevail. Standing tall means making the right decisions at the right time, and this MX missile, I swear to you, is not the right decision because we do not need it and we do not have the money to build it; it is just that simple.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Does the gentleman believe that it is in our national interest to have a nuclear deterrent?

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. I appreciate the question. Absolutely. There is not anyone in the House, in my judgment, that does not believe we do not need a nuclear deterrent.

As I indicated earlier, we have a triad that is the strongest nuclear deterrent in the history of civilization. Let me just comment about the gentleman's comment about jobs. This is not a jobs program. We are talking about spending \$14 billion.

Mr. STRATTON. The gentleman said that he believes in a nuclear—

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. I have not yielded to the gentleman.

Mr. STRATTON. Well, I yielded to the gentleman.

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. And I yielded to the gentleman from New York for a question as he did to me.

I am saying in response to the gentleman, yes, I believe in a nuclear deterrent. I believe in one that really does deter and one that really does work, and one that is cost-effective.

Mr. STRATTON. Do you think we ought to have an old-fashioned nuclear deterrent or should we have an up-to-date one? That is the real issue.

The Minuteman III is out of date.

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. I reclaim my time, Mr. Chairman.

That is not an issue at all. There is no question here about up to date or out of date; we live with 300 underground Minuteman missiles with the

most modern nuclear warheads this country has at this point. That is a deterrent; that is part of a strong triad that has prevented nuclear war.

Now, what we have to talk about is real arms reduction. When people say to me the only way to reduce arms is to increase them, I say that does not make any sense.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER].

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman who just spoke talked about how the MX could not concern the Soviets. I will tell you one thing that has not concerned the Soviets, it is the fact that they have built, since 1972, over 800 SS-17's, SS-18's, and SS-19's as opposed to the United States building and deploying no new missiles.

They built over 200 Backfire bombers, long-range strategic bombers. We have built and deployed no new bombers. I think we have rolled out a couple of B-1's; we are not using them yet. They built 38 ballistic missile submarines; we have a total of 5 Tritons in the water, the last one on sea trials. It is not even capable of operations yet. That deteriorating situation will not deter the Soviet Union.

You know, it is interesting to sit here and to listen to the MX missile being described as a "pet project" of Ronald Reagan that does not have the consensus of any expertise, real expertise, in the defense community behind it. That is absolutely untrue, and I think the gentleman who just spoke would admit it if he looked at the facts.

Here you have Melvin Laird, former Defense Secretary for the United States; Harold Brown, former Defense Secretary for the United States; James Schlesinger, former Defense Secretary for the United States; the Scowcroft Commission; a blue-ribbon panel of some of our best minds in the country, all supporting the MX. In fact, there are few weapons systems that have been developed, conventional or strategic, that have had as much of a consensus as the MX has behind them.

Let me address, very briefly, the survivability argument. There is an argument made that the MX is not survivable in and of itself, and therefore, we should not build it. I would argue back that if that is now the criteria and the new standard for going forth with strategic systems, then practically nothing should be built. Because strategic systems operate in the context of the triad, and it is true, that all of our ICBM's, not just the MX, but also the Minutemen are not, in and of themselves, survivable. They could be knocked out with part of the strike force that consists of 308 SS-18 missiles that the Soviets presently have.

□ 1420

But the facts are that it will take 30 or 40 minutes for that force to arrive in the United States, and that would give the United States sufficient warning, for our bombers to escape. By the same token, if SLBM's were launched at our bombers, because the Soviet SLBM's presently do not have that hard-target kill capability, our ICBM's would be able to escape.

So the triad forms a deterrent that is much stronger than the sum of the three parts of the triad taken separately.

Let us go a little further. Bill Perry, who was Under Secretary for Research and Development for the Department of Defense, told this committee some time ago that he could not guarantee the survivability of our submarines beyond the 1990's. So if you are really talking about survivability about one single part of the triad, it appears at least that at some time in the future even our submarines may well be at risk.

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNTER. Let me make a few more points and then I will be happy to yield. Let me make another point on the bargaining chip argument.

People talk about whether or not the MX missile should be considered a bargaining chip. In fact, if all of our systems are negotiable, and I think the President of the United States has said everything is on the table and we look forward to the time when we can reduce and do away with all nuclear weapons, everything is negotiable, everything is a bargaining chip, whether you are talking about bombers or heavy missiles or SLBM's. We look forward to that time. We do not build these missiles only so we can use them. We do not feel we are only going to be satisfied if we are going to be able to use them. We look forward to the time when we can reduce every part of the triad.

So if you define bargaining chip as being something that is negotiable in return for a quid pro quo from the other side, everything is a bargaining chip. But remember the term "quid pro quo," because we sat here and listened to Arkady Shevchenko, who was at one time Mr. Gromyko's deputy before he defected to the United States, and we asked him about MX missiles.

Mr. MAVROULES asked him, "Will it make or break the arms talks if the MX missile is killed?" and Mr. Shevchenko said, "My short answer is no."

Then I asked him if we should do away with it, and he said we should not unilaterally do away with the MX missile. He said if you unilaterally give up something, the Soviets will only escalate their demands. And he talked about the time when it, looked like Congress was going to hang tough on

the ABM, and we got an ABM treaty out of it because we showed we are willing to go to production, not because we were willing to cut a system unilaterally.

So we cannot cut a system unilaterally. So everything is a bargaining chip. Let us take that point up front.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. HUNTER. I will be happy to yield in just a second, and I will yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts first.

Let us talk about Geneva. Whether we like it or not, and I think we should like it, we are in Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] has expired.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 additional minutes to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this additional time.

Mr. Chairman, we should appreciate the fact that our President has negotiators in Geneva right now. If anybody can say, after having Max Kampelman come back and put his prestige behind the MX missile, after having Paul Nitze sit before us and say, "Do not give up the MX missile," and after all of the other arms negotiators who testified before us, can anybody really say that that is not going to affect the prestige of the President of the United States or the perception that the Soviet Union has regarding our resolve?

Maybe it is bad luck, bad timing, that Geneva should come up, that the Soviets should want to come to be bargaining table at the time when the MX missile is coming up, but I would like to ask my colleagues to remember, the Soviets did not make the MX missile being knocked out a condition of their coming to the bargaining table. But in fact, the President's prestige is on the line, and if Mr. Shevchenko is right, then the Soviets will escalate their demands if we give up the MX missile.

Let me just make one or two other points. According to some of our experts, in nonacoustic ASW, antisubmarine warfare, and I am talking about the survivability of our submarines, the United States now ranks fifth behind the Soviets, the Germans, the British, and the Canadians, and I would give this information to my friends who think that the sea-based leg of our triad, our ballistic missile submarines, are in fact going to take the place of our land-based systems and perhaps our air-based systems.

Let me finally say that if we unfence the MX funds, we will give our negotiators a solid start in Geneva. If we do not unfence the MX funds, the Soviets will renew their perception that they

have had for a long time that the United States is not capable of formulating a bipartisan foreign policy. And incidentally, when I spoke to the gentleman from Florida, I was not attempting to tarnish his medals; I was simply saying there is a time when our foreign policy should go forth from these shores in a single voice. There is a time when Congress should stop fighting with the President. There is a time when Congress should fight with the President. This is not that time. There is a time when Congress should stop fighting with the President and when we should stand behind him and we should go to Geneva united, and I would yield to my friend, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MAVROULES].

Mr. MAVROULES. I appreciate my friend from California yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to talk to the gentleman about two points he made, and the gentleman is absolutely correct that this weapons system did not start with President Reagan, but it had the support of other Presidents and other Secretaries of State. But I might remind the gentleman that if he is going to use that argument, it does not wash water because we have three Presidents who supported the SALT II agreement, and we had four or five Secretaries of State who supported the SALT II agreement, and it was this President when he was campaigning who campaigned against it. So it just does not hold water.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, let me take my time back and tell the gentleman the reason I said that was because I saw the implication in one of the former speeches that somehow this was Ronald Reagan's brainchild and that he had a wild idea one day and went out and built an MX missile. That is not accurate. It has been a missile that has been in development for a long period of time, and it has had the consensus of a number of Secretaries of Defense behind it.

Mr. MAVROULES. If the gentleman would yield further, I am going to have some time later, Mr. HUNTER, and if you want to, I will yield to you, the other point I want to make, and you are absolutely correct that if we do not continue research and development on the nuclear submarines and nuclear missiles, of course they are going to be vulnerable in 5 to 10 years. But the point is, we want to make it known here as part of this discussion that we are improving those areas also so that maybe 5 or 10 years from now they are not going to be vulnerable. We are spending billions of dollars in that area to improve that system. Am I correct?

Mr. HUNTER. You are not correct in the sense that when Bill Perry, our Under Secretary for Research and Development, said "I cannot guarantee the survivability of the submarine leg

of our triad beyond 1990," he was taking into consideration that, yes, we are continuing to spend money in that area. He did not say, "I cannot guarantee it if you do not spend another dollar."

Mr. MAVROULES. If the gentleman will yield further, the testimony that I listened to was that "we can guarantee it for 5 or 10 more years, but if we do not continue the research and development, the qualitative edge, then we could be in trouble." But now we are doing that.

Mr. HUNTER. Let me just respond briefly to my friend. The message that I saw in Bill Perry's statement, was that even in making the advances that we are making, and even in spending the resources that we are on the submarine leg of our triad, the Soviets are in fact closing the qualitative gap anyway.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNTER. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from New York.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman raised an important point in discussing the synergism that exists right now about the fact that Soviet submarines are not capable at this juncture of attacking both bombers and missiles simultaneously.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] has again expired.

Mr. HUNTER. I ask the gentleman from Alabama for 2 additional minutes.

Mr. DICKINSON. I am committed on time. Let the gentleman from New York get the time from the opponents.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER].

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. If the gentleman will yield further, does the gentleman foresee a day when the Soviet submarines will have missiles accurate enough to strike both bombers and land-based missiles simultaneously?

Mr. HUNTER. I would tell the gentleman that I am sure that the Soviet Union is moving forward on developments to make all of their missiles more accurate, and some day they will probably have the equivalent of a D-5 missile.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. The gentleman is a member of the committee and has thought about this, but how would the gentleman propose that we structure our force to prevent the Soviets from having the capability, from their sea-based leg of the triad, from destroying both land-based missiles and bombers simultaneously?

Mr. HUNTER. I think that the gentleman is aware of the fact that we are moving forward with the MX missile, and at the same time we are moving

forward with the Midgetman missile, which as the gentleman from Arkansas said essentially exists only on paper right now, but we are moving into what I would call a mobile/deceptive mode.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. In the land-based system.

Mr. HUNTER. That is right. But I would remind my friend that since 1972, we have talked a lot about building a lot of things. The only thing that makes any difference to the Soviets is what is really built, and they have built and deployed 758 SS-17's, SS-18's, and SS-19's compared to zero missiles being built and deployed by the United States since 1972.

□ 1430

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further to me?

Mr. HUNTER. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, the reason I asked the gentleman the question is it seems to me we often look for technological fixes or the building of a new system to prevent our forces from becoming more vulnerable. To a certain extent that is necessary and appropriate. But the Soviets someday will continue to modernize their submarine ballistic force and be capable of destroying both land-based missile systems, including mobile Midgetman and our bombers.

The way to prevent that is to prevent the Soviets from acquiring that technology, and the way to prevent the Soviets from acquiring that technology is not to continue the process of escalating the arms race, but to recognize that if you freeze the systems, theirs and ours, where they are, you will have attained a great deal of security.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] has expired.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER].

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNTER. Let me just respond briefly, and then I will yield to the gentleman from Michigan for a question.

Mr. Chairman, let me just say that if the gentleman is sincere about reducing armaments, the best thing we could do right now is to allow foreign policy to go forth from these shores with one voice and to support the MX missile and to support the President during these arms negotiations and hope that his negotiators can achieve some of the reductions the gentleman has spoken of.

Mr. Chairman, I now yield to my friend, the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The gentleman was right when he stated that past Presidents and past administrations have supported the development of the MX missile, but I think we can also agree clearly from the facts that over the years there have been over 30 basing modes discussed, and no past President, while he was in office—and certainly not the last administration—supported, nor does that past President support today, nor do many of the leading experts that were discussed by the gentleman from California support the MX missile in the Minuteman silos, hardened or not, because of the lack of survivability.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, let me simply answer the gentleman and tell him that of all the arms experts we have listened to and who have testified before our special panel, most of the experts support the Scowcroft Commission recommendation to put MX into existing silos. And let me say simply one more time that it is not our task to say that each individual piece of the triad, the submarines, the bombers, and the missiles, have to independently be invulnerable.

I have explained how, although they can in fact launch on our missiles with their SS-18's, our bombers would have a chance to escape from their bases. And we have exactly that situation with the Minuteman today.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, since we have been given the time to clarify the issue here, I wonder if the gentleman will yield further?

Mr. HUNTER. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, let us make it clear, though, that there are many experts, including past Presidents, who clearly do not support, and never did support, putting the MX missile in a Minuteman silo.

Mr. HUNTER. Absolutely. I think that Mr. Carter supported the mobile system that would run around a race-track in Nevada.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. NICHOLS].

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Chairman, this Nation, this Government, this Congress, and this House have probably lavished more time, attention, and debate on the question of whether to build and deploy a new intercontinental ballistic missile than on any other single national security issue in history. I am not sure the MX deserves all this attention. Contrary to myth, it is among the least costly of our major weapons programs. Moreover, in light of the Soviets' deployment of hun-

dreds of "MX-type" ICBM's, the small number of missiles that the U.S. plans to deploy cannot be considered by any objective observer to be an escalation of the arms race or an attempt by the United States to field a force threatening the Soviet Union with a first strike.

Recently, President Reagan commented that if the MX had been called the Minuteman IV; that is, an upgrade of our present 15-20-year-old ICBM force, it would have been built and deployed long ago. Last fall, I visited a Minuteman missile site and, as a result of that visit, I believe that we should suspend all of the rhetoric and view the MX, in terms of its military role, as the President suggested. The fact is that the Minuteman missiles are aging rapidly. At some point we will begin to lose confidence in their reliability and, as a result, the intercontinental ballistic missile leg of our strategic deterrent will be degraded. Replacing the Minuteman missiles would require an expenditure comparable to the cost of the MX. Consequently, it makes good sense to deploy the MX to replace some of the Minuteman missiles.

Some critics have claimed that the MX cannot replace the Minuteman because it cannot be maintained and operated in the Minuteman silos. Having inspected a Minuteman silo inside and out, I can answer this allegation: It is entirely feasible to deploy the MX in Minuteman silos.

Consequently, I believe that those who are interested in sustaining the viability of our strategic deterrent forces and at the same time ensuring the highest possible chance of achieving successful arms control negotiations will support the MX when the vote comes up tomorrow. After all, that was the game plan recommended by the Scowcroft Commission and accepted by the President and the Congress.

MX is needed, as pointed out by that Commission, to strengthen our strategic forces by finally placing the Soviets' most advanced missiles at risk. The Commission saw this as a necessary condition for its ultimate objective, creating the conditions under which arms control negotiations might begin to make progress toward a more stable strategic environment in which each side would agree to reduce the number of large missiles and move toward smaller, less threatening single warhead weapons.

In the absence of the MX in the U.S. arsenal, the Scowcroft Commission was skeptical that the Russians could be persuaded to agree to reduce their MX-capable missiles.

Mr. Chairman, I find the reasoning I have just recounted just as persuasive today as it was when this body first accepted it as the rationale for approving MX deployment. I ask my col-

leagues to reaffirm the support of this House for the MX.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. TRAFICANT].

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I rise today as a freshman after listening to all the original discussion. I am very proud to have heard the words of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] and the stand he has taken.

It seems that this MX debate has gotten down to the point that if you do not support the President, you are not patriotic, and if you are a Democrat, you are weak. I do not buy that.

The more I hear talk about jobs, it sort of makes me laugh. The district I represent has the worst unemployment problem in all of America. This country needs a jobs program but not an escalation of the nuclear arms race to accomplish the goal of jobs. I am very proud to hear the remarks and the stand that has been taken so far, and I would like to make my position clear as a newcomer to this Congress and add it to the types of rhetoric that have been heard so far.

In a Newsweek magazine article comparing the strength of both the United States of America and the Soviet Union, they compared 28 major weapons systems categories. Of those 28 major weapons systems categories, America was superior in 9, was equal to or had a lead in 15, and trailed the Soviet Union in but 4 weapons category systems. There was not one American military expert who was questioned who would trade the position of the United States militarily for that of the Soviet Union.

We have come down to a point as Democrats of apologizing for our position. I do not believe that there is any citizen out there who gave a mandate to this President to escalate the nuclear war. They like him, and let us not be confused about it. He will stand and look you in the eye and give you his position. America likes that, and that is certainly commendable. But for us now to take that position of his popularity and spill it over into America's position on the nuclear future of this country would be catastrophic.

The MX is a "sitting duck." Without mobility, there is no defense. I believe the speakers on both sides so far have stated that, and we understand that.

□ 1440

This President himself stated that this program was not a bargaining chip; so the arguments on it, in my opinion, are rather ludicrous.

I think what is most important to me as a freshman is trying to decipher, to distill, and digest all the information you have to make an important decision. Certainly we do not want to sell the President down on an important position; but this country is

being sold a bill of goods that bigger is better. I think President Eisenhower warned us himself that America would become a military nation by its spending, and we have become that. That cannot be argued. That is a fact.

We are no closer to peace than we were 4 years ago. I believe now it is time for America to meet with Mr. Gorbachev. I do not believe the Russians are crazy and want to explode and detonate the world. I do not believe that any bargaining position is enhanced by having a big hammer. It usually makes your adversary rather mad.

Our strength is unquestioned and for all the debate over this particular missile, which would give somebody looking in to believe that America's strength is not what some might report it to be, would not be very wise for them to accept that position; but America's strength is in its people and in seeking freedom, not in its position to continue to escalate a nuclear race.

I want to also now include statements of James Kilpatrick, written March 24, yesterday, in the Akron Beacon-Journal. The fundamental question he poses is:

Does the United States now possess a sufficient retaliatory capacity to deter the Soviet Union from launching an attack?

The truth is that the United States now possesses a nuclear arsenal sufficient to destroy the Soviet Union altogether—its cities, its refineries, its transportation system, its power generating plants, its military bases.

There is no question of that. I believe it is time now for America to give peace a shot, not with a hammer, but with mutual consent: Two rational parties to sit down and seek peace, not to try to hammer out peace by having a bigger weapon.

There was a time when America was prepared to overcome the narcotics problem by creating a super drug. Now we are going to overcome our defense problems by creating a super weapon.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio has expired.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 1 more minute.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I believe our position should be clear. I believe the Soviet leaders, whatever their flaws or the interpretation by the American people, that they are not lunatics. They love their country and their homeland, too, and faced with the proposition of destruction, I do not believe they are going to opt to push a button, nor should I believe that our dialog here today should be one that could be misconstrued that we would as well.

I think our position is clear. I am proud of the position I have taken. I do not particularly feel that there is any lack of patriotism in anybody who questions this particular spending. It does not cut it. It is a sitting duck and it does not help America. If we discuss those issues and put those issues on

the line and tell it like it is, it cannot be denied. It is not a time for a parochial fight. If you want to create a jobs program, I am for it a 100 percent and I would hope you would rise with it. I would not only help to support it, I would help to write it with you.

Mr. Chairman, I include the article from the Akron Beacon-Journal, as follows:

MX BARGAINING CHIP IS A BUST

(By James J. Kilpatrick)

WASHINGTON.—The House of Representatives will be voting this week whether production of the MX intercontinental nuclear missile should be continued. Last Tuesday, the Senate said yes. The House should say no.

Three reasons alone add up to a compelling case against continued investment in the MX. The first has to do with retaliatory capacity, the second with the problems of the MX itself, the third with alternatives to pouring more money into nuclear arms. A fourth argument more persuasive than all the rest, is that the likelihood of a nuclear war has become so remote that its possibility no longer should dominate defense planning.

The threshold question that has to be met in any discussion of new strategic weapons may be simply put: Does the United States now possess a sufficient retaliatory capacity to deter the Soviet Union from launching any attack? If the answer is no, then perhaps a case could reluctantly be made for continuing the hemorrhage of public funds in this area. If the answer is yes, as many informed observers believe, then the MX cannot be justified.

The truth is that the United States now possesses a nuclear arsenal sufficient to destroy the Soviet Union altogether—its cities, its refineries, its transportation system, its power generating plants, its military bases. Our Minuteman missiles may be vulnerable and our bombers may be aging, but given the will to retaliate—and few would doubt that Ronald Reagan possesses that will—the United States still retains the capability of wreaking awesome destruction upon an enemy. At some point, enough is enough. We have reached that point.

What is to be done with the 21 MX missiles voted by the Senate? The answer appears to be that we will "superharden" the existing Minuteman silos and house the new supermissiles there. But expert opinion is sorely divided on the feasibility of this approach. Unlike a submarine, a silo stays put; its location can be targeted to the last millimeter. Before the folly of the MX is compounded by the folly of silo deployment, surely renewed thought should be given to some form of mobility.

The argument that carried the Senate, convincingly put forth by Mr. Reagan, was that to abandon the MX would cut the legs from under the negotiating table in Geneva. A no vote would send the wrong signal. The MX must be preserved as a bargaining chip.

But a bargaining chip ceases to be much of a bargaining chip when this argument is so publicly pursued. If we mean to wage a nuclear war with the Soviets, and the MX is essential to survival, then the MX has to be produced. It becomes non-negotiable. Talk of a "chip" dissipates the seriousness of our supposed determination.

No one knows—no one can know—what the MX missile system ultimately may cost. Congressional testimony estimates the price

of each missile at \$74 million; the superhardening could range from \$100 million to \$180 million per silo. We are talking of squandering billions and billions of dollars in tax funds, merely to achieve some temporary enhancement of a destructive capacity that is more than sufficient already.

Rep. Charles Bennett, D-Fla., recently remarked upon the alternative to continued nuclear production. If the \$13 billion that has been allocated to the MX since 1974 had been channeled to conventional arms instead, our armed forces could have acquired 840 M-1 battle tanks, 716 Bradley fighting vehicles, 144 Apache attack helicopters, 180 F-16 fighter bombers and 48 F-15 fighter jets. All of these have been requested by the Pentagon for the coming fiscal year.

Surely it makes more sense to prepare for wars that likely will be fought than to prepare for an improbable cataclysmic conflict.

My own serene conviction, for whatever it may be worth, is that no nuclear war will ever be waged. This conviction rests upon the observation that Soviet leaders, whatever their flaws, are not raving lunatics. They love their homeland as we love ours, and in a showdown they will not risk its destruction. The time to stop this nuclear arms race is now. The House should say so this week.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 11 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. COURTER].

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the Chair and I thank the gentleman from Alabama.

I yield to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON].

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The previous speaker made some pretty strong remarks and I think that the people of this country have the right to choose who they want to believe regarding this very, very important issue. The President in a report to Congress on March 4, 1985, had this to say:

My report also concludes that Peacekeeper is an essential element of our arms control strategy. Without the Peacekeeper, our chances of reaching an equitable agreement with the Soviet Union to reduce significantly the size of our nuclear arsenals are substantially lowered. Indeed, should Congress delay or eliminate the Peacekeeper program, it would send an unmistakable signal to the Soviet Union that we do not possess the resolve required nor the continuity of purpose to maintain a viable strategic triad and the policy of deterrence the triad represents. The time has come to place this issue behind us, the President went on. While we have debated the merits of the Peacekeeper program, the Soviets have deployed over 600 Peacekeeper type missiles. If we are to move towards an equitable treaty in Geneva, procurement of the 100 Peacekeeper missiles must continue.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his comments. I think they are very appropriate.

What I would like to do is spend a couple of minutes attempting to refute

the arguments that have been mentioned already against the Peacekeeper, the MX missile, and then go forward to some of the positive reasons that I think make it overwhelmingly necessary to deploy this type of a system.

I would like to start out by saying, in contradistinction to what was said by the gentleman from Florida, that a pro-MX vote is an easy vote. It is not. It is not easy to vote in favor of weapons systems, particularly systems that have massive destructive capability. You only do so if you deeply believe that they are absolutely essential for deterrence, that they are absolutely essential to preserve our way of life and to preserve peace and freedom. It is then a difficult vote and it is a courageous vote.

It has been said that the MX missile system is an expensive one. Indeed, it is. You are talking in terms of anywhere between \$26 billion to perhaps \$30 billion over the life of the system; but if you examine the sum of money that we spend for other things, the sum of money that we are spending for the security of this Nation on an annualized basis, you will realize that the MX system is something that is necessary for security, is necessary for deterrence, and is something that we can and must afford.

We are talking in terms of spending approximately one-half of 1 percent on an annualized basis of our total defense spending for the MX missile. Now, if it is a system that is militarily necessary, one-half of 1 percent on an annualized basis of our defense posture is certainly not overwhelming.

It has also been mentioned that the MX missile is vulnerable in deployed Minuteman II and III silos. I think the gentleman from California, DUNCAN HUNTER, spoke well about the fact that these systems have a synergistic effect. It would be impossible for the Soviet Union to have great confidence in a disarming strike on all three legs of the triad.

Those people who look at silo vulnerability get the argument twisted. Basically, what we have is a question of force survivability. Is the entire strategic force that we have in the United States vulnerable? The obvious answer to that is that it is not. Each leg of the triad has different properties, different characteristics. The air breathing leg, the bombers, obviously can be called back. They take a longer period of time, but they are flexible. The sea launched ballistic missiles at least to the end of the 1980's, are invulnerable, but they have problems with regard to command and communication. It is difficult to communicate to the sea based leg of our triad. Everybody recognizes that. Everybody who has sat and listened to the hearings recognizes the fact that it is very difficult to communicate with our sub-

marines. Without divulging their location.

The land based leg of our triad has different properties. They are more accurate. They are prompt and at the present time they are not as invulnerable, as we would like them to be, viewed in isolation.

But the Soviet Union does not look at the land based leg of the triad in isolation. They are not going to look at the U.S. total deterrent as one leg of the triad. They obviously look at all legs of the triad in conjunction with each other.

Finally, it has been said that the MX missile is a first strike weapon. Never have I heard that from witnesses. I have heard that only from people who criticize the deployment of the system.

I would like to ask a question of those. If the Soviet Union has approximately 5,000 strategically important targets, silos, command and control centers etc., how can the deployment of 100 MX missiles make this a first-strike weapon?

□ 1450

The point is it simply is not. No witness in my experience in the last 6 years as a member of the House Armed Services Committee has testified that 100 MX missiles could be construed to be a first strike weapon.

The Soviet Union has approximately, and these are estimates, 90 percent of their strategic capabilities in systems that are 5 years old or less, the height of their technology. At the present time, although we are now modernizing after the 1970's when we did very little modernization, about 90 percent of the U.S. strategic systems are in systems that are 15 years old or older. And that is a great difference between the Soviet Union and the United States.

I would like to also mention, that there has been a great deal said over the years during this debate, and this is not going to be the last debate this year, that it is acknowledged that the Soviet Union today has approximately 600 MX capable missiles. That means the Soviet Union has 600 land-based missiles that can put at risk our deterrent force, that can put at risk our hardened command and control centers. We do not have a comparable system.

Most people will agree that it is important for the United States and the Soviet Union to have equality, to have rough parity, to have equivalency. I would argue that I do not argue that the United States should be superior to the Soviet Union in strategic capabilities. I believe it is impossible. I would make the argument, however, that it is not appropriate to have the United States inferior to the Soviet Union with regard to strategic weapons, and that is the case today.

They have 600 MX capable missiles. We have none. We have been debating year after year and we have yet to deploy one. The first one will not be deployed until the year 1986.

Also, there is an issue with respect to resolve. Everybody knows that. If the Soviet Union knows, as they do, that the MX missile is the best strategic weapon for the United States, and if we walk away from this system unilaterally, if we walk away from this system without extracting any type of concession from the Soviet Union, they, the Soviet Union, will draw the correct conclusion and the appropriate conclusion with respect to our resolve and our commitment.

Also, Geneva. That has been mentioned a few times today. What will the signal be to the Soviet negotiators if we unilaterally withdraw this very capable weapon without extracting one concession, one thing from the Soviet Union? What type of signal will that give to our NATO allies after we persuaded them, and cajoled them, and spent hours talking to them, pleading that they had to have a tangible response to the deployment of Soviet intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe, the SS-20.

When ally after ally is starting to deploy, recognizing the threat and recognizing the importance of deterrence, if we then, when it comes our turn to deploy a modern weapon on our own soil say no, we do not want it; go ahead, Europe, go ahead, France, we want your independent deterrent, Great Britain, we want you to deploy the cruise missiles, we want West Germany to deploy Pershing II, but we will not deploy the MX. What then will happen to NATO?

Also, it gives our deterrent capability, our deterrent structure, our deterrent force credibility, something that has not been mentioned here, something that really was not well mentioned 1 year ago when we debated this particular issue. And what is credibility? I have heard time and time again people saying, as we have already heard this afternoon, that the United States has enough force, has enough yield, has enough megatonnage in their strategic arsenal to kill all of the civilians in the Soviet Union two or three times. Or if the Soviet Union launched their SS-17's, 18's, and 19's, at the United States, we could deploy our Minuteman II's and III's or SLBM and bombers and we could annihilate Moscow, we could annihilate Leningrad, we could destroy their civilian population.

I would make the argument that the Soviet Union knows that that type of a threat is not a credible threat because we would simply not do it. If the Soviet Union, using their ICBM's that have hard target kill capability, in a surgical strike annihilates as much of

our deterrence as they possibly could, our land based missiles and our bombers that are in bases and our submarines that are in bases, would the United States then launch our missiles against Soviet civilian populations, killing 30 million to 60 million citizens of the Soviet Union? No. We would not and they know we would not. That itself would be immoral and, that would surely invite the annihilation of the American experiment, because the Soviet Union would have enough missiles to respond in kind, killing American civilian targets.

Therefore, in order to make sure that our deterrence, has credibility, we have to have missiles that are capable of targeting their missiles. We have to have a land based system that is capable of knocking out their weapons, not their people. And that is the only way we can possibly have a credible deterrence.

Until we go to defensive systems we have to, unfortunately, rely on deterrence. We must, if we rely on deterrence, have one that is believable, one that is credible.

Mr. KASICH. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COURTER. I will be happy to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. KASICH. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

I would just like to point out for those who have taken the time to read the Scowcroft Commission Report, they use the word "stability" consistently throughout this report. For example, when they talk about the massive buildup here over the period of the last 10 to 15 years, 1,400 launches, 5,000 warheads, throw weight four times that of the United States, 800 of the missiles, the 18's and 19's that are similar to our MX variety, the fact that the Soviets are moving forward with tests of even 2 new missiles, which will mean they will have a total of 5 if we even deploy 1.

But I say to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. COURTER] it is very interesting to see in here that they actually talk about stability, and the purpose of MX they claim is to restore stability.

There are people that say the MX is a destabilizing force. The Scowcroft Commission says—and I understand there are some Secretaries who served the country before who do not agree with Scowcroft and they are the ones that were involved in letting the strategic deterrence of the United States deteriorate to the point where Republicans and Democrats alike have seen fit to join together to rebuild America's defense posture—but it says in here that "Overall perception of strategic imbalance caused by the Soviet's ability to deploy hardened land-based targets with more than 600 18's and 19's, while the United States is clearly not able to do so with the existing bal-

listic missile force, has been reasonably regarded as destabilizing."

If the gentleman will continue to yield for 1 additional minute, not only do they point out in this one section of the Scowcroft report, and I urge my colleagues to look at it, but they go on to say that a one-sided strategic condition in which the Soviet Union could effectively destroy the whole range of strategic targets in the United States, but we could not effectively destroy a similar range of targets in the Soviet Union, would be extremely unstable over the long run.

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman. He said it better than I did. The point is well taken.

The concept of deterrence, when we worked that out with the Soviet Union quite a number of years ago, was based simply on two assumptions. One assumption is that both the Soviet Union and the United States would remain vulnerable, our civilian populations would remain vulnerable to an attack, knowing that the response would make any type of initial attack unreasonable, unethical, and immoral, and at the same time our military capabilities would be invulnerable; civilian populations vulnerable, military capabilities invulnerable.

That has been the *modus operandi*, over the years and that is what deterrence is based on. It was the Soviet Union, not the United States, that changed it. They have made our deterrent forces vulnerable, and all we are trying to do is regain parity. It is extremely important.

Finally, and my last point, and I thank the gentleman from Alabama for yielding for me to conclude my remarks, we have argued in the 1970's that we would modernize in the late 1970's. We argued that in the mid-1970's we would finally get around to modernizing in the early 1980's.

We argued in the late seventies that we would finally modernize the land-based leg of our triad in the mid-1980's. Yet there are some people today that say we should not deploy MX because someday in the 1990's we are going to deploy Midgetman, a small missile. If we do not deploy now, the Soviet Union can conclude that there will always be a strategic reason, there will always be an environmental reason, there will always be a fiscal reason, there will always be a doctrinaire reason, there will always be some reason for the U.S. Congress to debate and never deploy.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Alabama.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. STRATTON. Would the Chair advise me as to how much time we have on this side remaining, with the

gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON]?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York [Mr. STRATTON] has a total of 2 hours and 49 minutes left; the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] has 56 minutes remaining. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] has a total of 4 hours and 17 minutes remaining.

Mr. STRATTON. Four hours, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The figure 4 is correct.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. STRATTON].

Mr. STRATTON. I have a further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. STRATTON. The agreement, as I understood it, and as it was developed between the Speaker and the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, was that we were to have 6 hours of debate on today.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the Chair's understanding.

Mr. STRATTON. And we were to have 4 hours of debate tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct according to the Chair's understanding.

Mr. STRATTON. And therefore the proper allocation of time between the opponents and the proponents would require that we conclude the 6 hours with both sides conducting 3 hours of debate.

The gentleman from Florida has how much time remaining in the 6-hour period for today, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida, for the time today, has 2 hours and 17 minutes. The gentleman from New York is correct.

Mr. STRATTON. I am just wondering if the gentleman could consume a little bit more of his time, that is the gentleman from Florida, so that we will end up with equal time on both sides.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT].

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HERTEL].

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. I thank the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. Chairman, let us remind ourselves why we are taking 10 hours for this debate, why so many people are involved, why the vote is expected to be so close, because the last speaker from New Jersey pointed out what the real issue is.

While the proposition before us is to unfence 21 missiles, the last gentleman speaking in behalf of unfencing those 21 talked about 100 MX missiles. That is what we are talking about. We are not talking about one-half of 1

percent of the defense budget. We are talking about probably as much as \$40 billion.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I mentioned 100 missiles because of the irresponsible statements, I would argue, the inaccurate statements that the MX even in its full complement of deployment, is a first strike weapon. Obviously the debate today is uniquely suited to the 21 missiles. I think everyone will concede regardless of how you vote today and regardless of the outcome, no more than 21 missiles will be unfunded.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. If 100 are not adequate, what good would 21 missiles do if that is the gentleman's point on the 21 today?

Mr. COURTER. Well, we need 100. Twenty-one is better than none. It does show some resolve. It does show some capability with respect to rendering the inequality equal, putting their military posture at risk.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. But the gentleman believes, as he just said again, that we need 100.

Mr. COURTER. I believe we need 100, but you obviously are never going to get to 100 unless you have an affirmative vote on 21. The issue today is the 21. Regardless of how you vote today, you will never get more than 21. Based on this vote.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. But you will never get to 100 unless you do vote yes on the 21.

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I am sure there will be many people arguing that 21 is enough of an indication, it shows our resolve, it is militarily necessary. There will be those that say we should stop at 50 and those who say we should stop at 75. Those issues I am sure will be visited on a future day.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. The gentleman has pointed out and clarified for me my very point, that is that we are going to keep hearing about 21 missiles, 48, 50, until we hit 100, because the gentleman and many others want 100 missiles. The administration wants 100 missiles. That is why we are not talking about one-half of 1 percent of this defense budget. That is why we are talking with superhardened—and I love the adjective superhardened—silos and spending as much as \$40 billion.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman again.

Mr. COURTER. No. When I used the words one-half of 1 percent of the defense budget over the useful life of the system I was calculating all 100.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. I thank the gentleman for that clarification.

We are talking, then, as the discussion focuses, about 100 MX missiles. Let us not kid ourselves as some people in the Senate did, the other body did, some people said they were going to vote and some people are saying they are going to vote for 21 now but they will oppose the 48 and they will always oppose 100 missiles. But that is why we keep seeing votes switch in this House and in the other body. One time a Senator from the Midwest votes yes, last year; this year that Senator voted no. That Senator will have many more occasions to go yes and no on the very same missile on the very same basing mode that we are discussing today and that we discussed last year.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will please suspend for just a moment.

The gentleman will not refer to votes in the other body.

The gentleman may proceed.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I will try to refer to positions in the other body and strategies.

I am trying to address today those people who have voted no consistently against the MX missile because of all of the issues raised today, who are now saying they might vote yes for the first time and they might only vote yes this one time.

Well, this is not the end of the story, this is not the end of the line in this House because several more times this year and at least one more time this week we are going to be voting on the MX missile. And it was said in our caucus last week and it was said in the Committee on Armed Services last week that we all agree the negotiations are not going to be completed by next month. We all believe the negotiations are not going to be completed by next year. In fact, most experts expect that the negotiations in Geneva will take 2 or 3 or 4 years.

So when the question of resolve is raised you cannot tie that question and that issue and that argument only to the 21 missiles this week because over the period of the negotiations the escalation for the MX will go up and within the period of negotiations I predict, and within 4 years the question of 100 MX missiles will be back on this floor just as it is back in this debate today as the central focus, 100 missiles.

□ 1510

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

Mr. BENNETT. I yield 5 additional minutes to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Now, it would be easy to say that although we have been elected as Congressmen and as our chairman of the Sea Power Subcommittee has pointed out under

the Constitution we have the responsibility to decide these questions, that we should just listen to somebody else, and if they are wrong, it is not our fault; we just gave them a bargaining chip; we just gave them a chance.

But it is our responsibility, and we all know it is our responsibility, and we will know it next year and 5 years from now and 10 years from now.

Over 30 basing modes have been attempted in the last decade, plus, for the MX. Two years ago, Secretary Weinberger himself told us that we could not put it in the existing silos. Then they came up with an adjective, "hardened" silos, and "superhardened" silos—let us talk about those for just a minute.

They do not even have the technology yet for the superhardened silos; they cannot tell us when they will be finished, although it would be at least, under testimony from Under Secretary Wade, at least not until 1990 would they be prepared to have those superhardened silos, and they cannot tell us yet how much it will cost, exactly, because they do not know exactly how they are going to do it.

So superhardening those silos is still going to make them vulnerable. In fact, under an attack by the Soviet Union, we could have less than 1 percent survivability of these silos; because we are not talking only about the Soviet system tomorrow, and we are talking about the MX and hardened silos not even being ready until 1990 at the very least, the very least; the very soonest they say it is possible.

And what are the Soviets doing? Well, we are going to stick these MX missiles in the same hole the Minuteman missiles are vulnerable in today. What are they doing? Well, it was in the Washington Post just 2 weeks ago. The administration told us just a few months ago that the Soviets are going to deploy two mobile missile systems in the Soviet Union.

What is our response? To put the MX missile in the hole. Now we know from testimony from the administration, from Under Secretary Wade, that we could accelerate our mobile missile program and have it in operation as a deterrent by the early 1990's, and no one disputes that.

In other words, we could have the mobile missile that the Soviets are working on today to deploy deployed in this Nation at about the same time that the vulnerable, unsurvivable MX missile would be placed in these expensive, superhardened silos.

When we talk about "no alternative" let us look at what the alternatives are, and let us look at credibility. We all agree here that the Trident, the D-5 missile included is our best weapon and our best deterrent. And yet people say, and rightfully so, that maybe in

the 1990's it will not be as survivable; it will not be as invulnerable.

Well, then, why do not we accelerate the development today of the Trident missile which we have the capabilities of doing. In fact, it is very possible that we could double the acceleration of the Trident submarine. Why finish the force of Tridents in the mid-1990's and later when we agree it may be vulnerable at that time? When it is invulnerable, why not accelerate it today?

Why? Because the money is going other places. The same reason we cannot accelerate the mobile missile today; is because people want to spend money on the MX over the next few years.

Let us talk about the amount of money we spend when people talk about resolve. We spend over \$300 billion a year on the defense of this Nation. No one can question our resolve, and certainly the Soviet Union has seen that resolve through those expenditures, and through the choices that we have made in those areas, but our money we know even with this huge deficit that has been run up over the last 4 years is not unlimited; our allies' money is not unlimited; and our enemies' money is not unlimited.

So we all must make choices, and that is why I argue for the mobile missile acceleration; for the Trident II acceleration. Those things could give us credibility. We talk about our NATO allies that we are proud of for going along with us and deploying the cruise missile, the Pershing, which I think many of us would agree is what got the Soviets to the bargaining table in Geneva, the Soviets do not fear the MX but they do fear the cruise and Pershing missiles, and I think they are very concerned about what might happen under SDI. But not the MX; that has not come up in this debate as something that the Soviets really fear as much as the cruise, the Pershing, and SDI.

Let us talk about our brave NATO allies who stuck with us.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

Mr. STRATTON. I yield 3 additional minutes.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Our NATO allies are not clamoring, as some would suggest, for us to build the MX missile, because they are concerned about it being used as a first strike weapon; they are concerned that it is destabilizing, and they know that the Trident is a better deterrent.

So our NATO allies, and the people in our NATO allied countries, will not be disappointed if we do not go along with this destabilizing weapon, the MX.

Let me just talk about what is going to happen if the 21 are unfenced, then we will go to 48, and we will get to 100. It will cost over \$40 billion. The saddest part is, there will be no real deter-

rence, and as far as the defense of this Nation, the saddest part is that more of the money did not go to conventional forces. We are already seeing the Defense Department talk about cutting things like munitions and food for our troops, and stretching out other weapons systems that we agree are needed.

The saddest thing for the defense of our Nation is that in the end when we have these silos, these vulnerable holes—and we all know that is true; we will have picked up nothing for the \$30 or \$40 billion which we have spent.

Now it is not easy to say no at a time like this; but if we do not say no today, we will not have the chance to say no later. The talks in Geneva will go on. Not only this week while we face 21; the talks will go on while you face full funding for 48, full funding for 100, and the argument will be the same:

That argument is not on the facts or the deterrence of the MX missile, but rather on the question of resolve. We have shown resolve. I think we have given enough alternatives today and in the past, and I think we have shown we have spent enough on our national defense. I think we have shown that we care, that we can agree in so many other areas, that when we are torn so much on this one issue, there has got to be a good reason.

Why the MX? Why is that the big debate every year? Because it is the most vulnerable, for the most amount of money that does the least good for the defense of this Nation.

I ask you to vote no on it.

I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. I appreciate the gentleman yielding, and I certainly was not trying to in any way hurry him along; I just wanted to ask him a question.

One of the things that the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission talked about was the fact that they felt these missiles would not be vulnerable because they debunked the whole notion of a window of vulnerability. They said, no rational Soviet planner can attack our land-based ICBM's because he or she would know they would be devastated by our submarines and bombers. And that synergism creates survivability.

Does the gentleman in any way dispute that notion of synergism, as related by the most distinguished panel of Americans that has ever spoken on this kind of argument?

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. The gentleman's argument, and we heard it earlier today from the other side, is that if we have the triad, and we have different weapons coming at the Soviets if we are under attack, that they cannot defend against all three legs of the triad as easily.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BENNETT. I yield 3 additional minutes to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, that is a point upon which we base our strategic defense and can agree. But when we spend our money for the three legs of the triad, we still should make the best choice for the triad, and as I argue today, the mobile missile that the Soviets are showing us would be a stronger leg.

Let us agree on this: That of the three legs of the triad, when we have the B-1 in place, we have the Trident II in place, the MX would be the weakest link of that triad. Do you agree?

Mr. DICKS. Thanking the gentleman for yielding, I would not agree, because I believe synergism will work. Let me just tell you—

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Would the mobile missile be superior to the MX missile in 1993?

Mr. DICKS. Well, let me explain one thing. I think that the Scowcroft Commission said that—a lot of my colleagues have not been willing to talk about, because I am afraid that everyone has made up their mind on this issue anyway, but just remember one thing the Scowcroft Commission said: That what MX does is give you some prompt, hard target capability. But most importantly, it gives you leverage to get the Soviets out of their vulnerable silos, to move toward the SS-24 and SS-25 which are mobile systems, which are more secure, as we move toward Midgetman.

Now when you put the two together, MX and Midgetman, you give the Soviets an exceedingly difficult problem.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has made his point.

The fact is, as I have pointed out, we already know that if we build the MX up to 100, which they are arguing for today, and they will be in the future, that will push back the mobile missile.

□ 1520

We all know that is a fact, that it is going to put it back until the late 1990's or maybe the end of the century.

Mr. DICKS. I disagree. The IOC on the Midgetman is 1992, 1 year after the IOC on the D-5.

What I would say to the gentleman is that this is the only immediate step in modernizing the strategic land-based missile that we can do in the near term.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Let me take my time back for a moment to address a point that you made, and that is General Scowcroft. He told a group of us at a luncheon last year the question was not that the MX was not survivable. It is not. The fact is that he thought it was a question of resolve.

That is why I bring forth other ideas today, to show our resolve, and to remind the Members that we have spent \$300 billion per year on resolve already.

Mr. MARVOULES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MAVROULES. I think there is one question that must be addressed here that we have not addressed at all. We talk about weapon systems, we talk about parity, superiority, we talk about qualitative, quantitative. If indeed the Soviet Union is so powerful, so threatening to the United States, why in God's name would they want to go back to the table? The MX missile is not going to bring them back to the table. The reason they are back to the table is because of the triad spending and research and development that is going on presently.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. The gentleman makes an excellent point.

Mr. MAVROULES. I will address that later on.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. A very excellent point. When Congress voted the full money for MX missiles 2 years ago they did not come back to the table. When we fenced 21 last year the Soviets still came back. Why? Because they are afraid of the cruise, the Pershing, and SDI.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I think the Soviets probably came back because of the initiative of the President and other people on SDI.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HERTEL] has expired.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. COURTER. If the gentleman will yield further, I just wanted to clear up what I thought perhaps was an inaccuracy. It has to do with the small Midgetman missiles. I have not heard any testimony that would lead me to conclude that the program could be accelerated. It is now on track. You are talking in terms of initial deployment in 1992. So regardless of what the vote is today, the initial deployment, at the earliest, of Midgetman, if this body so votes, which I doubt when they hear about the costs, will be 1992.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Well, I think we can agree on that. That is exactly my point. It would be 1992. That was testimony from Under Secretary Wade just this past month, but also at that very same hearing he pointed out that we cannot have the MX in the super-hardened silos until, at the earliest, 1990. So we are talking about 2

years for one system that is not defensible against the mobile missile, which we all know is far superior. And we are going to hear that argument later: We cannot now afford the mobile because we spent all the money on the MX-hole-in-the-ground operation.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MAVROULES. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I think my colleague, Mr. COURTER, makes an excellent point, and that is something we will have to determine, as to whether or not we go for the Midgetman.

The other question, of course, is: Are we prepared to go along with the hardening, the cost of the hardening, for these 100 MX missiles? And those will be coming down the line pretty soon. That is another question we have to determine.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. I thank the gentleman very much. It is a good point.

In conclusion, let us all be sure what we are talking about. We are talking about not 21 missiles, although that is the provision before us; we are talking and will be talking, if this provision passes, from now on, for the future, about 100 missiles and the cost of 100 missiles, not the strategy of 21 missiles.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. KASICH. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

I think the gentleman from Washington makes a good point. And for those who read the Scowcroft Commission report, you do notice what we are linked.

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. I yield for a question, not a statement.

Mr. KASICH. What the Scowcroft people say is that if we deploy the MX, it will provide incentive for the Soviets to move toward a single warhead.

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee will rise informally in order that the House may receive a message.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. [Mr. ADDABBO] assumed the chair.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair will receive a message.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States was communicated to the House by Mr. Saunders, one of his secretaries.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The committee will resume its sitting.

TO AUTHORIZE RELEASE OF FUNDS FOR MX MISSILE

The committee resumed its sitting.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT].

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. BOXER].

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, the MX missile is like a recurring nightmare. It is frightening, and it just keeps coming back.

Now, this body has set aside a great deal of time to debate whether or not the House should vote to release \$1.5 billion to fund the production of 21 additional missiles. Today alone, as we debate here, the budget deficit that this country is generating and the staggering national debt that we are piling up for our children will have increased by \$608 million and \$487 million, respectively. The President says only domestic spending adds to our debt. What a fabrication. Military spending has gone up over 100 percent in 4 years. Those are hard dollars, and those are our dollars.

Now, I have listened to my colleagues stress the need to make some hard choices in order to bring the deficit under control. To me, this is the first test of those hard choices.

We have a deficit this year that may exceed \$200 billion. Yet we are being asked to approve the release of \$1.5 billion for a missile program that is being touted not for its military value but rather for the message that we wish to send to Moscow. The total program will cost more than \$40 billion. This is the most expensive telegram ever sent, and the message we are sending to the Soviet Union is basically worthless. Here we are, building a weapons system that is vulnerable, expensive and unnecessary. Frankly, I think the message we are sending if we vote for the MX is that we do not know what we are doing. Now, I respect very deeply the Office of the Presidency. But I do not care how many Members of Congress the President talks to and cajoles, the facts are the facts.

If we vote no on the MX tomorrow, will the MX missile die? The answer is no. The MX Missile Program, like so many other weapons programs, is currently overfunded and undertested. The GAO tells us that as of January 1985, the MX Program had only expended \$150 million of the \$3 billion provided in 1984-85. My colleagues, that is less than 5 percent of the total funding available. GAO has confirmed that with the available funds only, not including the \$1.5 billion that we are asked to release now, production could be sustained through 1986. So as long as the production line remains hot, the Soviets know that we can continue to produce missiles. The message is

clear. \$1.5 billion more thrown into the equation will not make the MX any more of a bargaining chip than some say it already is.

The original MX test plan called for 23 test flights prior to deployment. Now we are going to deploy 21 missiles before we have even done those tests properly.

Here we go again. We have spent over \$4 billion on the Sergeant York air defense gun, and it still has not passed crucial tests and it has performed so badly that the Secretary of Defense froze funding until the whole system is reexamined. We have spent over \$1.5 billion on the Bradley fighting vehicle and yet it has not been fully tested, nor do we know the extent of problems that will arise and how much it will cost taxpayers to solve them. The MX itself has been plagued by cost overruns. Unit costs will exceed original estimates by as much as 35 percent.

I would say that the American people are fed up with the waste and the abuse of the military procurement system and expect Congress to exercise appropriate oversight authority over these programs.

I want to talk for a minute about this bargaining chip argument, because I think it is very important. It is so important that the President has flown back our chief arms negotiator to meet with Members of Congress. And I will be going to that meeting, as well as many of us, today. And I intend to say to that chief negotiator and to the President, if I have that opportunity, that we in this Congress have approved the spending of over \$1 trillion in the last 4 years for defense. We are currently funding programs for development, procurement, maintenance, and modernization of weapons that include so many they are almost too numerous to mention in the time that I have, so I won't even list them. Is it possible that anyone could look at the funding levels of these programs and doubt our awesome strength?

Is anyone naive enough to think that out of all those weapons and this unbelievable arms buildup, only these 21 MX missiles will keep the Soviet Union at the bargaining table?

1530

When the administration announced the resumption of arms control talks in Geneva, it went out of its way to lower expectations concerning possible agreements that might result from these talks. They cautioned that it would be a long and arduous time.

Now we are told that if we do not approve the MX missile, we are pulling the rug out from under the people in Geneva. If we accept this specious line of argument, then we cannot oppose any request for any amount of MX missiles for 4 years or more. The Presi-

dent can continually use this argument to support a vast array of weapons systems, and let us look at some of them.

Star wars; he is going to say the same to us on that. Chemical weapons; he is going to use the same argument. How about nerve gas? Maybe that is going to pull the rug out from under the negotiators. I think we cannot support this logic; we should not support this logic.

As far as vulnerability is concerned, we know that the MX is a use it or lose it weapon. We are being asked to spend billions of dollars on a weapons system whose basing mode makes it completely vulnerable, and this point has been raised.

I want to talk a moment about the budget. I am happy to say that I am on the Budget Committee this year, and the President is telling us that we have to cut spending. But to him, military spending just does not seem to be spending. But we have to cut domestic programs. He is talking about cuts in financial aid for students. Biomedical research grants for cancer and other diseases. School lunch programs; senior citizen housing. He has asked us to approve increases in Medicare premiums for the elderly, and a 5-percent pay cut for Federal workers.

He wants to eliminate the Small Business Administration; the Legal Services Corporation; the Job Corps; Urban Development Action Grants; Revenue Sharing, and I can go on and on. I think that is a fundamental argument against building this very questionable weapon.

Any time we talk about controlling the military complex, we are accused of being unpatriotic, and I really resent that. I think it is impossible to morally justify asking for \$1.5 billion for a weapons system that has no value, while asking Americans to endure further shredding of the middle-class programs that have made this country what it is today.

Let me conclude with a comment on research recently confirmed by the Pentagon that should change the entire debate for every Member in this body and for the American people. I am referring to the research done by a team that included Carl Sagan and other prominent American scientists confirming the probability of a nuclear winter occurring shortly after a nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Nuclear winter is the description of what would happen when nuclear weapons explode billions of particles of earth and debris into the atmosphere forming a cloud between the Earth and the Sun. Temperatures would drop rapidly throughout the world and would remain at such a low level as to destroy all living organisms, including those that are crucial ele-

ments to our food and oxygen chain necessary for our very life.

The size of the exchange that would cause this is surprisingly small. Each side using 110 kiloton missiles, a very small exchange by nuclear standards, could trigger nuclear winter. That means that a veritable fraction of either the superpower's arsenals could cause the end of life on Earth as we know it, and that is what this debate is about.

Yet, despite this evidence, despite the Pentagon having confirmed these findings of nuclear winter, we do not hear talk of any new approaches; we do not hear any acknowledgement that this new information destroys the justification for these huge arsenals. Instead, we are asked for more missiles while we continue to talk, test and build, talk, test and build.

Mr. Chairman, we have a strong arsenal of weapons capable of defending this country. We have a strong arsenal of weapons on land, on sea and air. We can defend this Nation with an awesome strength. We have a tremendous deterrent already in place. We have it without the MX missile. We do not need it; it is as simple as that.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. BOXER] has expired.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentlewoman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. BOXER. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to simply ask a question. The gentlewoman is going to be seeing Max Kampelman today, America's arms negotiator. If America's leading negotiator at Geneva tells you that he needs the MX missile to have a strong position at Geneva, was I correct in hearing the gentlewoman say essentially that she will not be concerned about that argument?

Mrs. BOXER. The gentleman is totally incorrect. What I said was I intended to tell our chief negotiator and ask our chief negotiator are there not other reasons for the Soviet Union to be at the table, and this is not my own thought.

I have done a tremendous amount of reading on this subject, and many, many experts admit, and I have even heard testimony in front of committees that we do not need the MX to keep the Soviet Union at the bargaining table. I will discuss this; that is the purpose of the meeting. I assume we do not live in a dictatorship; I assume we are a democracy where we, as good, patriotic Americans can exchange ideas. I intend, definitely, to question him on this point.

I thank the gentleman.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, I had the opportunity to serve 6 years in this House, one of the prime aerospace districts in our country, where the B-1 was designed and will be partially built. Never did I use the jobs argument, and although I understand and respect those who talk about 32,000 jobs, a major strategic defense system is not a work program.

However, I now represent a district where, although there is not much production, many of the aerospace workers in southern California, both at Los Angeles and Orange Counties live.

I received a letter from a gentleman named Mr. B.J. Russel, who works on the Peacekeeper strategic defense system. I would like to read this very short letter in its entirety, because I think it says a great deal about the pride that the people have in a system that has come in on cost, on time, and has been almost too successful, if there is such a thing, because it lends itself to this false argument that this weapons system is so accurate that it is somehow or other destabilizing.

He writes:

DEAR Mr. DORNAN: I am writing this letter to give you some facts about the MX program as I see them. I have worked on the program from the very beginning, so I believe I am in a position to know what has actually been happening.

Contrary to the common view of defense contracts, I can assure you that the people working on the project have done so with great diligence, and the results to date have been better than the results for any other major defense program I am aware of.

The seven flight tests have been completely successful. This is rather remarkable considering the complexity of the system, and the fact that its accuracy is much better and its capability to survive high nuclear environment is much greater than that of the Minuteman missile.

I also take pride in the fact that the program has been executed within budget. There have been no cost overruns. Everything the government has paid for has been delivered. Although the press has left the impression that MX is about to bankrupt the treasury, I do not believe there is much basis for saying that. The fact is that MX is not even one of the ten most costly defense programs. If the object is to save dollars, there are other programs where much larger possibilities exist.

Finally, the program has met all its schedules. This has involved a high level of dedication and technical ability. The MX team is extraordinary, and would take years to rebuild, if it should be dispersed.

As to the ultimate use of the MX, none of us ever want or expect to see a nuclear weapon used. My expectation is that the President (or some future president) will eventually negotiate treaties eliminating all nuclear weapons. However, I cannot see how he can achieve such an agreement if the So-

viets see that we are stopping production and dismantling our weapons without getting any corresponding concession from them.

If I can provide any other information about the MX that you would find useful please let me know.

Sincerely,

B.J. RUSSEL.

□ 1540

Mr. Chairman, I will go over some of the salient points that I think should be in the RECORD today, the first day of the debate heard across America on C-SPAN and by those Members who are here or watching and some of the facts that were brought out in an excellent article by the American Security Council that has been circulated to all of us by a "Dear Colleague" letter sent by the distinguished gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McEWEN].

Before I do that, I would like to yield to some of my colleagues. I yield first to the distinguished gentleman from Arizona [Mr. RUDD].

Mr. RUDD. Mr. Chairman, let me just rise in support of what our good friend, the gentleman from California, is saying.

The United States has not built a land-based missile since 1970, and the Soviet Union's propaganda machine is telling us that we should not build this now. So they have been successful since 1970 in seeing that we do not build one. The numbers have been repeated over and over again, the overwhelming numbers they have already deployed, with missiles that are equal to the MX missile. We are gratified and astounded that they want to come back to the bargaining table. Well, the sole reason they want to come back to the bargaining table is, of course, for themselves to try to convince us not to build the MX missile.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Or a space-based defense.

Mr. RUDD. It is a tragedy that we are not building it, and it is time that we build it.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of House Joint Resolution 180 to authorize the release of funds for 21 MX Peacekeeper missiles.

The United States has not deployed a new land-based strategic missile since the early 1970's. Consequently our land-based systems are aging significantly. Only 30 Titan II missiles remain in service as of February 1985, and all are scheduled for retirement by 1987. The Minuteman II and Minuteman III require continued upgrading to keep them operational and are well past their design lives.

By contrast, since the time we last deployed our most modern type of ICBM, the Soviets have deployed three new types—the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19—including 360 of the latter which are comparable in size to the MX, and 308 of the much larger SS-18's with 10 warheads each.

They have rebuilt over 800 of 1,398 silo-based ICBM launchers; hardened all new silos and command, control, and communication centers to better withstand retaliation by U.S. ICBM's; and have developed a fifth generation of ICBM—the MIRV capable SS-X-24 and the single RV SS-X-25.

The MX is the only available near-term option for modernization of U.S. land-based forces and the preservation of the integrity of our triad of strategic defense forces. The triad—air, sea and land-based forces—poses nearly insurmountable planning difficulties for the Soviets in timing a first strike. It has proven a successful strategy for more than 30 years. We should not now compromise a vital leg of that triad by refusing to modernize our land-based ICBM's.

Approval of the MX is also essential to progress at the bargaining table in Geneva. With the MX, we have 38 significant leverage. We will start these new talks from a position of strength.

However, if we vote down the MX, the Soviets' incentive to negotiate seriously on the deep reductions the President has proposed will be diminished substantially. We will prove that the Soviets can succeed in obtaining an important concession without ever having given anything in return. We cannot unilaterally disarm.

Furthermore, the arms talks in Geneva will not produce results overnight. They will likely go on for months and years. If we kill the MX—the only available system to redress the immediate imbalance in land-based forces—we compromise our security pending the outcome of those talks. And let's not fool ourselves—even when we have an agreement with the Soviets, we can't count on their abiding by it. The Soviets have a long history of violating treaties. Over the last 14 months, the President has sent three reports to Congress on Soviet treaty violations. All three indicate a pattern of violations, not just isolated incidents. If we can't trust the Soviets to comply with existing treaties, how can we trust them when a treaty is merely being negotiated? The MX must be there to provide deterrence.

The sole reason we are negotiating now is that they would have the United States leave them with an overwhelming advantage of not having the MX to counter that advantage, in other words, our unilateral disarmament.

This is no time to cast doubt on our national resolve. Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the MX is essential to our national security, and I urge that the resolution to release the funds for the MX be adopted.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. RUDD].

Next I yield to my distinguished colleague and leader on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from California [Mr. LAGOMARSINO].

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this resolution. It seems to me that the overwhelming argument in favor of this is that it just does not make sense to give up something without getting something in return.

Mr. Chairman, once again we are debating the merits of providing funds for the modernization of our strategic nuclear forces. I would like to take just a few moments to review the different perspectives of United States and the Soviet Union on the utility and purpose of nuclear weapons.

To the Soviet Union, the possession of nuclear weapons alone insures their status as a superpower. For without nuclear weapons which are used to threaten and intimidate the west, and the United States in particular, the Soviet leaders would not have a legitimate claim to the future of mankind. Let's look at some facts (facts which many even in this body refuse to recognize or confront): The Soviet Communist system of government is totally bankrupt, morally, politically and economically. The Soviet leaders cannot and indeed do not offer Soviet Communism as an attractive model for a thriving or productive economy; a free and open system of government, with due process of law or the holding of fair elections; or a society where its citizens can pursue "life, liberty and happiness . . ." no, the Soviet leaders—from V.I. Lenin to the new ruler and CPSU head, Mikhail Gorbachev—have relied on terror and party control to insure the regime's continued survival. Their grip on power has lessened little in the almost 70 years since the Bolsheviks acceded to power by a bloody coup. And nuclear weapons play a significant role in insuring that Soviet power is respected and feared.

In the mid-1950's, the Soviets began assembling an arsenal of nuclear weaponry based on a war-fighting theory—that is, to shape one's forces as to achieve the highest chances of winning the war no matter where, how or why it started. Thus, the Soviets chose to structure their nuclear forces around large, highly MIRV'd land-based ICBM's: The quickest, most accurate—and therefore most destabilizing—tool for nuclear blackmail and destruction. Today, almost three-fourths of all Soviet warheads are atop land-based ICBM's. The Soviets continued to build up these offensive and destabilizing nuclear forces, through exploiting ambiguities and violations of arms control treaty language and allocating immense funds for the strategic rocket forces. Simply stated, the Soviets have taken a no-nonsense approach to nuclear strategy—should hostilities erupt, they plan to win the

conflict swiftly and decisively. Soviet nuclear doctrine has, from the beginning, "focused on the problems associated with acquiring the means and devising the methods for fighting to victory."

The United States, on the other hand, does not use nuclear weapons to threaten other nations. On the contrary, U.S. military doctrine strategy and force structure are all designed to deter and prevent war, not initiate it. In the late 1940's and early 1950's, the American defense and scientific communities chose to disperse U.S. forces among three legs of a strategic nuclear triad—ICBM's, submarines carrying SLBM's and long-range bombers—emphasizing the belief that the best approach to nuclear force structure is to stress stability. And, let us not forget, for many years the United States held a de facto "nuclear monopoly" on explosive devices and the means of delivering them to their targets, without using it against an alien and hostile ideology and growing power, the Soviet Union. One has to wonder what the world would look like today if the situation had been reversed.

Hence the dilemma we now face: The United States possesses a stable yet aging and relatively inaccurate triad of strategic forces, while the Soviet Union maintains a large offensive force of highly-mirved ICBM's which is capable of destroying virtually all of our ICBM's in their silos in a first strike and holding our most valuable political and military assets at risk. As Strategic Air Command Commander in Chief Benny Davis recently told Congress, "our deterrent strategy must have a capability that leaves no doubt in a potential aggressor's mind that he could not succeed by threatening or initiating aggressive acts against this Nation." This is the essence of deterrence, and also the reason we again meet today to discuss and debate the merits of modernizing the land-based leg of our strategic nuclear triad.

In my view, there are four main reasons why we have a solemn duty to approve continued funding for MX/Peacekeeper production. They are:

First. The age of our present ICBM force, and the need to upgrade and modernize our land-based nuclear forces;

Second. The ability of our nuclear forces—particularly our ICBM force—to hold at risk those Soviet targets which the Soviet leaders value most;

Third. The need to show national resolve, given the massive buildup of Soviet nuclear forces; and

Fourth. The positive impact a vote for continued MX production funds will have on the recently revived United States-Soviet arms control negotiations in Geneva.

Since the United States deployed its most modern type of ICBM, the Minuteman 3, the Soviet Union has de-

ployed three new types of ICBM's—the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19—including 360 SS-19's which are equivalent in size to the MX, each with 6 warheads, and 308 of the much larger SS-18, each with at least 10 warheads. I say "at least" because many estimate the SS-18 can or does actually carry 14 or more warheads. According to the Defense Department, "at least one additional modified version of both the SS-18 and SS-19 is likely to be produced and deployed in existing silos in the future." In addition, the DOD states:

Despite these development programs, the Soviets appear to be planning on new, solid-propellant ICBM's . . . two new solid propellant ICBM's, the medium-sized SS-24 and the smaller SS-25, are being tested . . . available evidence suggests mobile as well as silo deployment for both systems. Development for all of these missiles have been under way for many years.

The Soviets surpassed the United States in number of deployed ICBM's in 1970. By deploying their fourth generation ICBM's with MIRV capability and large throw-weight, the Soviets surpassed the United States in numbers of reentry vehicles [RV's] in 1975, and continued deployments have significantly increased the Soviet advantage. The Soviets now have about 35 percent more launchers than the United States—1,398 versus less than 1,030—and about three times as many warheads—6,420 versus around 2,130.

The age of our forces was also brought home to me recently when I was informed that a Minuteman 3 missile, which had been randomly selected by the Air Force, removed from its silo and test fired from Vandenberg AFB in my district, had failed to work properly and had to be destroyed during its flight. It is unfortunate, but it is a fact nonetheless, that these systems are not 100 percent reliable. They are getting old. They need to be replaced, and it is advisable to begin replacing them now with a very capable missile such as the MX/Peacekeeper.

Part of the previous discussion addressed the MX's military capabilities. Here, the MX excels; it promises to be our most accurate land-based missile yet. These expectations have been confirmed by the results from the MX's highly successful flight testing program. Some politicians believe accuracy is unimportant to deterrence, however; we need only threaten Soviet cities to deter Soviet aggression, they say. I disagree. From what we know of their own statements—and they have been quite consistent about this over the years—the Soviet leaders value most their nuclear weapons and the means for delivering these weapons to their intended targets, the command and control infrastructure necessary for implementing Soviet war plans, and the political and military leader-

ship. The MX—unlike most of our present-day forces—will be able to successfully engage these and other hardened Soviet targets. Our ability to hold at a risk these targets is stabilizing on the military balance and adds to deterrence, as it will complicate the war plans of the Soviet leaders and make even more uncertain the outcome of a decision to initiate a nuclear war with the United States.

Next, let me turn to American resolve. Too often we underestimate how important it is for deterrence for the United States to appear resolute in the face of the many challenges posed by the Soviets. In the Soviet lexicon, the "correlation of forces" is a vitally important tool for assessing the current "balance" of all kinds of political, military, international, and other factors affecting Soviet politico-military decisionmaking. If the Soviets believe—as they undoubtedly did under the previous administration—that they can so to speak "get away with anything," they will probably judge the correlation of forces is in their favor, and proceed with the action or activity in question. If, however, they perceive a resolute American response in opposition to the Soviet activity, then they will be less likely to undertake that activity.

Since 1981 the United States has come a long way in changing the Soviets' perception of America's resolve and willingness to defend ourselves and our interests and allies across the globe, Mr. Chairman, as I'm sure practically all of us here would agree. Yet, much remains to be done. If we were to deny funds for producing the MX, after so many administrations—both Republican and Democrat—have called it "vital to U.S. defense and security," I believe this would send entirely the wrong signal to the Soviet leaders.

This leads into my final point, Mr. Chairman. Across the country, across Europe, indeed across the entire globe, people yearn for a reduction in the number and destructive capability of nuclear weapons. As a member of the congressional arms control monitoring group, I know I share their sincere feelings that the recently revived bilateral arms control talks underway in Geneva will yield positive results. President Reagan is to be commended for holding his ground in the face of the Soviets' diplomatically untenable position calling for the removal of all NATO INF forces prior to the resumption of arms control talks; he held firm, did not advocate unilateral concessions, and in fact has brought the Soviets back to the table. We should be "cautiously optimistic" about these new talks. The historical legacy of United States-Soviet bilateral arms control is certainly a "mixed bag" at best; the road has been rocky, as the Soviets have exploited or violated

every treaty they have signed with us. They are now violating SALT II, the 1972 ABM Treaty, and the President has issued two reports, mandated by the Congress, outlining further Soviet areas of noncompliance. We, as a nation, must view these actions with grave concern. They call into question the Soviets' commitment to treaties, and raise questions about the advisability of engaging in such negotiations in the first place.

Yet, there can be progress in arms control, in my opinion, if we are patient and the Soviets decide it is in their interest to negotiate in "good faith." We as legislators have a solemn duty and obligation to defend the security interests of this country and to insure that our negotiators have adequate leverage in the form of capable forces so the negotiations can go forward. A realistic person would ask: Why would the United States unilaterally cut back its own forces without seeking a corresponding reduction in Soviet forces?

Mr. Chairman, I vividly recall, it is indelibly imprinted in my mind, an occasion in August 1979, when in Moscow as a member of Codel Wolfe, I met with members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the governing body of the U.S.S.R. parliament. I asked how they were going to reciprocate for then-President Carter's cancellation of the B-1 bomber, deferral of the MX and Trident missiles, cancellation of the neutron warhead, vetoing of a nuclear aircraft carrier, et cetera. The reply? "We don't believe in unilateral disarmament." All have heard how the Soviets answered General Rowley at the SALT II negotiations when he asked how they were going to reciprocate for cancellation of the B-1, "We are neither pacifists nor philanthropists * * *."

While the MX has been both hailed and chided as a supposed "bargaining chip" in the negotiations, I believe the MX should be supported because of its military capabilities, as well as its potential for eliciting reasonable and desirable tradeoffs from the Soviets. Let's look at a hypothetical situation (one which, in fact, might not be so far-fetched): Should the President receive an offer from the Soviets to drastically reduce their SS-18 and/or SS-19 ICBM forces in exchange for a reduction in the number of planned or deployed MX's, what would he do? Such a tradeoff might very well be in the U.S. interest. But the point I wished to raise was that such a scenario would be impossible without this body approving legislation authorizing and appropriating funds for the continued production of additional MX missiles. I think the President should at least have at his disposal the option of approving or turning down such a proposal. For the negotiations to go forward and to insure that our negotia-

tors have adequate options available to them, we must approve the funding for these 21 MX missiles.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, contrary to the arguments espoused by opponents of the MX, there is a very real purpose and need for that weapon system. It is an important component of the President's strategic modernization program. It is important as a symbol of U.S. resolve. It is vital because it will enable us to strengthen deterrence by holding at risk those targets the Soviet leaders value most. And it is important for our arms control delegates to be able to approach the negotiations from a position of strength. America needs the MX, Mr. Chairman. It's time this body recognized the vital importance of the MX to the continued security of this Nation, and passed authorizing and appropriating legislation. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] has expired.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 additional minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield to another of my distinguished colleagues, the gentleman from California [Mr. SHUMWAY].

Mr. SHUMWAY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the MX missile. The MX missile represents the credible deterrent that we need today to regain a strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. While I recognize the imperfections of the missile's basing mode and the very real need, in light of the Federal deficit, to exercise fiscal restraint, I believe that, in the best interest of our nation, we must go forward with the immediate deployment of the MX missile as recommended by the President's Commission on Strategic Forces.

We need the MX, the first new U.S. ICBM in a decade, to ensure that the strategic objectives outlined by the Scowcroft Commission—improved ICBM capability, modernization of land-based forces, and progress in arms control—are all effectively achieved. The Commission's recommendations called for a balanced approach to meeting our security needs, an approach in which the MX missile is a crucial and irreplaceable element. Together with the development of a small, mobile ICBM and arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, the MX will serve to strengthen the U.S. policy of deterrence, our most effective guarantor of peace.

Mr. Chairman, without the MX, the deterrent capability of our strategic triad is in serious jeopardy. In the 15 years since the United States last deployed an ICBM, the Soviet Union has deployed the SS-17, the SS-18, and the SS-19—deployments which repre-

sent over 800 missiles—and they are reportedly ready to deploy still two more new types. Highly accurate and capable of destroying hardened targets in the United States, these Soviet weapons have given the U.S.S.R. a decisive advantage in land-based ICBM forces and have created a destabilizing imbalance between the two superpowers which the MX missile is designed to counteract. Although some contend that deployment of the MX will heighten the instability of superpower relations by giving the U.S. a first-strike capability, I strongly disagree: by deploying only 100 missiles, we will challenge the Soviet ability to destroy our land-based forces without creating a force large enough to completely destroy theirs. The MX system does not, Mr. Chairman, represent a first-strike threat to the Soviets but rather a deterrent to the very real first-strike threat they now hold over us.

By redressing the current Soviet superiority in ICBM capability, the MX missile will repair the weakness in the land-based portion of our strategic triad that continues to grow as our Titan II and Minuteman systems age and become outdated. We have allowed this trend to continue too long: all three legs of our strategic defense—land, sea, and air—must be strong. The MX is vital to achieving this goal.

It is vital, too. I believe, for the successful negotiation of an arms control agreement. With the recent resumption of arms control talks in Geneva, there is sincere hope for progress in limiting the expansion of both superpowers' nuclear arsenals. In this atmosphere, the significance of our decision on the production and deployment of the MX missile is more than a question of whether the MX is a "bargaining chip" to be traded for Soviet SS-18s at the negotiating table. The importance of the MX is not as limited as that—it represents less a chip in our hand than an expression of our national will to maintain an effective deterrent. I submit, Mr. Chairman, that we cannot expect to achieve through arms negotiations what we are not willing to pursue on our own. By demonstrating our willingness to offset Soviet ICBM advantages, we can help to create an atmosphere that encourages the Soviets to conclude a fair and substantive agreement. It is in this context, Mr. Chairman, that deployment of the MX missile is critical to the U.S. negotiating position in Geneva.

Clearly, the objectives of improved ICBM capability, force modernization, arms control leverage, and demonstration of national will can best be achieved by the immediate deployment of the MX missile. While the debate over the missile's basing mode has been long and complex, and a technically and politically acceptable solution has been difficult to achieve,

I firmly believe that the Scowcroft Commission's recommendation for deployment in existing Minuteman silos sufficiently addresses concerns for the missile's survivability.

As the Commission emphasized, the MX can rely for its survival on the strength of our strategic triad: since the Soviets would be unable to attack all three legs of our strategic forces simultaneously without threat of retaliation, the mutual survivability of the triad acts as a deterrent and a protection for our land-based missiles. The vulnerability of Minuteman silos can also be reduced through research to improve hardening technologies, making the missile silos better able to withstand attack. This approach has been supported by the Scowcroft Commission and funded by Congress. Without sacrificing MX survivability, this basing strategy will allow us to proceed with the prompt deployment which is required for strategic modernization while continuing development of a small, single-warhead missile that will be suitable for a mobile basing mode. Together, the MX and the small, mobile missile will strengthen our ability to deter attack—in the short term and in the long term.

While I recognize, Mr. Chairman, the need for restraint and frugality in defense, particularly now as we face a serious national deficit, I believe that international peace and stability can only be preserved if we maintain a strong and effective national defense. The MX missile, which is operational now, is necessary for the preservation of our national security. It is a program that has been supported by four Presidents and six Congresses; already we have invested \$9 billion in its development. To abandon the MX now would be to waste that investment and gain nothing in security and deterrent capability.

As the MX missile is our best near-term option for meeting ICBM modernization requirements, I believe that we must continue our commitment to its deployment and free the \$1.5 billion needed for the production of 21 missiles. While I certainly support the development of a small, single-warhead ICBM as an important step toward integrating strategic force programs with arms control negotiations, such a system will not be operational before the 1990's and our force modernization must not be delayed any longer. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, it is in the interest of both deterrence and progress in meaningful arms control negotiations that I support the release of funds for production of the MX missile and urge my fellow colleagues to do the same.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. SHUMWAY].

Mr. Chairman, let me say to my colleagues that the American Security

Council is one of the largest private-sector caucuses of any of the groups that surround our Capitol Hill area here. It assists us with information and with an exchange of ideas and some camaraderie on any issue. The American Security Council claims to have 237 Members of this House, and keep in mind that the breakpoint for a majority is 217 plus 1. Their motto is "Peace through Strength."

Now, if every one of the 237 Members, who like to proudly point to their association with the American Security Council and its slogan, were to vote for this system, we would have no issue in doubt here today or when the vote comes tomorrow night. So that means that there must be a goodly number of members of the ASC who have decided to go in a different direction than the general body of knowledge within that organization. If that is so, no one is questioning their patriotism.

I keep hearing this strawman held up here today. There have been some articles that maybe have gone too far across this country, but as I said in a 1-minute speech today, if someone stands in this well as an Amish Member or as one of our great deceased Members from a year ago and votes against every weapons system, if he is a unilateral disarmament person or a pacifist, it still does not bring his patriotism into question. I have not heard one Member on my side of the aisle or on the other side who supports the Peacekeeper do that. So please give us a break and stop holding up this strawman.

This is strictly a question of judgment, and it does not mean you are stupid if you do not go along with the arguments we make for the system. It simply means your judgment takes you in another direction, and we are trying to change minds, both sides in this debate.

Now, in this excellent article that the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McEWEN] sent around, there were some points that I think have to be made. Some of them have already been made, but they bear repeating. Our current actual and projected military spending, \$82 to \$86 billion, comes to \$40 billion less than the Jimmy Carter budgets projected for that time period when the majority party in this House last held the Executive Mansion.

There was a figure of 200 then discussed by President Carter. And how did they arrive at that 200 figure? Because people get up and say that this is a destabilizing first-strike system.

The very thinkers who developed our SIOPS plan to integrate 200 Peacekeeper missiles settled at the 200 figure because they decided that at about 250 MX Peacemakers, with its 10 warheads, you would start to reach

a provocative number where the Soviet Union's paranoia would have some basis in fact. We are now talking about 100 missiles when the Reagan program is completed, and as has been pointed out quite correctly by the gentleman from New Jersey, what we discuss here today is unfencing No. 22 through No. 42—21 missiles only, hardly a first-strike capability.

One-third of 1 percent of our Federal budget goes to this system, and although my constituent, Mr. Russell, may not be precisely correct on 10 weapons systems costing less than the entire program—and some people are throwing around billions of dollars like 30 and 40, and that is not fair—in constant dollars, then dollars projected into the future, the entire 100 will cost \$21.5 billion. And we cannot be unfair and not adhere to that figure since there have been no cost overruns and this is one of the most efficient programs of our strategic system.

As the gentleman from Arizona mentioned, our very latest Minuteman rolled off the assembly line in 1970. We have a choice here of either correcting the aging of some of our IBM land-based forces or letting them be replaced unilaterally by disarmament through obsolescence. Seventy-five percent of the Soviet force is less than 5 years old; 75 percent of our U.S. force is 15 years old or older. Missiles do deteriorate over time.

Many of you have had delivered to your offices a very attractive brochure made up by the U.S. Air Force that talks about the ICBM modernization program. In this brochure, when it discusses the triad, it says we have 38 Titan II missiles on station, and that they will all be phased out by 1986. This is already wrong before it leaves the printer's. By the time it gets around to our offices, we have only 29 Titan missiles on station.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] has again expired.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 additional minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, although 29 is the figure that we say is on line, keep in mind that because the total on-line capability of our strategic forces is classified, our military people can only say that substantially above 90 percent of our Minuteman and Titan missiles are on station at any one time. That means that 29 is not a hard figure. We shut one of these Titans down—and they are deteriorating, and they are liquid-fueled—every 45 days. By September of the first year when the people who are declaring for the next Congress, the 100th Congress, before 9 months is up in that very next Congress, every one of these Titans will be gone and they will only just barely have started

to be replaced by some of these MX Peacekeepers.

But they are going into Minuteman holes, so in effect we are not replacing any of our Titan force, which was really our most powerful weapon, with the 9-megaton warhead.

While we debate the MX—and we will still be debating the B-1; some will come on this floor and try to stop that airplane from being delivered to Minot or Grand Forks Air Force Base in the district of the gentleman from North Dakota [Mr. DORGAN]—first they go to Dyess, then they go to Ellsworth, SD, then to Grand Forks, and there will be four B-1 bases—there will be somebody who will come along and try to stop that strategic defense system. That debate is not over, although we pretty well have the momentum going for those who believe in peace through resolve and strength. We will debate the Trident, we will debate the D-5 missile system, and while we are debating all these systems, the Soviets will have deployed 30 new strategic weapons in various states of research, development, production, and deployment.

The Soviets can target six missile warheads per silo. That is three times more than every intelligence briefing tells us is necessary. Our Defense Intelligence Agency says that Soviet superhardened silos can withstand a direct hit from the warheads of one of our most powerful missiles, the Minuteman III. Only a Peacekeeper can have the deterrent effect of threatening one of the Soviet's superhardened silos.

Peacekeeper will reduce the growing Soviet temptation for a first strike or, even more important—because I agree that they may not be irresponsible enough to consider starting a war, but nuclear blackmail is not beyond them; they exist on diplomatic blackmail in every corner of the world—it gives us a genuine capability to retaliate against some of the Soviets' remaining command bunkers and their missiles, so this is not strictly a countersilo system. It is a system to threaten hardened targets, but that can include submarine pens, it can include some industry, and it certainly should include command bunkers, all toward a deterrent effect.

Now, Cambridge Reports—that is their title; Cambridge Reports is a survey group in this country, highly respected, and I do not have to say that because all the groups polled throughout this country from Gallup to you-name-it agree with this—says that 60 percent of our citizenry agrees against 33 percent on the other side and says yes on Peacekeeper if you give them this following suggestion: That we can resume arms reduction talks with the Soviets from a position of strength. There is a margin of military superiority in spite of what you

hear in this well here of the Soviet Union over the United States in both conventional and strategic forces and this Peacekeeper missile and the entire military modernization program is not going to change that.

□ 1550

We must replace part of our land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles that have already exceeded the design life. All—all will be ready for retirement in the next 5 years. Then what are we going to do?

Our Poseidons will be ready for retirement in 1990. Our B-52's will be more than 30 years old. I repeat, our choice is simple. We either replace some of our aging missiles or they will be replaced through unilateral disarmament by obsolescence.

The President is exactly correct, that if this had been named the Minuteman IV, they have been saying this in the Pentagon, by the way, for years.

Shakespeare is usually right, but in the case of "What's in a name?" "A rose by any other name"—is wrong. He was wrong. If this had been called the Minuteman IV, merely presented to this Congress as a modernization of our decaying, aging Titan force or our Minuteman force, just as the Minuteman I disappeared without a whisper to be replaced by Minuteman III, we would have these systems in silos already.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. WEAVER].

Mr. WEAVER. Mr. Chairman, we have heard a lot about signals in the debate on the MX. And we have heard a lot about resolve. I agree that those are two most important factors in this debate. But they have been used on the wrong side of the issue.

The signal that the people of this Nation are waiting for, are hungering for, is the signal that we are going to do something to slow, to stop the arms race. The signal that we should send—that we must send—to Moscow is a signal that we are serious about mutual disarmament of nuclear weapons. The defeat of the MX by the House would be such a clear signal.

The resolve we must show is not a resolve to continue the insanity of building more weapons of holocaust. The resolve we must show is one of willingness to take risks for curtailment of nuclear weapons by all who possess them. Furthering the arms race leads to their certain use. The construction of more and more nuclear missiles and bombs is sure and swift destruction of our world. Armageddon is waiting to happen. We must resolve to do all in our power to forestall that biblical warning.

President Reagan is obsessed with building more nuclear weapons. All else seems unimportant. Our people

are frightened. Our economy is in deep trouble. Our relations with allies are disintegrating. All this is swept aside in his obdurate demand that we continue the arms race.

Mr. President, do you know what you are doing to this country? Do you know what is happening to us? The growing of food is far more important to our survival as a free people than the building of more nuclear weapons. Yet our farmers are being forced to abandon their farms while you do nothing but pressure the Congress for more bombs.

In 1930 Stalin murdered the farmers of Russia in cold blood. Soviet agriculture has never recovered. They cannot sufficiently feed their own people to this day. Mr. President, you are presiding over the liquidation of our farmers and the result will be the same as Stalin's brutal act. Broken men, though still alive, will not come back to the farm. It will take decades to revive our agriculture if it is allowed to deteriorate further. That would mean disaster for our people. Please consider, Mr. President, something you seem not to understand: National security depends as much if not more on food production as it does on arms production. As another populist once said, let our farms go bankrupt and grass will grow on the streets of our cities. Who will build weapons then?

Mr. President, you are right when you say the farm programs of the past were disastrous. I agree with you they should be changed. But the farmers should not be shipped overseas. We need them here. What we do not need, Mr. President, is more nuclear weapons. We do not need the MX. If you cannot see past your obsession to the real condition of the American people today, to our farms and our industries, then we in the House of Representatives must be your eyes. We in this body must resolve to send a signal to our own President that it is not MX the country needs but a concern for our own people and their livelihoods.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WEAVER. I will be glad to yield.

Mr. COURTER. I just wanted to give the gentleman a chance to clarify a statement that I heard. I am sure I heard it inaccurately. I heard that the gentleman was equating the policies of President Ronald Reagan with that of Stalin in Russia; is that correct?

Mr. WEAVER. I said that Stalin murdered his farmers.

Mr. COURTER. And President Reagan is murdering our farmers?

Mr. WEAVER. And this President is presiding over the liquidation of our own farms.

Mr. COURTER. Well, I thank the gentleman for the clarification. I am sorry that he chooses to use those words about our President.

Mr. WEAVER. Those are the very words I used, I tell my friend, the gentleman from New Jersey, exactly the words I used.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. MONTGOMERY], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Veteran's Affairs and a distinguished member of the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Procurement for giving me this time for the strong stand that he has taken on this side of the aisle in support of the MX missile. I also take the same position as the distinguished chairman, the gentleman from New York.

Most of the subjects have been covered, but I would like to go back over the basing mode. That seems to be the big problem with a number of people who are opponents of the MX missile. They say the basing mode does not make any sense.

Well, I disagree. I think the basing mode that has been selected by this President for the MX is not that bad.

Using existing silos is not a big cost to the taxpayers of this country. I point out that as compared to the racetrack concept. It was estimated that it would cost \$50 billion to put the MX under the racetrack concept.

Under the dense pack basing mode, it would have cost over \$30 billion.

Under a basing mode with existing silos, it would cost \$2.6 billion for 100 missiles. Certainly that is a savings when we are looking to find something that would deter the Soviets, and it makes a lot of sense. You do not have to put a lot of concrete in and use a lot of land when you already have these existing silos.

I know the next point will come up that you can knock out all of these silos. That are already targeted by the Soviet Union. Well, I am not convinced that the Soviets on a first strike can knock out all of these MX's. The point I tried to make in the Democratic caucus the other day was that we do not have any experience in a nuclear war, and that is good. Thank God for that. We do not have that experience, but we do have a lot of experience on what goes wrong in a conventional war. We have found that platoons are wiped out, companies, battalions, when wrong decisions are made, that in a conventional war everything goes wrong.

I would think also this could happen in a nuclear war, that many things could go wrong. Whichever country would launch missiles would be pretty busy. Let us say instead of losing a platoon or a company, you probably are going to lose a whole country. So we better take a good hard look about de-

terrence and how we handle the MX missile.

□ 1600

Another point on mode basing is that if the Soviets do launch a first strike of ICBM's on the United States of America, they are, as I said earlier, going to be pretty busy. As I understand it, the Soviets will have to make an attack on our bombers. By that time they will be up in the air. Soviet missiles can strike these bombers in 8 to 10 minutes.

The Soviets also in the meantime will have to be launching their ICBM's that will take from 30 to 40 minutes to reach the targets here in the United States. And surely whoever our Commander in Chief is, having that 30 or 40 minutes time, is not going to let the MX's or the Minuteman missiles sit in those silos, and he or she is going to launch these missiles. So they will be able to launch them.

It is a good buy. It does not cost a lot of money, as we already have the existing silos.

Someone mentioned and was talking about the small mobile missile, that it makes a lot of sense for us to have them. As I understand it, the concept is now to put these small mobile missiles close to MX silos and Minuteman silos and in case of a first strike coming toward our Minuteman or MX silos we can move these small, mobile missiles away from the silos. We would have at least 15 minutes, and they will go 30 miles an hour, and they can move out. Therefore, the Soviets would not be able to destroy all of our missiles. In fact, they would have to have enough missiles to destroy or put a target base on 44,000 square miles, which would take over 17,000 warheads, and the Soviets just do not have that many warheads.

So I think we ought to work on the MX, move ahead on the MX missile, and also work on the small, mobile missile.

Mr. HUNTER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank my friend from Mississippi for yielding.

I think it is interesting to note that as we have talked now for some 3 or 4 hours in this debate, and as the gentleman was speaking about the MX missile, and the fact that it is tested, it is tried, and it is a system that we have right now, it occurred to me that there has not been yet, at least in my view, a single word of criticism about the missile itself. Nobody has gotten up on the House floor and said, "Well, the guidance system is defective. It does not have a big enough payload; it is not accurate enough." There has not been a single word of criticism, politi-

cal or technical, about the missile itself.

Ambassador Nitze's input in this situation is very vital because this is one of our leading arms negotiators. I want to thank the chairman of the committee, LES ASPIN, for putting together the policy panel where we could listen not just to our DOD representatives, but also listen to our arms negotiators. And Mr. Nitze following the statements that he gave to us, was asked what would happen if MX was killed, and he said:

I think the Soviet Union—the decision-makers in the Soviet Union take many factors into account, and they are really quite conservative on how they estimate what is going to happen in the United States.

If it were not to be unfenced, I think they still would believe that it will be unfenced somewhat later. So I am not sure that it would make an immediate and dramatic difference. But I think it would convey a greater hope to them that there would be opposition in the United States against the very thought of maintaining an adequate deterrent against real opposition, and that it would encourage them to increase their opposition, increase their propaganda campaign, play upon the divisions in Europe and try to defeat us indirectly.

I would simply ask my friends to remember that this in not Ronald Reagan, the Republican, negotiating with the Soviets. It is the United States negotiating with the Soviets. Paul Nitze represents all of us.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Let me make a point on this basing mode. The gentleman is supporting the MX concept and the basing mode, so he generally feels like I do, that we could launch these missiles. So, therefore, that puts the ball back in the court of the Soviet Union, in that it is a deterrent that they know that they cannot knock out all of these MX missiles. So it will deter them from firing a first strike.

Mr. HUNTER. Absolutely. And in the case of a submarine ballistic missile launched attack against our bomber bases, they would now have that much more deterrent in our ICBM's that we could retaliate with. So there is a deterrent capability with MX even using the basing mode that the gentleman talked about.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentleman.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. COURTER. The inquiry is how much time is left for the proponents and the opponents of the motion in the aggregate. I seem to have lost track. I wonder if the Chair can advise me.

The CHAIRMAN. There remains 1 hour and 43 minutes of today's time for the general debate for the opponents of the legislation and 1 hour and 23 minutes for the proponents for today's debate.

Mr. COURTER. And who has the 1 hour and 43 minutes?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT].

Mr. BENNETT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COURTER. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. BENNETT. Someone just told me that the White House has asked people to come down there at 5 o'clock. I have not been asked to come, and I never knew about this, and I am not upset about it at all. But I realize that if that is true it is kind of awkward about our time here and I do not know exactly what you want to do with us if we do not finish, because there is not enough time between now, if we get everybody's time. I do not know what that problem is. I am not invited, and as long as I am not invited I will stay here. But if we are going to complete the time I guess we would have to come back. And I never heard of going to the White House and coming back. That is something new. I never heard about that.

But, anyway, that is just a thought for the Speaker to think about.

Mr. Chairman, I now yield 13 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. DOWNEY].

Mr. DICKINSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. I appreciate the gentleman yielding in order that I might reply. It was my understanding, and all I know is that an invitation came to the office that all of the Members were being invited to the White House at 5 o'clock this evening.

Mr. BENNETT. What is the idea for handling the House? How are we going to handle it with this debate taking place on the floor?

I never received such a message myself, and I am not uptight about it at all. I have already been to the White House once.

Mr. DICKINSON. It is very seldom that they consult with us before they make any decisions. They simply inform us. There is supposed to be a bus being provided starting at 4 o'clock to take the Members down and to bring them back. There was not any concert with anything I did or that the committee did. It was just an announcement because they brought one of the negotiators back to discuss the state of the negotiations.

So I intend to be here as long as the debate is going on.

Mr. BENNETT. That being the case, then you and I can talk it over together, if necessary. We can just stay here and talk.

Mr. DICKINSON. I am always glad to speak to a gentleman who is amenable to logic and persuasion, and if his mind is not closed.

Mr. BENNETT. Then that settles the question, because we will just stay here, because I do not know of any way in which you can request that the Congress recess.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me. We are going to spend a great deal of time listening to the pros and cons of the MX missile. We have already heard a great deal, and we will hear more as the afternoon and tomorrow wend their way.

But I want to talk for a few minutes about strength. The issue of strength has been raised on this floor of whether Democrats are for it or against it. And I will outline some of the things that I know to be strong, and elements of strength, and things that Democrats are for.

First of all, Democrats are not for vulnerable systems. If there is one great lesson of history it is that in Pearl Harbor in 1941 we had a very powerful fleet stationed there, powerful and exposed, and it was a ripe target that was attacked, and attacked convincingly. Doing that again is something we are clearly not for.

What we can argue, in a bipartisan way, is that we are both for peace, and peace is not just the absence of war, but a recognition that we inhabit this planet with the Soviets, and we need to get along, that we have got to be able to resolve our differences through negotiations, as opposed to through violence. And that in the process of establishing a permanent peace, we need to recognize that nuclear weapons are here to stay, probably through our lifetime and the lifetime of our children. That is an unfortunate fact of life.

The question of how we achieve that peace with nuclear weapons has been resolved over the last 40 years through a process of deterrence. It makes sense, up to a point. It is something that has worked, albeit we are questioning it now with the advent of star wars.

□ 1610

Deterrence is best maintained through the process of having a stabilizing force on both sides.

Since I cannot tell the other side what their force is going to be, I only have control over my own force. Our own achieves deterrence when it is survivable and not provocative, when it is a second strike.

What are the elements of this force? You need to have a capable triad, that is without question, no one disputes that. We will dispute of course what the elements should be, how it should be modernized.

The first thing we need to continue to explore is the idea of freezing the testing and deployment of new types of weapons. And I hope that is some-

thing that our negotiators keep in mind as we begin this entire process, because you can achieve enormous security with a freeze on the testing and deployment of new weapons and existing weapons.

But let me talk for a few minutes about the triad. Clearly the submarine-based leg of our triad is its most survivable base. It is clear to me that even with the advances the Soviets have made in ASW that the Trident submarine force will remain a secure and viable element of deterrence, certainly for the next 10 to 20 years.

A sea-based leg of the triad is best if it is believed to be a second-strike force; a survivable force of Trident I missiles, where we would use the additional money now planned for the D-5 to be plowed back to buy additional Trident submarines with C-4, makes the most sense.

I believe there are many other Democrats who believe that as well.

With respect to the air-breathing leg of the triad, there have been discussions of whether or not the B-1 is the best system or not. I believe that the cruise-missile-carrying wide-bodied jets, plus the stretched FB-111's was the better way to go but that has not been the path this Congress has chosen. It has chosen the B-1 bomber. It is likely that the B-1 bomber will be secured, up to possibly 100 and maybe even more. We will have the B-1, we will have cruise missiles, we will have SRAM's, we will have the B-52H's probably for the next 20 years. We will certainly have the B-1 for that period of time.

Last, and some Democrats are for the B-1 and some are against it, but everyone as far as I can tell has been for the cruise missile program. I have been. We were a little concerned when President Ford slowed it down but we are pleased at the rate at which it has been procured to date.

Last, we come to the ICBM leg of the triad. For those of you who believe that you can have a Midgetman without arms control, let me disabuse you of that notion. If we do not have a way to restrain the number of Soviet warheads aimed at us, we are not going to be in the environment of the future capable of deploying a survivable Midgetman unless we can reduce their warheads.

So arms control and the Midgetman go hand in hand. And I believe as, other Democrats, do that a single survivable warhead that has mobility is a viable way to provide deterrence.

Now why do we want a second-strike force? Why should we not do what the Soviets have done, and build big missiles and threaten their big missiles? First of all, we should build what we need and not what the Soviets have built. And if our policy is to be a second strike, and President Reagan has said it is a second-strike policy,

you will hear throughout the course of the debate on the MX that our policy is second-strike, the MX has no place in that strategy. It has no place because even with hardening of silos, to 100,000 or higher pounds per square inch, this is a vulnerable system.

When we debated the B-70, and I was not here during the period of the sixties when that was debated, it was clearly recognized that the B-70, though it would fly high and fast, was vulnerable to Soviet land-based missile attack; we decided to scrap it. Now we are faced with an interesting similar position today.

The MX as it is currently configured is the first system that we will consciously deploy that is both vulnerable and antithetical to our stated policy of second strike.

How can we achieve stability and deterrence while we proceed with modernization? The Soviets have in the past suggested that we have a freeze. We discussed the freeze here on the floor of the House of Representatives. It passed here; it did not pass in the Senate.

What would the freeze provide us? Well, the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] raised an interesting point before. He said that our force structure manages to survive, and Mr. DICKS, our colleague from Washington, has made the same point, because there is a synergism; you cannot attack land-based missiles and bombers simultaneously because submarine-based ballistic missiles that the Soviets currently have are not capable of doing that, and that is correct.

But there will come a time in the future when Soviet sea-based missiles will be accurate enough to attack bombers and land-based missiles. Then the advantage will be to the side that goes first. And that will leave us with only the sea-based leg of the triad as a viable system of deterrence.

Now while I believe that that sea-based leg of the triad is a viable system of deterrence, I do not want to rely on it alone. Only if we restrain the next generation of technology on their side will we see this notion of stability and deterrence survive. If the Soviets are allowed to get highly accurate sea-based systems, whether we have them or not, both sides are less secure.

The only way stability can be achieved is if: First, we build weapons that are stabilizing; and second, restrain the other side from building systems that are destabilizing.

Whether we shout at the Soviets, whether we talk to the Soviets, whether we ignore the Soviets, the decision in the next day will be based on what is in the U.S. security interests in terms of procurement first. I hope and I wish our negotiators well, but we need to make the judgment not based on what happens in Geneva, but what

happens here on the floor of the Congress. We need to emphasize stabilizing survivable systems and let the negotiators achieve what they can.

We are here with the awesome responsibility of providing this country a deterrent force. The MX has no place in that deterrent force.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOWNEY of New Jersey. I will be happy to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I appreciate the gentleman's statement. He indicated that Democrats, I guess that is with a large "D," do not vote in favor of vulnerable systems. I ask the gentleman really two questions: First, does he believe in the synergistic effect with regard to the multiple systems that we have, which is explained by Scowcroft, explained by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS] and a number of other people; No. 1; and second, how would the gentleman talk about the vulnerability of the Minuteman II's and III's? Certainly he is not arguing that we should remove them from the arsenal. They have some deterrent capability, but they are vulnerable according to his definition.

Finally I am sure the gentleman recognizes the importance of systems like tanks which are vulnerable, systems like command-and-control centers which are necessary for strategic capability and so forth.

Mr. DOWNEY of New Jersey. Let me try to answer the gentleman.

Mr. COURTER. Early-warning radars, they are all vulnerable. So obviously you have voted in favor of vulnerable systems.

□ 1620

Mr. DOWNEY of New Jersey. Let me try and answer the gentleman's question, because I think he has made his point clear.

The gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS] will tell you, and I think, the record is ample demonstration of the fact, that I believe in synergism; indeed, for those of you who are losing sleep over the window of vulnerability, when the Scowcroft Commission finally provided you the sleeping pill so that you can get through the evening not worrying about it, you had heard me and others already talk for years about the synergistic effect; that it is insane for anyone to believe that he could simply attack one leg of the triad and not have the other two survive to destroy him.

That exists today. That is true today. The best way to retain the survivability of the land-based force is to prevent the Soviet Union from doing any more testing of its SS-18 and SS-19.

That is the way, over time, for the land-based leg of the triad to become more secure. You cannot wage a first strike unless you have done the sort of tests that allow you to have some confidence that your system will work. If you do not test, you cannot wage a first strike. That is the way to prevent the vulnerability of land-based systems.

As to the vulnerability of tanks and other systems, any military system we build is—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 additional minutes to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Any system you build is potentially capable of being destroyed. MX is a lot more so than most. The question is, whether or not you want to lead with your chin or not.

I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. I appreciate the gentleman yielding, and the gentleman is correct; he was one of those, along with Congressman DELUMS, talked about the synergistic relationship long before the Scowcroft Commission came up with it, basically on the argument that you didn't need to go to the MPS system; that you could put missiles in existing silos and because of synergism, the Soviets could never, a Soviet war planner could not attack the land-based missiles in isolation.

I guess, I just feel that this is still the case and that we get one thing that the Scowcroft Commission talked about out of some deployment of MX and that is leverage to get the Soviets to move out of their vulnerable silos toward mobile systems like the SS-24 and SS-25, and as we move toward Midgetman, then we have enhanced stability because we have gone to mobile systems which are more survivable.

I say to the gentleman, if we kill the MX program, I do not see why the Soviets would continue to go on a mobile basis if they have a sanctuary with 648 SS-18's and SS-19's that are now invulnerable to attack because we do not have a system that is accurate enough.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Let me respond to the gentleman, because he has raised a thoughtful question, and we have discussed it both publicly and privately.

First of all, the synergism remains whether you have MX or not, with the Minuteman II's and III's because they still cannot, whether you have MX or do not deploy MX, destroy the land-based system and the bomber system simultaneously.

The second point, and I thought I made this and I will make it again, is that when you are attempting to lay out what is best for your country, clearly you must be cognizant of what

it is the Soviets are doing. One can argue that they are going mobile because of any number of systems; MX, the Pershing or the D-5. I mean, all would argue for the Soviets to go mobile.

The logic is somewhat confused and circular. I do not know why it makes a lot of sense for us to deploy systems that can be easily countered by the Soviet Union. That is a question that we need to raise at another time.

The point the gentleman has made to which I agree is that we retain the synergistic effects with the existing land-based leg of the triad. You need not have another system to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has again expired.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I will yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman, after I make a remark myself.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to say about the point of synergism and the triad, that after all there is another thing we have not talked about too much, and that is the cruise missile. I guess it is synergistic as well.

So this beautiful concept of synergism, it just has to do with the fact that they do work together, and so does the triad which already exists. If you got rid of all the ICBM's, there would still be synergism.

I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. As the gentleman knows, it has been 12 years now since the last Minuteman III's were built. We have argued about this missile system. During that timeframe, the Soviets have deployed seven new ICBM's, they have modernized their entire force; what I do not understand is why it is bad for us to have some prompt, hard target capability to get them out of those vulnerable silos as long as we do not present them with a first strike potential?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I do not think that the point is necessarily the one that the gentleman has made. We do have hard target kill capability; we retain that capability in the cruise missile; we cannot do it in 30 minutes, we can do it in 8 hours.

The point the gentleman makes is that there is somehow a need for us to be able to place in jeopardy Soviet ICBM's, because this is something they have decided to do. Well, I do not believe that they have chosen the right path for stability. I do not want to mirror their mistake. I want our system to be deterrent, nonthreatening, and survivable.

If it is those things, we can hold ourselves out to the world as truly being the ones who are interested in deterrence, not the ones who are interested in waging a first strike. The problem is, when the numbers of MX are added

to the numbers of D-5, added to the number of Pershing II are added together, that is a first-strike capability.

We can talk ourselves until we are blue in the face saying we do not want to wage a first strike, but if the Russians were doing the same thing, we would have to respond. They will have to respond; the arms race will be ratcheted to another level that will be mutually detrimental, and that is something I want to prevent.

I will be happy to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I appreciate my colleague yielding to me.

Let me ask the gentleman about something that has troubled me, and I think must trouble every Member of the House that has to make this decision in voting for or against MX.

We have had very esteemed leaders come before us; people who have worked for Democrat and Republican administrations like Paul Nitze. The last thing Paul Nitze told us was, I think it would convey a greater hope to them, the Soviet Union, that there would be opposition in the United States against the very thought of maintaining an adequate deterrent against real opposition, and it would encourage them to increase their opposition, increase their propaganda campaign, play up on the divisions in Europe—very important to us, and to try to defeat us indirectly.

That is a very strong statement for Mr. Nitze to make, and not only did he make that but four Secretaries of Defense said essentially the same thing; and I would ask my friend, if perception is also an important part of this game. Because here he says, the way the Soviets perceive this, you may say it is a common sense decision, but their headline is going to be "the Reagan Administration Has Been Weakened." Does not that bother you?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BENNETT. I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. These talks will probably take a great deal of time.

I do greatly respect Mr. Nitze, Mr. Kampelman, and our arms negotiators. They have been appointed by President Reagan. President Reagan believes deeply in the MX missile; I would be very surprised if Mr. Kampelman were to come back and say, "I do not think it is such a good idea." He'd lose his job.

This has been a position that the administration has maintained, and I anticipate that with all due respect to these eminent gentlemen, they maintain their position because it is the position of the administration.

Mr. HUNTER. If the gentleman would continue to yield, I think you missed part of my question.

My question is not just about the MX missile; it is about the other things that Mr. Nitze talks about. Play up on the divisions in Europe. I think the Soviets have perceived that coming out of the Euromissile crisis, Europe held together.

I think Mr. Gorbachev will be very skilled in driving those wedges in Europe.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I am not going to let the Soviets dictate our policies to us.

□ 1630

The Soviets have been witness to the 40 years of the miracle of democracy, where members like ourselves, who held very different views, were capable of discussing and resolving our differences in open debate. That will continue to be the case of the next couple of years as we sort through what is appropriate for our own defense and what is not appropriate for our own defense. Let the talks go ahead as they will, and let us try and make the decision as to what is best for America's security independent of those discussions.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McEWEN].

Mr. McEWEN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, Adm. Thomas Moorer, who led the interrogation of the Japanese high command at the end of World War II, explained to us that when he had questioned the Japanese leaders as to why they felt they could attack the United States of America on December 7, 1941, with impunity, he said the answer he received from the Japanese high command was the same from all: They had logically looked at the United States and had come to a conclusion on three points. First of all, they recalled that President Roosevelt's request for reinstitution of the draft had passed this body by only one vote; second, the United States had failed to fortify its interests at Wake and Guam Islands; and, third, the U.S. Army had just completed maneuvers in Louisiana, using wooden rifles and cardboard tanks.

Admiral Moorer points out that it was the conclusion of the Japanese high command that the United States of America, when presented with a fait accompli, that when they woke up on Sunday morning and the deed was done, that the United States of America would have neither the will nor the capacity to respond. And thus they made the decision to attack our sovereign territory.

Mr. Chairman, common sense tells us that being unprepared for war has never prevented one. In 1973, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev said:

Trust us, comrades, for by 1985, as a consequence of what we are now achieving, we will have reached most of our objectives . . . a decisive shift in the correlation of forces will be such that by 1985 we will be able to exert our will whenever and wherever we choose.

Gen. George Washington, our first President, said in his first address to the Congress: "To be prepared for war is the effectual means of preserving peace."

We are now engaged in a historic debate on whether to maintain our Nation's defenses sufficient to deter war and thus preserve the peace.

Mr. John Fisher, president of the American Security Council, recently said in an article to a Washington newspaper anti-defense lobbyists and lawmakers have attacked the MX as being part of a massive defense buildup. They fail to mention that President Reagan's actual and projected total military spending for 1982 through 1986 is \$40 billion less than that which was planned by his predecessor during the same period. In addition, while Mr. Carter had requested 200 MX missiles, President Reagan has cut that request in half.

The MX will replace our 30-year-old Titan missiles. This replacement is necessary if the U.S. wishes to maintain a land-based deterrent.

While the MX is expensive, the total cost of this long overdue replacement is less than one-third of 1 percent of the 1985 Federal budget. The last four Presidents, the last four Secretaries of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for over a decade have all urged modernization of our ICBM force by building the MX. While the United States has not built a missile since the 1960's, Soviet production has never stopped.

Mr. Fisher goes on to say that today 75 percent of Soviet strategic weapons are less than 5 years old while 75 percent of U.S. strategic weapons are at least 3 times as old or older. Missiles, like planes and submarines, deteriorate over time. They become less dependable. Time makes them obsolete. The Soviets know this and have thus continued a program of replacing their old missiles with new ones. They now have in place more than 600 strategic missiles that are more powerful than the MX. In fact, in 1982 alone, they installed more MX type warheads than the United States plans to deploy in its entire program.

I cannot help but wonder why certain so-called peace groups have never protested this massive ongoing Soviet military buildup.

Last year the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission stated that it is essential to replace our aging Titan and Minuteman missile systems which are currently being dismantled because they are too old, too corroded, too dangerous to maintain. While the U.S. Congress still debates the MX missile, the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine,

the Soviets have 30 new strategic weapons currently in production. Today the tremendous Soviet advantage allows them to target six warheads on each of our ICBM silos, which is about three times more than they need. But here is the crux of the debate: The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that the Soviet's superhardened silos can withstand a direct hit from our most powerful Minuteman III's. The MX would be the only missile in our arsenal that could threaten those Soviet silos, a necessity for deterrence.

Thus, the MX missile would reduce the growing Soviet temptation for a first strike or for nuclear blackmail, because it reestablishes—it does not launch onto new ground—it reestablishes a meaningful capacity to react to a Soviet attack.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McEWEN] has expired.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 additional minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McEWEN].

Mr. McEWEN. According to both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Soviet Union now has a margin of military superiority over the United States in both conventional and strategic forces. The MX missile and the entire military modernization program will not change any of that. The U.S. modernization program is only aimed at replacing part of our strategic defense that because of age must be replaced. Our land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles have already exceeded their design life and must be dismantled. Our aging strategic submarine force must be retired over the next few years. Our 30-year-old B-52 bomber force has by attrition been reduced from 2,300 bombers under President Kennedy to 287 under Carter and 231 today. The last U.S. bomber that was built was built when I was in the sixth grade.

I recently saw a documentary on the production of the B-52, which began in 1952, was produced for 10 years and then terminated by Robert McNamara when President Kennedy impounded the funds that were appropriated by the Congress for the last 90. The reason it was proposed the B-52 should not be built was because: First, it was too expensive, it was three times the most expensive plane ever built, second, as it rolled off production in 1952 they said it was too sophisticated to maintain; and third, they said it was World War II technology that was now obsolete.

□ 1640

Those three points as to why we should not build the B-52; it was too expensive, too sophisticated, and obsolete.

I guarantee that that same debate will be applied to every weapons system by those who choose not to strengthen our national defenses. You can take the debate, anyone who served in this Congress for more than a year, can take the debate on any system, whether it be on the M-1, whether it be on the B-1, whether it be on the MX, whether it be on aircraft carriers, whether it be on cruise missiles, and the response will be the same: No 1, it is too expensive, No 2, it is too sophisticated to maintain, and No 3, it is already obsolete.

The question was asked earlier in the debate, why all the fuss over the MX? I have the answer to that: Because the MX is the first commitment by the United States to maintain the strategic triad since 1950. Essentially the choice before Congress is between replacing some of our aging ICBM's, or continuing our unilateral disarmament by obsolescence.

For 40 years, our strong defense has deterred aggression and kept the peace. The world is too dangerous and human liberty is too valuable to invite aggression by abandoning it now.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume to ask a question.

Would the gentleman from Florida indicate whether or not he plans to use all the time allotted today, or does he have an idea at this time?

Mr. BENNETT. I do intend to use all the time that people have asked for today, which will take us well beyond 5 o'clock, in my opinion, because I am extending time as people ask me. But I think at the end of the day we can probably say that the time we will have is 4 hours tomorrow. Is that what the gentleman understands? That is agreeable to me.

Mr. DICKINSON. Let me say first that I have checked, and the White House informs me that every office was called on the Democratic side, including the gentleman from Florida, and I do not know why he did not get the message, but—

Mr. BENNETT. I checked myself, and my staff has told me categorically that no such message has been received. I am not uptight about it. I just do not know why the White House is able to cut off this debate. If you want to do it the other way, it suits me. Is there some way to recess and come back?

Mr. DICKINSON. No, not at all. And I do not know who was so bright down at the White House that they would schedule a briefing during our debate on the bill. There has to be somebody down there with more sense than that. I do not know, but I think there ought to be more sense than that.

Anyway, I plan to stay here as long as the time that is allocated. We will conclude with the number of speakers

that we have over here. It is my understanding that the gentleman will go forward as long as there are speakers desiring to be heard on this side.

Mr. BENNETT. The only speakers I have here are Mr. MARKEY, Mr. LEHMAN, Mr. MAVROULES and possibly Mr. SEIBERLING. They are the only ones who have asked me. But that does look like beyond five. Not being invited at all, if the gentleman wants to go to the White House, maybe he could put somebody else in that chair. I will not take advantage of the gentleman. I do not know how.

Mr. DICKINSON. I thank the gentleman. What I was trying to indicate is that we will go forward, and all of the speakers who wish to be heard will be heard on this side today, until the expiration of the total 6 hours, if that is agreeable with the gentleman, and I assume that the gentleman from New York, who is handling the proponents' time on that side, will agree to that.

I will be glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. STRATTON. I think we ought to continue until we have exhausted any speakers who want to speak from this side.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield, briefly?

Mr. DICKINSON. I will yield to the gentleman if the gentleman from New York has finished responding. Has the gentleman from New York finished responding?

Mr. STRATTON. Yes. As I said, we intend to go to anybody else who wants to speak. I do not know how many speakers there are.

Mr. DICKINSON. I yield to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS].

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the MX continues to be an extremely emotionally charged issue for this House and for the Nation as a whole. It has become for many a symbol of either our resolve to respond to the Soviet arms buildup or to ending the nuclear arms race.

While I certainly do not underestimate the importance of the issue, MX is a system whose virtues are exaggerated by its strongest opponents, and whose drawbacks are oversold by its sharpest critics. To paraphrase Columnist Leslie Gelb's observations on arms control, MX is neither sin nor salvation. It is rather an important, but far from inclusive, issue in the overall question of how to reconcile the implications of Soviet nuclear force deployments and the desire to vigorously pursue reductions in nuclear arms on both sides that can result in a more stable environment and lessen the chances that tensions could lead to nuclear conflict.

What MX has come to symbolize is the divisiveness in the American body politic that has resulted in a discouraging lack of progress toward either of these goals. What we have instead are

"phyrric" victories for those who advocate strategic modernization or arms control to the exclusion of the other. One element hailed the success of their efforts to block ratification of the SALT II agreement on the grounds that it would result in Soviet superiority. The other side seeks to halt whatever U.S. strategic weapons program is closest to deployment in the belief that this will somehow end the arms race.

But both sides are repeatedly frustrated. The Reagan administration, for all its campaign rhetoric, continues to observe SALT II limits. And strategic modernization issues do not somehow magically disappear. The realities of this imperfect world are that for the foreseeable future, some mix of both arms control and strategic force modernization is required if we are to protect freedom and reduce the chances of war.

It is in recognition of this reality, and the roadblock that polarization presents to facing it, that I joined with others in this House and in the other body to seek a bipartisan consensus on a balanced approach to these issues. We saw the report of the Scowcroft Commission, which combined recommendations for strategic modernization that could lead us toward a more stable environment with the requirement to vigorously pursue arms reduction efforts, as a guideline on which to base such a consensus.

I believe we have had some success in this area. I think any objective observer would have to conclude that this administration has exhibited a more flexible and serious approach to arms control as a result of its endorsement of the Scowcroft recommendations. I have just returned from Geneva where I was a congressional observer to the negotiations. I am convinced that we have an extremely capable team that is dedicated to seeking an agreement that will enhance mutual security. I am also convinced that the flexibility they have been provided will make an agreement more likely. While the history of negotiations on these issues with the Soviets teaches us that progress takes time, I count myself as an optimist that we can be successful.

There has also been some success in promoting more stable strategic modernization efforts. The single warhead missile has received strong support and research on it is proceeding well. The Congress has developed parameters on the program designed to ensure that it meets the objectives outlined in the Scowcroft report and has tied MX developments to progress on this system. We have also voted to moderate the rate of MX procurement over the last 2 years.

But the tenor of this debate clearly illustrates that we have not been total-

ly successful. The middle ground on strategic issues remains a lonely area. But I am committed to continuing the effort to make it a majority. Because regardless of the outcome of this vote, or the fate of this particular weapons system, the question of how to reconcile the twin goals of force parity and arms control in a way that can prevent war will go on. We will still have to debate the fate of the Midgetman, whether to deploy the D-5 and if so in what numbers, what to do about anti-satellite weapons and where we go with SDI.

There are also critical arms control questions to resolve. We have to decide what form interim restraints will take while negotiations are underway. Both sides must work to reaffirm the AMB treaty. We have to determine how strategic defenses could be consistent with offensive force reductions or if they will fuel the arms race. And if this latter outcome is the case, which I think is most likely, how do we put in place controls that will have the confidence of both parties?

Without a consensus approach that will give us a consistent and enduring approach, we will continue to spin our wheels, miss opportunities, and the world will become even more dangerous.

With these factors in mind, and after long and difficult reflection, I have concluded that the release of funds for the 21 MX missiles included in the fiscal year 1985 Defense Authorization Act should be approved.

I have reached this conclusion first because I believe that it will help contribute to force stability. I reject the contention of nuclear warfighting advocates that a nuclear conflict could somehow be won. The truth is that the whole world would be the loser. But I also reject the argument that force structure imbalances are irrelevant to efforts to prevent nuclear war, or to avoid submission to nuclear blackmail.

Like it or not, we live in a world where our safety and freedom depends on deterrence. Deterrence is by its very nature in the mind of the beholder, it can not be neatly quantified. Our task is to balance the uncertainties facing a Soviet leader. There must be enough force to make as certain as possible that a rational adversary will not attack, or seek to coerce us through the threat of attack. At the same time we must be careful not to accumulate so much force that will create the fear that a rational American President would attack or seek to coerce. If we do, the temptation to preempt such a feared attack might become too attractive for comfort.

The sad fact of the matter is that the Soviets have deployed 648 large, MIRV'd, highly accurate SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM's. We have not deployed any forces that threaten them. This

Soviet monopoly in prompt hard target capabilities causes this member, at least, some uneasiness.

The question is how do we convince the Soviets to move, over time, in both arms control and force deployments away from this type of system. The Scowcroft Commission concluded that some MX are "necessary to encourage the Soviets to move toward the more stable regime of deployments and arms control" outlined in that report. The prospect of MX has in fact already resulted in the Soviets moving in the direction of mobile systems which were advocated by Scowcroft, with the SS-24 and SS-25. We want to continue that trend, and I must conclude that release of funds for these 21 missiles will do so.

The second basis for my support of the resolution relates to arms control negotiations. It is important to make the distinction between the leverage that the Scowcroft report saw some MX providing, and the traditional concept of a bargaining chip. The leverage argument sees MX as a necessary means toward an end, the incentive that can provide enhanced stability. It is in this respect like the ugly duckling that led to the swan.

In an arms reduction agreement we may well want to give up the MX. I would certainly hope that if the Soviets were willing to make substantial reductions in their force of SS-18's and 19's that we would be willing to do the same for MX. But this is not the only potential positive outcome.

The potential for any positive outcome will be hindered by a refusal to approve this resolution in my judgment. The negotiations have just begun and this is the first test of our united front. Ambassador Nitze said it very clearly in his March 15 letter to House members.

I believe the prospects for achieving meaningful arms reductions with the Soviets will be damaged if Congress fails to support President Reagan's request for MX production funds.

It is impossible to address this question without also asking the question, what about the long term? What happens to MX after this resolution is resolved?

The issue of ICBM survivability will continue to be an issue. I concur with the statement made by my colleague from California [Mr. DELLUMS] on this floor last year on this subject:

A number of people in the Pentagon said that when they evaluated America's nuclear triad, that they came to the interesting conclusion that our land based missiles would be vulnerable to Soviet attack sometime in the mid-1980s. A number of us, the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. DOWNEY], myself, and others took the floor in the 1970's and argued against this assertion.

We said you do not need each leg of the nuclear triad to be independently survivable. To use the argument of my colleague

from Washington, we argued that the synergistic relationship among the three aspects of the triad collectively would not allow this country to be vulnerable, that no rational Soviet planner would look at America's ICBM's and say, "Aha, they are now vulnerable to attack," because they knew what we knew. We had two other legs of the triad that could wreak havoc on the Soviet Union * * * You do not need each leg to be independently survivable.

While I recognize that my good friend from California does not agree with me on the question of MX production, we do agree that opposition should be on other grounds than the supposed window of vulnerability. One must recognize that ICBM's constitute only about 25 percent of U.S. strategic forces, as contrasted to 70 percent of Soviet forces. Even with the full MX force advocated by the administration it would constitute only 10 percent of our overall ICBM launchers, and only about 10 percent of our total ballistic missile warheads. Thus I conclude that the near-term leverage provided by deployment of a limited MX force does not produce unacceptable risks.

For the longer term I share the concerns of many, because we can never be absolutely certain what future developments hold for the survivability of the other legs of the triad. That is why I am a strong supporter of development of a survivable single warhead missile and an active research effort into more survivable ICBM basing modes.

A second long-term question relates to force size. I must state that I have serious questions about the implications of the full force of 100 MX advocated by the administration. It was these questions which prompted me last year to include an amendment on the authorization bill that requires a detailed report on overall strategic modernization plans, including anticipated numbers of D-5 Trident II missiles and Midgetmen. This report, due April 15, will help the Congress insure that the President's commitment not to develop a U.S. first-strike capability is fulfilled.

A factor in this issue is the better than anticipated accuracies demonstrated in MX tests to date. This combined with recent adjustments in estimates of Soviet silo hardness could well enhance the military effectiveness of the MX and require a smaller force structure for the same capability.

My own personal view, is that with approval of the missiles covered in this resolution, the time will have come for a de novo review of the MX program. We will have approved 42 missiles, which I believe represents a militarily significant force. In fact many Members may remember that in 1981 this administration originally suggested we deploy only 36 MX in existing silos while we sought a more survivable

basing mode for the longer term. Let me cite Secretary Weinberger's own statement before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee:

Deploying the MX in reconstructed silos gives us a short-term improvement in our existing ICBM force. It is an interim way of breaking the Soviet monopoly on prompt hard target counterforce capability until the D-5 and more permanent MX deployments become operational.

For any deployed force, operational test and spare missiles will be required. I am inclined to think that it will be appropriate to pause with approval of 40 to 50 deployable missiles, keep a warm line with production at a moderate rate of testing and spare missiles, and defer final judgment on the ultimate MX force objective while we consider developments in a number of areas.

Among the issues that must be considered are what progress we have made in arms reduction efforts; what developments have taken place on other strategic weapons programs both in the United States and the Soviet Union; what we have learned from our exploration of alternative basing modes; and what direction the debate over strategic defense takes us.

By keeping a warm production line we can maintain the needed leverage for arms control without making commitments that could prejudice desirable outcomes.

I certainly recognize that this is not the administration's view on the issue. While I speak only for myself, I know that this approach does have attractions for many Members who have pondered this question. It represents what I believe is a reasonable outcome that could command broad support.

Let me conclude by looking ahead and considering what would happen if this House votes not to approve this resolution.

The President will accuse the House, and the Democratic Party in particular, of undercutting the negotiations in Geneva.

It will strengthen the hand of those both inside and outside the administration who oppose arms control negotiations in principle and who believe that no positive agreement is remotely possible.

It will inhibit U.S. flexibility in Geneva on the strategic defense initiatives and other thorny issues.

There are also things that rejection of the resolution will not accomplish:

It will not finally resolve the MX question. The fiscal year 1986 request will still be before us and the administration will redouble their efforts for approval. Anyone in this House who thinks this is your last MX vote is dreaming.

It will not produce a Soviet offer to correspondingly reduce its forces. As they responded to our SALT negotiators when asked what they would give

up after we decided unilaterally to cancel B-1, "Nothing, we are neither philanthropists nor fools, now what else do you want to give up?"

In sum defeat of this resolution will have no positive results, but many negative ones. It would be a bad step for the Nation, our party, and the prospects for a consensus that could give the arms reductions negotiations a legitimate chance.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 9 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MARKEY].

Mr. MARKEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, spring is here and so is the first vote of the year on the MX missile. When you are looking for a reason why the MX should be continued in production, you just look at the newspaper headlines. Right now, the Geneva talks are opening, so Geneva is the reason that we need the MX missile. Every year we get a different reason, but the program remains the same.

Before, they said that we had to build the MX because we have a window of vulnerability. Remember that one? But after racetracks and dense packs, they found no home for the MX except the same vulnerable Minuteman silos. Therefore, they decided that there is no window of vulnerability, so we can build the MX missile.

Last year they said that we need the MX because we are not talking to the Soviets. Now they say we need the MX because we are talking to the Soviets. In this spinning constellation of administration policies and pronouncements, there is one fixed star: Produce the MX regardless of the consequences. It is "promise them anything, but give them the MX."

I think we can all agree on one thing: The MX is a loser. Strategically, militarily, economically, it makes absolutely no sense. Defense missiles and nuclear arms control are supposed to have the same purpose; to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The MX does just the opposite. The MX decreases stability and increases the risk of nuclear war.

We all know about the merits of the MX, it has none. The MX is to nuclear weapons what Ohio savings and loans is to the banking industry: It is a missile without a mission. A weapon without a home. It will sit in the same, vulnerable silos that house Minuteman missiles and invite a Soviet attack. It is called the Peacekeeper, but it is in fact a war fighter. It is a \$41 billion exercise in weakening American security and reducing nuclear stability.

Unable to argue for the MX on its merits, the administration is trying to give it a sugar coating of arms control to bathe it in the glow of Geneva. Now President Reagan has ordered Max Kampelman to abandon the arms

talks at Geneva, to come to Washington to push for MX production, and all of us are invited over to the White House at 5 o'clock tonight to talk to Mr. Kampelman about the need for an MX missile. Our chief arms control negotiator may miss talks in Geneva in order to lobby for more nuclear missiles. That says it all about this administration's attitude about new nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman, President Reagan has been telling the truth: The MX is not a bargaining chip for Geneva; Geneva is a bargaining chip for the MX. The MX missile is making a mockery of the Geneva talks. And the story this spring is the same as it was last summer: Promise them arms control, but give them MX.

Last year, there were three positions here in the House. Some of us wanted no production of the MX missile. The administration wanted production of the MX missile. The compromise position was to fence production of the MX so long as the Soviets were negotiating in good faith.

Let me quote from the architect of that compromise, Congressman LES ASPIN, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee:

The amendment that we are offering here is an amendment that says that we will vote for 15 missiles, fence the money for 6 months, wait and see if the Soviets come back to the table. If they come back to the bargaining table, the money is not spent. If they do not come back to the bargaining table, the money is released.

Now that was the argument for the Aspin-Price amendment. Use the MX as an incentive for the Soviets to negotiate. As long as the talks are going on, the funds remain fenced. That was the purpose of the Bennett-Mavroules amendment. The only thing that Bennett-Mavroules did was to place the decision on whether the Soviets were negotiating in the hands of Congress rather than in the hands of the President.

We seem to be suffering from MX amnesia on Capitol Hill today. Some people seem determined to forget the reason we decided last summer to have a vote this spring: We are getting two-stepped here in Congress. We got one-stepped from no MX to a fenced MX last summer. Even those of us who supported no production voted for the middle position: a fenced MX. Put up the money appropriated, but do not spend it as long as there are good-faith negotiations going on. A real bargaining chip. Quite a move for those of us who were against all production of the MX.

Now they are trying to two-step us from fencing the MX to producing the MX; saying that now the fence is no longer an incentive for the Soviets to negotiate, even though it got them back to the negotiating table just as

we were promised by those of us who wanted to see a fence.

Let me return to the RECORD of last year's choice. On May 31, the gentleman from Wisconsin, my good friend, said:

We are trying to encourage the Soviet Union to return to the bargaining table. That is the purpose of the original amendment. The trouble with the Bennett-Mavroules amendment is that it says that after 6 months if the Soviets are not at the bargaining table and bargaining, we will have another vote in Congress on the issue. That is not much of an inducement for the Soviets to return to the bargaining table.

Well, with all due respect to those who held that position, I say you were wrong last year, and you are wrong today. The Soviets did come back to the talks, and the Soviets will stay at the talks if we continue the fence that we set up last year. What we are hearing now is a lot of reverent talk about the strategic triad. You would think that we were talking about the Blessed Trinity, but none of us are arguing about the triad. Nobody today is saying that we should not have land-based missiles. What we are saying is that we should not have destabilizing, unnecessary sitting ducks or land-based missiles if we can continue to produce the same effect by having the fence money that keeps the Soviets at the bargaining table.

We are hearing a lot of talk about President Reagan's efforts to achieve arms control. But let me read from the RECORD of August 1982, the debate on the nuclear freeze.

Now, the President says that he is interested in genuine arms control, and I would like to believe him. But look at the record. The record tells us something different. When President Kennedy proposed the Test Ban Treaty in 1963, Ronald Reagan opposed it. When President Johnson pushed for non-proliferation in 1967, Ronald Reagan opposed it. When President Nixon negotiated the SALT I agreement in 1972, Ronald Reagan opposed it.

□ 1650

When President Ford restricted the sale of weapons-grade material in 1975, Ronald Reagan opposed it. When President Ford concluded the Vladivostok Agreement in 1976, Ronald Reagan opposed it. And when President Carter negotiated SALT II in 1979, Ronald Reagan opposed it.

For 20 years Ronald Reagan has opposed every step toward arms control by every President of either political party, whether they be Republican or Democrat.

Now, they are saying they are for arms controls. Well, maybe, and maybe not.

These are not my words. These are the words of the gentleman from Wisconsin, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee in 1985.

Now, President Reagan has ordered Max Kampelman to leave Geneva to lobby for more MX missile production. He and his colleagues were already lobbying Congressmen by phone from Geneva, but it seems that was not enough.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MARKEY] has expired.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MARKEY].

Mr. MARKEY. So now, Mr. Chairman, our chief negotiator may miss arms control negotiating sessions in order to lobby for nuclear missiles, and the Geneva negotiating sessions for each arms control area will happen only 1 day a week. I say that we would be a lot better off if Max Kampelman was in Geneva trying to limit nuclear missiles and not in Washington lobbying for more missiles.

And we would be a lot better off if the MX factories were working 1 day a week and the arms talks were running around the clock.

Does Ronald Reagan have a record of support for arms control? Does James Watt have a record of support for the environment? Maybe, maybe not.

We have a chance here. We can fence this money. We can continue to use it as the inducement to goad them back to the table, to serve as the bargaining leverage that our negotiators need in Geneva.

We are not voting to kill the MX missile here today. That is something everyone has to understand while listening to this debate. We are going to fence the money, as we have had it fenced for the last 7 or 8 months. That is all, plain and simple. A yes vote is to produce the MX missile; a no vote is to fence the money, put it on the table, and threaten the Soviets that we will produce if they do not negotiate in good faith.

It seems to me that that is the classic definition of a bargaining chip. It seems to me that that is the kind of a position that a country interested in stopping new arms production ought to be taking if they want to be credible in the eyes of the world in their attempts to in fact achieve such an agreement. That is what we are offering here, a choice between production or the threat of production, not production or no production.

We took a middle ground last year. It was not easy for many of us to take it, but we did. It has been successful in bringing the Soviets back to the table. They know that there is in fact a bipartisan consensus.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MARKEY] has again expired.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. STRATTON].

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts has been combating a straw man. The resolution which we are in the process of

debating today and tomorrow and voting on tomorrow was not concocted by the gentleman from Wisconsin. It was concocted by the distinguished Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. THOMAS P. O'NEILL, JR., and the former majority leader of the U.S. Senate, Senator Howard Baker. They were the ones who determined the procedures without any intervention on the part of any member of either the House or the Senate Armed Services Committees.

The gentleman is talking about something that does not exist in this law, and I think that point ought to be made clear. As a matter of fact, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee tried to point it out on this floor when he was being ragged by his colleagues, but nobody paid any attention to it, and if the gentleman from Massachusetts has any complaint about what is going on here, he ought to refer that complaint to the Speaker of the House.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. No; I will not yield to the gentleman. He did not yield to me.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has also said that if this goes down, it simply means that the money will continue to be fenced. That is not true, either. The fencing operation was part of an agreement to continue the production line for the MX missile. If we are going to turn on the MX and turn it off, it is absolutely impossible for us to undertake any economic procurement of this particular missile, and the agreement of the Speaker of the House and the majority leader of the Senate in the 98th Congress made it perfectly clear that the funds, if they were unfenced, would make it possible for the 21 missiles approved in the 1984 legislation to be assembled into actual missiles rather than to remain in individual parts.

A Member of the other body tried to persuade the Members in the other body to believe that this money did not really mean anything, that there was plenty of money available, but the fact of the matter is that that is not the case, and we would be doing grave damage to the status of the defense bill if the recommendations of the gentleman from Massachusetts were to be pursued. Eighty-two percent of the research and development money has already been expended, 52 percent of the Milcon money has already been expended, and 32 percent of the procurement funds has already been expended.

The program outlined here will cost \$11.2 billion in then-year dollars, and the 1985 Peacekeeper Procurement Program represents only 11.4 percent of the total. Those who want to wipe out the MX can do it by voting no, but

they cannot retain the MX and at the same time vote no.

So I think it is important that we not, as the gentleman from Massachusetts has done, resurrect old lines from the last campaign, but that we take a clear look at exactly what we are doing financially and what we are doing in terms of our foreign policy.

The gentleman from Massachusetts was apparently quoting the President of the United States or at least was criticizing the President of the United States for suggesting that we would undercut the negotiations going on in Geneva by voting no on this particular resolution, but I would point out, as I tried to point out earlier in my opening remarks, that one of the most outstanding negotiators in the United States' stable of negotiators is Mr. Paul Nitze, who has been at this job over a long period of time. Mr. Nitze happens to be a Democrat, a long-time Democrat, but he is one who has the wisdom and the courage to rise above partisanship and to subscribe to the view that the majority leader of the House, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WRIGHT], announced when he left the White House a couple of weeks ago, that foreign policy and defense policy should stop at the water's edge.

Here is what Mr. Nitze, who is much more familiar with the process of negotiating with the Soviets than is Mr. Kampelman, says—although apparently the gentleman from Massachusetts thinks that he is going to cast some mesmeristic spell over the Members of Congress who go down to the White House—

I think it would convey a greater hope to the Soviet Union that there would be opposition in the United States against the very thought of maintaining an adequate deterrent against real opposition, and that it would encourage them to increase their opposition, increase their propaganda campaign, play directly upon the divisions in Europe and try to defeat us indirectly.

□ 1700

Now, that is a statement by somebody who knows what he is talking about.

Mr. Nitze goes on to say:

It is vital to the success of our negotiating effort in Geneva that we convince the Soviets that, as a country and alliance, we stand united. We must bring them to conclude as early as possible that their public campaign will not bear fruit, and that they should get down to serious bargaining at the negotiating table.

That is precisely what happened with what went on early in this House and in the North Atlantic Alliance. They are back at the negotiating table because of the strong posture of the United States.

Congressional support for the MX will send just such a message to Moscow. It will send a strong signal of national resolve and will greatly strengthen our hand in Geneva.

He goes on to say:

I believe the continuation of the MX program is essential for the maintenance of a strong deterrent posture, for the support of our fundamental foreign policy objectives, and for the chances of success at the Geneva arms control negotiations.

He also points out that as the leader of the Western Alliance, we have to remember the impact of our action on our allies. He says:

I believe a decision to continue production of MX will demonstrate to our partners and America that is resolved to maintain the strategic balance as a solid basis for its commitment to peace.

Were we to back away from MX, we would place ourselves in a most awkward position vis-a-vis our European partners—

Who have agreed to accept the nuclear deterrent—

As the leader and most powerful country of the West, should we do less?

I think this is the kind of statement that we ought to ponder over and not be so foolish as to suggest that somehow there is something phony about what the negotiators in Geneva are saying to us, because it would be a serious mistake, in my judgment, for the Democratic Party to be the party responsible for bringing about this kind of tragic rupture in a long-lasting alliance.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, before I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MAVROULES], I would like to make an observation about what has just been said.

First of all, I would like to say that the people who are working to try to help our country in the arms control movement certainly ought to be congratulated for their efforts, but they are administration appointees. They are appointed by this administration.

The complimentary remarks are particularly applicable to Mr. Nitze. He is one of the finest men this country has ever produced, a great man. He would not cavil. He would not bow or scrape to do anything for political reasons, but he is representing the administration. I heard the testimony of Mr. Nitze, the report in the newspaper, in my opinion, was accurate, the Washington Post. Here is the lead on the story:

The Reagan administration's top arms control adviser yesterday said that he doubts that withholding funds from the MX missile would have "an immediate or direct" impact on the arms talks in Geneva; a statement placing him at odds with the administration's main argument for releasing \$1.5 billion for the missile this year.

I want to compliment the gentleman from New York for the way he has presented his work today and I want to compliment Mr. Nitze on what he is doing for our country; but I think when you look at all of it, you really do see that Mr. Nitze is representing, as he should, the administration in

these matters. Despite that, he has the courage and determination which comes from being a mature gentleman. I am not quite as mature as he. I am in that direction. He was willing to serve his country in this way and was not willing to overstate the case, and he stated the case as he did. It is not as strong as some people would lead you to believe it was in the direction of being an absolute rubber stamp for the administration.

Now, we have already had several people here today that have made fine speeches, like the gentleman from New York [Mr. DOWNEY] and others, who have been very, very active in trying to kill the MX. I am not a partner in just trying to postpone the MX. I want to kill the MX, because of the fact that we have not got a basing mode for it. That is the only thing I have against it; but I am against it for that reason.

The gentleman from New York [Mr. DOWNEY] has been mentioned. Others have been mentioned; but the man I am going to yield to is a man who has really done legion work for this effort to try to kill the MX.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MAVROULES].

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to respond very lightly to my chairman, the gentleman from New York [Mr. STRATTON], who is putting up a great fight on that side of the aisle on this particular issue.

This is not a Democratic or a Republican issue. I think we ought to get that straight. There is no position taken as a formal position of the Democratic leadership on the MX missile. I think it is important that we maintain that position.

Also, I, too, listened to the testimony put forth by Mr. Nitze. I have listened to Mr. Weinberger. We listened to the Soviet defector, Mr. Shevchenko. We listened to most of the people who came before our panel.

The one question that I asked each and every one of them, if indeed the MX missile is that one particular missile that would cut the legs from under our negotiators in Geneva, as suggested by the President. To a man, each and every one of them said no, that one weapons system does not; but let me be fair and state that they recommended going ahead with the MX missile anyway.

Let us try something else here.

Mr. Chairman, Congress and Presidents have, for over 200 years, made the critical decisions and sacrifices that have made America strong and kept her free.

From the rostrum of this House almost three-quarters of a century

ago, Woodrow Wilson spoke of a world made "safe for democracy." And a generation later, Franklin Roosevelt utilized the resources of the "arsenal of democracy" to free a suffering world from the terror of totalitarianism.

At those critical times, we did not stand as Democrats or Republicans, but as Americans. For in times of trouble, in the immortal words of Thomas Paine, "It is not in numbers but unity where our great strength lies."

Yet now, this House is once again locked into a passionate debate on the future of the MX missile.

We are told this vote will measure the unity of our land. And the argument is put forth that without this one weapon system, America will lack the resolve to "stand tall" in negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva.

To my colleagues in this House: If the MX were those things, if it was the weapon to guarantee peace in the world and disarmament in Geneva, then I am convinced this House would support this request without reservation.

But in fact, the MX is a broken promise. The rhetoric does not match the reality to be found in years of testimony, investigation and debate.

At issue here is not a lack of resolve, but a lack of judgment if we authorize more billions for a weapon vulnerable on the drawing board and in the silo.

Some of those on the other side of this argument know, in their hearts, the MX is a waste of money. But, they are worried. In the cloakroom and corridors of the Capitol we hear whispers of being "soft on defense."

Well let's look at the record. In 5 years, the Reagan administration has requested \$1,234 billion for defense. Congress has appropriated \$1,174 billion during that period, providing 95 percent of the administration's defense program.

Those budgets and this spending reflect the true commitment of Congress—and the American people—to rebuilding U.S. military capability. It is a very visible effort, which can serve only to impress the Soviets that America is serious about its national security.

Yet, after appropriating all this money, we have been told that failure to release the \$1.5 billion in "fenced" MX funds "will knock the legs out from under the negotiating table."

Now of all the arguments, this is the most difficult to accept. In reality, the "fenced" MX funds represent one-tenth of 1 percent of what the United States is spending of defense during the present 5-year program.

CONGRESS AND REAGAN'S DEFENSE BUILDUP

(Dollar amounts in billions)

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	Total
Reagan requested	\$177.1	\$221.8	\$257.5	\$273.4	\$305.0	\$1,234.8
Congress appropriated	\$178.4	\$213.8	\$239.5	\$258.2	\$284.3	\$1,174.2
Proportion of Reagan request appropriated (percent)	101.0	96.0	93.0	94.0	93.0	95.0
Real growth rate (percent)	12.7	12.2	7.6	4.4	5.8	

Source: Office of Management and Budget.

□ 1710

Mr. STRATTON. Will the gentleman yield to me just a moment?

Mr. MAVROULES. I will be happy to yield.

Mr. STRATTON. The amount, as the gentleman indicates, is a relatively small amount. But if we do not unfence it the line, the production line for the MX missile is going to collapse. In fact, the date on which we set the vote for the MX was the absolute last date that we could utilize the production line, or else we would end up with nothing but small parts.

Mr. MAVROULES. As a matter of fact—

Mr. STRATTON. I think that was the point that I was trying to make.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to argue your point, and I am not going to take you up on it. But the figures I have reflect a little different from what you are saying.

As a matter of fact, of all of the contracted moneys versus money that has been authorized up to this point, I think you will still find that we have an excess of \$500 million that has not been contracted for and that will not come on line until September 1985. So it is a judgment.

I am going to agree with you for the sake of agreeing, not for the sake of argument. But hear me out.

Mr. STRATTON. It means that we are going to have no missiles whatsoever, not even the first 21.

Mr. MAVROULES. That is incorrect, because in the agreement we had in the conference report we did give the up-front money for the continued production of the 21 missiles.

Mr. STRATTON. But not until you unfence it. That is the point. The 21, the two 21's are included in the same batch.

Mr. MAVROULES. I disagree. I cannot agree with the gentleman on that point. The money has been given up front for the production of the first 21 missiles.

What we are talking about here is an additional 21 missiles. If you remember, we gave the long-term money, did we not, Mr. Chairman? Did we not give the long-term money for the 21 missiles?

Mr. STRATTON. The first 21 have not been assembled. That is the point. And they can only be assembled when the money is unfenced.

Mr. MAVROULES. Correct me if I am mistaken. In the conference report of last year did we not allow the long-term funds? I would ask my colleagues from the other side to answer this. Did we not allow the long-term funds for the continuation of production of the 21 missiles? May I ask staff here? They are here today.

Mr. STRATTON. Well, the staff has already answered the question and said no.

Mr. MAVROULES. On the other hand, I would ask staff on the other side.

Mr. STRATTON. And I did not terrorize them, either.

Mr. MAVROULES. It is immaterial on this point, and if you will hear me out you will hear my entire argument.

Mr. STRATTON. The gentleman was suggesting that it was just a mere matter of funds.

Mr. MAVROULES. It is.

Mr. STRATTON. When as a practical question, it is a matter of whether we are going to have some kind of a defense.

Mr. MAVROULES. As a matter of fact, it is an infinitesimal sum of money that we are referring to, and it is others who make it seem very important. I do not. But under the present 5-year program, let me repeat, it is one-tenth of 1 percent of what we are spending.

And, by the way, those are not my figures. Those are from the Office of Management and Budget.

Can we seriously believe that one-tenth of 1 percent, one-one thousandth of the administration's 5-year defense program is the critical mass which is going to make or break the talks in Geneva?

If that one-one thousandth is so important, we must really be wasting the remaining 99.9 percent of the \$1,174 billion we are spending on defense.

And to my wavering colleagues, if you are still concerned, I have one more sobering statistic to offer.

The funds which I have been discussing are for the last 5 years. The period of fiscal 1981 to 1985.

During the next 5 years, the administration's Department of Defense budget forecast totals, in current dollars, another \$1,985 billion.

FISCAL YEAR 1986 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET
LONG-RANGE FORECASTS

(Dollars in billions)

	Fiscal year—				
	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
BUDGET AUTHORITY					
Total, current dollars	\$313.7	\$354.0	\$401.6	\$438.8	\$477.7
Total, constant (FY 1986) dollars	\$313.7	\$339.4	\$369.5	\$388.0	\$406.7
Percent change	5.9	8.2	8.8	5.0	4.8
OUTLAYS					
Total, current dollars	\$277.5	\$312.3	\$348.6	\$382.3	\$418.3
Total, constant (FY 1986) dollars	\$277.5	\$299.0	\$319.3	\$336.1	\$353.8
Percent change	8.4	7.7	6.8	5.3	5.3

FISCAL YEAR 1986 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET
LONG-RANGE FORECASTS—Continued

(Dollars in billions)

	Fiscal year—				
	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Composite pay/price assumptions for outlays.....	\$100.0	\$104.5	\$109.2	\$113.7	\$118.2

Source: Annual Report to Congress, Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, fiscal 1986.

After reviewing these numbers, can anyone seriously question the commitment of the United States to national security.

These defense budgets are the bargaining chips—which forced the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table in Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MAVROULES] has expired.

Mr. MAVROULES. Will the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] yield me 3 additional minutes?

Mr. BENNETT. Before I allow the gentleman the 3 additional minutes, I would say I have talked to staff and the gentleman is essentially correct. There are 21 missiles which have already been authorized and appropriated for, and they are not affected by this vote.

Mr. MAVROULES. If you recall, Mr. Chairman, I was in the conference committee at the time and we gave the long-lead money to finish 21 missiles.

Mr. BENNETT. You have reassured me and you are correct.

Mr. MAVROULES. What we are referring to is the other 21 missiles which are fenced at this point.

Mr. BENNETT. Unfortunately you are correct.

I do yield the gentleman 3 additional minutes.

Mr. MAVROULES. The point I am trying to make here is that the MX missile is not the one weapons system that is going to make or break the Geneva arms talks. It is indeed the resolve of Congress. The moneys that I refer to, these are the defense budgets, which are indeed the true bargaining chips, which indeed force the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table in Geneva.

Let me kind of sum up a little bit at this point, because I think it is important to stress a couple of points.

We know the MX missile in Minuteman silos is vulnerable because one of our current negotiators labeled it a "sitting duck" just 3 years ago.

And if the soft on defense argument sounds familiar, 2 years ago this House demanded that our Marines in Lebanon be redeployed to a safer location. We were accused of being soft on security, and favoring surrender.

But the administration knows that this House of Representatives was right on Lebanon. And today, we are just as right on the MX missile.

Mr. Chairman and colleagues, we must draw the line, MX does not add to our security.

The Soviet negotiators in Geneva know it.

The American public knows it.

This Congress must show it.

It is time to stop wasting money. This resolution should not be approved.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 8 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON].

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I thank the chairman.

I think I would like to start off by just saying there are many of us that do not feel that the Soviets returned to the negotiating table because of the MX. However, I think the MX is a factor. I think most people would grant the Soviets returned to the table because of the strategic defense initiative, because that is something they are very concerned about.

But the fact of the matter is I believe the MX does have a bearing upon the Soviet's attitude at Geneva. I think that is inescapable.

If the President of the United States does not have the power to get the MX through this Congress and you are a negotiator in Geneva for the Soviet Union, would you not wonder if he might not have the clout, or might lack the clout to get the SDI research and development funds through the Congress? I certainly would. And if I were a negotiator for the Soviet Union I would just sit there and say, "Listen, this guy does not have it. He may have carried 49 States, but he cannot control that Congress of his."

So I think there is a direct bearing on these negotiations with what we do here tomorrow and the rest of this week.

The President in his press conference the other day said:

For more than a decade we have debated the MX and while we were debating the Soviets were deploying more than 600 such missiles, 648 to be exact, and targeting them on U.S. targets. Now they are on the verge of deploying two new strategic land-based systems and we are still debating.

I think that is deplorable. We continue to debate while they run away from us. They have 648 SS-18's and SS-19's.

The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MARKEY] said we need to continue to freeze MX funds while we negotiate. Let us look at what that mentality has brought us.

Since 1968, and I am looking at the Soviet military power book, since 1968 when we had approximately 1,000 U.S. ICBM's and the Soviets had about 800, the Soviets have increased to about 1,200 ICBM's while we stayed at about 1,000.

□ 1720

Our U.S. reentry vehicles are about 2,000 now and the Soviets have increased from about 800 to 6,400 reentry vehicles. While we sat around and talked, they have gone from about 800 to 6,400 reentry vehicles. We have gone from approximately 1,000 to 2,000. They have been running away from us.

While we stood around and talked since 1970, they have 7 ICBM's either under construction or on the drawing board. We have completed one. The MX is the first one since 1970. We do not have that built and deployed yet.

That is what happened while we sat around here and talked. When you talk about bombers, the Soviet Union since 1979 have gone from 250 intercontinental-capable bombers to 400; we have gone from 400 because ours are so old and outdated, the B-52's, down to below 350 which are operational.

We continue to talk and talk, they continue to build and build. I think we are at the point right now where we have to take some action, especially to see any results from the Geneva START talks.

You know, one of the things that bothered me today, and I want to digress just a moment, is that during the debate tempers get a little heated and we say some things that we later regret. One of the things I think one of our colleagues on the other side of the aisle ought to regret before this day is over, that is Mr. WEAVER of Oregon, is what he said equating Stalin's genocide action with what President Reagan has been doing. I would like to urge him to reconsider saying things like that in the future because, even though he may differ greatly with the President, to equate this President, who is very, very popular with the people of this country, who carried 49 States, with Stalin, is just unthinkable.

Why should we back the President in Geneva? I think it is relatively simple. That is, the future security of the United States is at stake.

If we show no resolve tomorrow and the rest of this week, the Soviet Union, in my view, will not negotiate in good faith. They will continue to build and build and build without any restraint whatsoever, and while they build, they will sit in those chairs in Geneva and not negotiate. And if they do not negotiate, Mr. Chairman, then I think the risk of a nuclear war is much greater than if we show some resolve right now.

You know, we have heard people talk about history earlier today. Winston Churchill talked about no resolve as far as the British Empire was concerned prior to World War II. And they let their military might deteriorate into nothing while they negotiat-

ed with Hitler. We have talked about this before.

While Great Britain deteriorated as a military power, Hitler rose to be one of the greatest menaces to our society and the freedoms the world has ever known, the people of this world stood by and let it happen.

Now we are faced with a much more monstrous possibility and that is that the Soviet Union, who has moved into Afghanistan, who supported genocide in Vietnam and now in Cambodia, who supported Communist expansionism even into our Hemisphere, and now who is threatening to build a nuclear force without equal in the history of this world, we stand idly by and let it happen.

I feel very strongly, Mr. Chairman, that this is a time for the United States to show resolve, and I hope that before this debate is over, my colleagues on the other side, who are on the bubble, will see this also and will vote with us. I think it is going to be a very close vote and a very important vote.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume before I yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. LEHMAN].

Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that you have got to bear in mind, when all these figures are given to you about how much the Russians are producing in the way of missiles, that if the gentleman feels that we are not doing what we should and we do not have a reasonable parity and should go further forward, I would be willing reluctantly to spend all this money on other nuclear weapons, but I would want to spend them on some good nuclear weapons. The triad would still exist even if you got rid of the ICBM's; namely, the cruise missiles, the Trident submarines and the bombers. If you want to take the \$34 billion or \$40 billion, or whatever figure you want to have, and apply it to Trident submarines and nuclear weaponry, through the bombers and cruise missiles, or if you can find a good basing mode for the MX, you are not closing that off. This is some 30-some-odd billion bucks you are going to throw down the drain for a faulty missile.

It is my opinion that things we spend that kind of money on ought to do harm to the enemy.

It was my suggestion in my first speech, and everything I have ever said about the MX, was that I would prefer that it went to conventional weaponry in Europe because we are asking for a war in Europe, we are asking for a nuclear war because we cannot win a conventional war. So I would prefer that the money be spent in that way. But if you are so obsessed with the fact that we need more nuclear weapons I prefer to put it into some weapons that will do some harm to the enemy.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to ask one question: Is the MX a more accurate weapon than the Titan or Minuteman missiles we now have?

Mr. BENNETT. At the moment, the MX, I would assume, is more accurate but there is some doubt cast on it by the GAO report.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. The GAO?

Mr. BENNETT. The General Accounting Office, who made a study of it.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. What do they know about how accurate a missile is?

Mr. BENNETT. Well, if the gentleman does not know that they know about missiles, they know a lot about missiles. They have a very substantial weapons division. They have got a report on it that has been asked for by the Government. It has not been released yet. But things have leaked out of it. I have never read it. But I read in the paper about it. The paper says that they have some doubts about its accuracy. But it is probably more accurate than the present Trident weapon. But by the time it goes into production, in my opinion, the weaponry of the Trident submarine will be better.

And I will say something else: Why all this fetish about accurate weaponry when you say you do not want to have a first strike capability? Why are you so concerned that the weapon might kill a few people outside of the silos if you are not striking for a first strike? Now, if you are striking for a first strike, I can understand it. But our country has denied the fact that it is going to have a first strike. I frankly feel that if we buy the MX missile my own opinion is you have got 100 missiles in the silos and you are buying 123 other missiles. That is like buying 6 spare tires for a jalopy. Nobody would ever do it. There is no sense to it whatsoever. They testified about the spares. They testified what it would mean about getting old and they did not testify anything like that number; a very much smaller number.

So it will not be very long, if we get the 100 missiles in the tubes, that they will have another 100 tubes and, of course, that, times 10, makes it 2,000 missiles, or warheads. So you have a very substantial group. Whether that would be first strike or not I do not know.

But I am inclined to think it would be. I am inclined to think that adding it to the Trident missiles that we have, and the other things that we have, the cruise missiles, I would think we probably would have a pretty good first strike capability.

Somebody earlier on today thought it was not very important the difference between first strike and first to use. But they are very, very different. Our country stands solidly for the idea of not having a first-strike capability. That is not having the ability to wipe out them so they cannot in turn respond. But our country also stands very firmly for the first use of nuclear weaponry. As between the two, there is no comparison about the morality of the two. The one that says you are going to be the first to use a nuclear weapon in my opinion is the least moral, particularly since our country could preclude it by being able to win a conventional war in Europe which we are not spending the money to do.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. Now I will yield to the gentleman.

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate and have heard his argument a number of times.

Mr. BENNETT. And I have heard the gentleman's response.

Mr. COURTER. I understand that. It is my understanding, and correct me if I am wrong, that the gentleman, going back to 2 or 3 years ago, was a proponent of MX.

Mr. BENNETT. A proponent?

Mr. COURTER. Yes.

Mr. BENNETT. I was never a proponent of anything but movable capacity, being mobile.

□ 1730

Mr. COURTER. Is it not true that the gentleman—and you have a right to change your mind; I have no concern about that—I am just trying to find what the gentleman's argument is.

Mr. BENNETT. I do not feel at all vulnerable about it. I mean, suppose I had been? I will just say for the purposes of your debate that I was a strong advocate of the MX missile, which is not true because you will not hear me—there is not a speech in the RECORD that I remember, and I am sure I never made one in favor of the MX—I was asked to speak for the MX, and I said, I do not think they are going to find a way to use it.

It is a good missile, but we are not going to find a good basing mode until we get along better—I am not going to be a proponent of it. So you are not correct if you think I was a very strong advocate of it.

Mr. COURTER. Well, I do not know how strong you are; it was my impression that you were in favor of the procurement of the MX.

Mr. BENNETT. Well suppose I was, so what?

Mr. COURTER. Well, the point is as follows: Whether we assume that cor-

rect or assume it not correct, it does not make too much difference. I would like to ask the gentleman—

Mr. BENNETT. Until it starts making a difference, I will assume it.

Mr. COURTER. I would like to ask the gentleman a question. It is conceded, I think, by both sides that the Soviet Union has the capability of first striking or rendering our strategic deterrent, at least our land-based strategic deterrent, vulnerable. Their SS-18's and 19's do have that hard target kill capability.

It is also conceded that our land-based deterrent, our sea leg and our air-breathing leg of our triad does not have that capability.

Mr. BENNETT. I do not concede for the same timeframe.

Mr. COURTER. All right. Does it upset you at all—let me ask you this—you will have your chance, but—

Mr. BENNETT. Well, I do not have to.

I have a perfect right to say what I think.

Mr. COURTER. Does it upset you that the Soviet Union can essentially eliminate our deterrent strategic capability, or much of them, certainly a land-based leg of our triad, and we do not have that capability with respect to the Soviet Union?

Is that lack of parity at all bothersome to you? I assume it is not; I would like to hear your explanation.

Mr. BENNETT. Well, I would like to have everything perfect; you are certainly looking at a person who has got many wounds of many kinds, and I am probably known mostly by the wounds that I have got rather than what I have accomplished.

But I would say that it does concern me that we are not as strong in that field as we would like to be, but it would concern me greatly if we spent \$35 billion on such a vulnerable weapon as this when we have a Trident submarine which is capable of wiping out every city and every hamlet in all of Russia.

Now, you may be concerned by the fact—we had a debate the other day on radio—I heard you make the statement the other day, well, you should not be that cruel; you should not wipe out civilians.

Well, that shows a little bit about being in combat. I do not like to say this, but the truth is that if you are a combatant and you have fought in combat, you do not always save every civilian that happens to be around.

I, myself, have been guilty of that. When I knew that I was facing a particular location that had enemy in it, I did not entirely check to get their serial numbers to see if there were not some people there who were civilians. I never purposely ever killed a civilian, but if there were people there firing at me from a particular location, I would fire back.

Mr. COURTER. Would the gentleman yield?

That was precisely my point. It was never your desire to purposely attack civilians. I am suggesting that if the only weapons we have have the capability of attacking civilians, that is right now the land-based leg of our triad does not have hard target kill capability, then you will be pushing the United States in the position of having to respond by annihilating civilians.

Mr. BENNETT. Maybe we ought to—if you want to keep people to argue about this, it is all right with me. I just feel, myself, that you are failing to look at the realities of it; that we have to do the best we can with whatever weapons we have.

There are some weapons I would like to prohibit, that I do not think we really need, like napalm and a few like that, but I would like to do it by international treaty.

As far as this is concerned, it seems to me that until we have weapons that are more accurate, I think we should use them in any way we feel we should use them.

The real thing I feel about it, and with this I am going to conclude because we have been talking too much, and you are not going to be satisfied anyway; we talked the other day at great length and you are not going to be satisfied with my position; I am not going to be satisfied with yours.

The real thing I feel about it is that we are making a very grave error in 1985, which is not to be able to win a conventional war in Europe. And that is the main thrust of what I am trying to do. I am trying to pick up the money out of the MX pocket, and I would reluctantly give it to other nuclear weapons, if you wanted to put it in other nuclear weapons; but it really ought to go into conventional war, because there is the immoral thing we are doing in 1985.

The immoral thing is asking for a nuclear war when we could prevent it, and we are asking for it because of the fact that we are not sufficiently strong in Europe to hold them back for a very few number of days. That is a crime, that is a crime against humanity; we ought to correct it.

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. BENNETT. I will yield if you really want to go on with it.

Mr. DICKS. I think it is an important point. As the gentleman pointed out, that a Trident II submarine could destroy the entire Soviet Union. We have also discussed in this debate before how they are relatively invulnerable, certainly until the 1990's, and the gentleman from New Jersey used the date, at least until 1990 absolutely.

So now the gentleman raises the specter of having an MX missile for a limited nuclear war, to avoid hitting civilians. I do not think that is a seri-

ous point to discuss; we are not going to discuss limited nuclear war, but the gentleman has pointed out that the MX, because it is so vulnerable, because it is not survivable, would have to be used as a first attack weapon.

Well, that is not our policy, the first strike. I think we have clarified some of these things, and move back to the MX missile. Let us agree on one thing: The triad, which we do agree upon as a policy, strategic policy, that the MX if put in place would be the weakest link of that triad. Is that correct? Does the gentleman agree?

Mr. COURTER. No, because the Soviet Union does not look at individual links of the triad, just like one football team does not look at a quarterback only. He has got to look at the whole synergistic effect of the offense and defense.

The Soviet Union looks at the United States from a strategic standpoint, cannot pick up one weapons system.

The flaw in saying that our sea leg is a great deterrent because we can annihilate Soviet civilian population is simply to say that if we use that weapon we will, in fact, destruct ourselves; it is committing suicide.

Mr. DICKS. None of these weapons will destruct ourselves.

Mr. COURTER. I do not think any rational decisions by the President of the United States would say that the Soviet Union, in some sort of a period of great tension attacked military targets that our response would be to attack civilian targets.

Right now our only response is that. My argument is, it is not a very credible response.

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman is suggesting that we should not have—

Mr. COURTER. And therefore, deterrence is breaking down.

Mr. DICKS. The gentleman is suggesting that we should not have MAD, mutual assured destruction? That is what the gentleman is suggesting?

Mr. COURTER. I would argue that we should do the research and development to see if we can move from a doctrine of mutually assured destruction, as I pray that we will be able to one day, to defensive systems.

I would also submit, and agree with you, that the only doctrine we can possibly have right now is mutually assured destruction. That is based on deterrence. That is what your side is arguing and that is what our side is assuming.

I want to get away from it; I do not like it, but it is the only thing I think we have at the present time, and therefore we have to live with it.

Mr. DICKS. I think the argument on SDI will be a separate debate. But the point is here, what we are talking about is the vulnerability of the MX missile. After all these hours now, and

after all the debate all these years, by putting that MX missile in that silo I will again quote Secretary Weinberger:

Whether you harden it or superharden it, it is going to be as vulnerable today as it was 2 years ago when the administration rejected that. And the other side has not made a point yet as to the fact that the MX will not be that vulnerable, nonsurvivable after over \$30 billion is spent on the MX missile.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you.

I have been very unfair, Mr. LEHMAN has been waiting since 12:30 today. Actually, he asked me yesterday, and he is the last speaker on our side. I guess at the end of it, if everybody rolls it over, we will wipe out all our time.

Are there any other speakers? Oh, there is one more speaker. I will let you be the last speaker if you want to, except I will say a word or two at the end.

I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. LEHMAN].

Mr. LEHMAN of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the distinguished dean of the Florida delegation.

As I sat here since almost 12:30, the more I sat the more depressed I became with this debate.

Mr. Chairman, I do not often come to the well of the House to speak. I was not a particularly good orator before my surgery, and since the surgery I have been even less inclined towards speechmaking. There was, however, one positive political benefit from my surgery. Without any reflection on any of my colleagues, it is now physically impossible for me to speak out of more than one side of my mouth, on the MX or any other issue.

Others will argue the technicalities of this issue in the 20 hours of scheduled debate this week. Someone must speak on behalf of our grandchildren, and that compels me to rise today in opposition to the release of \$1.5 billion to fund 21 new MX missiles for fiscal year 1985.

In the 40 years since Hiroshima the superpowers have continued to stockpile nuclear weapons. Yet, we have avoided a nuclear explosion. It's like the story about a man who falls off of a 50-story building. After falling 40 floors he waves to some window washers on a scaffold and shouts, "no sweat so far." We are at 40 years, not 40 floors, and if we build 21 more MX missiles, we too are just as idiotically optimistic in the face of annihilation.

Recently in Miami I lost a good friend. He was operated on in the finest of the teaching hospital medical centers by the best trained staff and attended by the best operating room team. Yet at the end of the operation, the preservative into which his diseased tissue was supposed to be placed was instead injected into his spinal column, killing him. A human mistake by experts, despite all safeguards, can destroy life on earth as easily as it destroyed this one good man.

The MX is the ultimate "Yuppie" weapon. It is very high-tech. It has no military value. It cannot be used without total self-destruction. Yet we think that we need it. We are buying it to impress our neighbors with our literally upward mobility.

In the middle ages, the best minds of the church spent time and money debating how many angels could "dance on the point of a pin." Now our nuclear experts similarly confuse us with quasi-religious talk about silos, basing modes, ICBM's, MIRV's and the triad. Thousands of years from now some other planetary visitor will see what is left of our Earth and how life was eliminated because we tried to determine how many nukes we could make dance here on Earth.

That same visitor from space might wonder at the lifeless remains of our hardened silos, and at the foolishness of a people who could so easily destroy themselves.

A few years ago Clint Eastwood when playing a supercop, Dirty Harry, said to the bad guy before his own quick draw—first strike, "Go ahead make my day."

Not long ago, veto pen in hand, the President so challenged the Congress on taxes. Think of our now, or future, Commander in Chief, a model of a hardened silo in one hand and a red telephone to Moscow in the other. I fear those same words, "make my day," and those words will make the last day for life on Earth.

The MX is not a bargaining chip and we are not in a poker game. We are risking the survival of mankind. I urge my colleagues to join me in opposing the MX.

□ 1740

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEHMAN of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STRATTON. Those of us who have been conducting this debate here have not been able to hear Mr. Kampelman. I wonder if the gentleman from Florida had had the privilege of hearing what Mr. Kampelman had to say and whether he may have changed the gentleman's mind.

Mr. LEHMAN of Florida. I have read some of what Mr. Kampelman has to say. I respect Mr. Kampelman. I think he is going to be a good negotiator if they give him the power to negotiate.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentlewoman from Maryland [Mrs. BYRON].

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Chairman, nearly 3 years ago I cosponsored an amendment with the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MAVROULES] to eliminate the funds for the first nine production MX missiles. At that time the administration was asking for the missiles before a determination was made on

how to base them. It was ludicrous, to me, at that time to produce missiles when there was no basing mode.

That basing mode has been resolved, though not in the way many individuals feel it should be, but resolved nonetheless. We are now left with two alternatives. Either we modernize our land-based leg of the triad or we do not. Either we retain the upgrading of our triad or we do not. There are good reasons for moving forward on this program.

First, since 1980 we have pursued our commitment to modernize the strategic forces due to the age of our systems and the investment in offensive strategic forces made by the Soviet Union since the signing of the SALT II treaty. The Soviets have now deployed six new or modified systems since SALT II. We will have an operational MX capability late next year, the first new system since the late 1960's. No amount of rationalization can explain away the discrepancy in land-based offensive systems.

Second, the alliance has held up magnificently against a massive Soviet effort to turn around the deployment of the Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missiles. Our NATO alliance is holding firm. It would indeed be ironic, in my mind, for the European allies to see the United States put the MX missile to rest not because of Soviet pressures, but because of our own weak resolve not to make the investment necessary to modernize and retain the programs of the strategic triad.

The MX will be the first of our missile modernization efforts to be deployed.

In a GAO report, it says: "Accuracy achieved by the first of test missiles has been significantly better than design requirements."

The D-5 Trident missile will not be on line until 1989, and the paper Midgетman is not expected to be ready until 1992. Modernization means putting new systems in the field; it does not mean waiting for the next idea to materialize.

Finally, let me agree that the MX missile cannot be a bargaining chip and is not a bargaining chip. The MX missile gives us a capability we now lack and cannot afford to give up in light of the Soviet MX-like missiles.

We cannot go back to square one and begin all over again. If we do that, that does not mean that the need has gone away. It is still very much there. If we close down the line, there will be no new production as we know it today.

In last year's bill the language for fencing the funds for the 21 missiles was done with the March date in mind because it was that March date that was the time that we would run out of funds for continued production. The

end of this month that production will begin to close down. That line will be closed in May 1985.

Let us also agree that cancellation of the MX, after we have spent over half of the program dollars, is more than a waste of money. It is a waste of courage to ignore the capability of the Soviet Union. It is a waste of courage to ignore the limited steps that can be taken to counter that capability head on.

Arms control will not defend this country. Arms control will not do away with the Soviet land-based offensive strategic forces aimed at the United States, Europe, and Asia. Arms control cannot guarantee peace. Arms control cannot guarantee security. Congress is responsible for the national security of this country. Congress is responsible for setting the standards in this free world. If this Congress cannot make a commitment to limit the security investment, who are we to lead in the future?

I support the unfencing of the MX missile funds. We cannot continue with an off-and-on policy with defense. We saw this in the B-1. We now have seen it with the MX.

□ 1750

The first B-1 is coming off the production line into our inventory this summer after a 2-year stoppage in 1979. The MX is in need of moving forward.

In December 1986, the first 10 authorized missiles, authorized in 1984, will be ready. The 1980 funded missiles, which are necessary, must be moved forward now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. CARNEY].

Mr. CARNEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, Americans observing the ongoing debate on arms control have been subjected to both sides presenting the arguments. United States-Soviet systems have been presented as well as the United States-Soviet systems' survivability characteristics. The numbers of weapons in each country's arsenals; the relationships between NATO and the United States have also been presented. Obviously, both countries have the ability to destroy each other if all their weapons were successfully launched.

The real debate, arms control, should focus on two issues: Deterrence and fruitful negotiations leading to the reduction of forces, greater stability of those forces, and confidence building.

Today, we are debating the merits of House Joint Resolution 180, a resolution to authorize the expenditure of \$1.5 billion for the procurement of 21 additional Peacekeeper missiles. It is imperative that we put the Peacekeep-

er missile debate in the context of: First, preserving deterrence; and second, advancing productive arms control negotiations. Negotiations that should lead to fruitful conclusions.

We should not debate the horrors of the nuclear winter or other emotional and less than substantive issues. I believe the Peacekeeper has great merit in both the enhancement of deterrence and in arms control.

When dealing with the issues of deterrence, we must do just that: Ask not what destructive value our weapons systems have or our adversaries' weapons systems have, but ask what value these weapons systems have in preventing our adversaries from launching thermonuclear weapons. The Peacekeeper missile has great value in the promotion of deterrence. Taken in the total context of our triad, it presents to the Soviet Union numerous planning problems. It substantially reduces their certainty or probability of a successful first strike attack.

Additionally, it places some of their prompt, hard target warheads on the 668 SS-18 and SS-19's in jeopardy. This action alone should encourage the Soviet Union to negotiate in good faith at Geneva.

If I may, I would like to focus the remainder of my remarks on the ongoing negotiations in Geneva. Negotiations, like politics, is the art of give and take, and an attempt to reach reasonable goals. In the case of arms control negotiations, these goals should be for the reduction of nuclear forces, hopefully to the ultimate level of zero. They should be for the improvement of stability and a balance in the existing forces, and they should be for the promotion of confidence-building measures.

Let us examine the give and take aspects of the present negotiations. One, to enhance stability, the United States desires to move to a small, mobile missile, the Midgetman. However, the United States is presently prohibited from deploying a new, small, mobile missile. The Soviet Union is now testing the SSX-25, a small, mobile missile. Some believe this is in violation of SALT II agreements. I am not here to argue that; the Soviets believe it replaces their SS-13, under the 5 percent agreement of SALT II.

The important point here is that if we want to deploy a new, small missile we have to get an agreement at the bargaining table. What will our quid pro quo be? What will we give at the bargaining table to get their agreement to allow us to move to that missile?

Frankly, we have nothing to give. Let us look at the balance of the existing forces. The ICBM forces. Let us look at it from the standpoint of prompt, hard target capability. Today, the Soviet Union has an exclusive hold

on this capability. What can we present to the Soviet Union in the give and take to get them to move back from their position of having 668 prompt, hard target-kill capable missiles? We have nothing, unless we have the peacekeeper.

Let us look at the future, ladies and gentlemen. Under SALT II, we have nowhere to go, but the Soviet Union still can deploy the SS-24 under SALT II protocol as a new missile. This will be a missile that has the characteristic of being MIRV'd to 10 warheads. It has the characteristic of being mobile as well. We have nothing in that area.

We have nothing to match that capability, which, as I said before, the Soviet Union can have and can build under present SALT II agreements.

If we do not continue to develop and deploy the MX missile, we have two areas in which the Soviet Union would be crazy to give up, because we have nothing to give up in return.

There are other points we must consider, and some people talk about those points: The Strategic Defense Initiative, for example. People believe that is something we can bargain with. Frankly, I believe that is something we can bargain with, but it should be bargained with the Soviet Union on the basis of the fact that they are moving forward with strategic defense initiatives, and we have to be very, very concerned about that. We have to be concerned about the possibility of a breakthrough by the Soviet Union in the area of strategic defense.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CARNEY. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. KASICH. I appreciate the gentleman yielding for just an instant.

Mr. Chairman, I was in the meeting at the White House with Mr. Kampelman. Mr. Kampelman, of course, agreed with the gentleman from New York. Mr. Kampelman said that we clearly need to have the MX, that the Soviets understand strength and deterrence; that if we do not give them the MX missile, we seriously undermine the negotiating process. He also said that the Soviets will say if we give them this, unilaterally, and get nothing in return, the Soviets will say, "What else can we get if we do not give anything in return? Maybe if we sit and wait, the United States will concede to us other systems unilaterally, and we do not have to negotiate anything away."

I just want to point out to the gentleman from New York that our chief negotiator in Geneva, Mr. Kampelman, said we need the MX missile in order to conduct the kind of successful negotiations and the reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons that we would like to see, but only if we have strength, determination, and resolve,

and something behind the process of negotiating, and that is strength and consistency.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CARNEY. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciated the gentleman from Ohio's statement regarding Max Kampelman's statements. Let me just say that he concluded, Mr. Kampelman concluded, by saying that in his estimation, if the MX was taken from consideration, it will delay the negotiations.

I think that is perhaps the strongest statement that he has used so far.

He has to be back, I believe, to commence negotiations at 11 o'clock tomorrow morning. He flew to the United States, as a Democrat who asked his fellow Democrats to stand behind the President of the United States. I think he made a very compelling argument. He said, "You know, I am a Democrat, but in my book we only have one President at a time, and this is a time to support him."

I thank the gentleman again for yielding.

Mr. CARNEY. I thank the gentleman for their comments.

Mr. Chairman, if I may continue, we may look at the B-1B bomber, and we have to realize that the Soviet Union is now doing research and development and in fact have constructed a Blackjack bomber, which we can negotiate for. We can look at cruise missiles. The Soviet Union, of course, has the ASX-15, a cruise missile that has comparable capabilities with our cruise missile. These are issues that can be negotiated on in good faith at Geneva. If we do not go forward with the MX missile, or the Peacekeeper missile, as I prefer to call it, we do not have a viable position to deal the Soviet Union on the SS-24 and the SSX-25.

□ 1800

And we also do not have anything to deal with the Soviet Union on their present hard-target kill capability, the SS-18's and the SS-19's.

A lot has been said about Mr. Kampelman coming here today, and I believe Mr. Kampelman came here today because he realizes that if he does not have things to deal with in the give-and-take of arms negotiations, these arms negotiations that we all hope will be successful cannot be successful. So he has taken time out from his negotiations in Geneva to come here to build a base for himself and our negotiating team from which they can deal with the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. CARNEY] has again expired.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. PEASE].

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, I will continue to oppose funding for the MX missile for a very simple reason. It is a waste of money. It is a missile without a mission.

The best argument President Reagan can muster on behalf of the MX is that it is a bargaining chip in the recently revived nuclear arms negotiations with the Soviet Union.

At a time when Federal deficits are running at \$200 billion every year, when the Nation adds \$1 trillion to the national debt every 4 or 5 years, the idea of spending \$25 billion for a bargaining chip is ludicrous.

A bargaining chip is all the MX can be. It surely won't add to the defense of the Nation.

The whole rationale for the MX was that it would be invulnerable to a Soviet first-strike attack, that it would survive for a retaliatory attack on the Soviet Union.

But after several different schemes to base the MX in a way to make it invulnerable all proved impractical, the present plan was developed to put the new MX missiles in old Minuteman missile silos. It was the vulnerability of the latter which led to talk of the MX in the first place.

So, no increase in the Nation's security. But do we simply need additional nuclear warhead delivery capability?

Hardly. With B-52 bombers already in the fleet and B-1 bombers on the way, with Pershing and cruise missiles stationed in Europe, with Minuteman missiles at the ready, with Trident submarines prowling the seas, the United States certainly doesn't need the MX as a delivery vehicle.

In short, the MX is useless except as a bargaining chip at the Geneva talks.

The cost of the currently sought batch of 21 missiles will be \$2.5 billion.

That's \$2.5 billion the U.S. Government doesn't have. The Treasury Department will have to go out and borrow the money.

Recently, President Reagan told county elected officials that he adamantly opposes renewal of Federal revenue sharing for local government at a cost of \$4.5 billion because "we don't have any revenue to share."

Shouldn't the same reasoning apply to Pentagon weapons systems which aren't absolutely critical to our national defense? When we don't have the money to pay for them and no prospect of getting the money except by more self-destructive borrowing, marginal or "nice-to-have" weapons systems should be put on the shelf.

A major flaw in the defense buildup psychology of President Reagan and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger is their tendency to go for every new weapon on the wish list of the admi-

als and generals. Making choices is too painful for them.

It would be like a family reacting to reports of burglars in the neighborhood by installing three locks on every door, bars on all the windows, and electronic alarm system, barbed wire fence around the property and attack dogs in the yard.

The family would have good reason to feel secure, but it would also be feeling broke. Its actions would not pass the test of common sense.

Neither is it sensible for a nation to spend \$25 billion for a MX missile system it doesn't really need and can't really afford.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HERTEL].

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, as we reach the end of this debate today and look forward to tomorrow, we can agree on one basic thing, and that is that while we are voting on 23 MX missiles this week, the proponents of the MX have admitted that they are talking about a hundred missiles. So unlike the other body, when Members talked about voting yes on 21 and no on 48, the issue in the House is very clear. Everyone agrees that 21 is of no use to us; it is just a step to 100 MX missiles.

Let me point out that there is more than that in the equation. We know that the Defense Department is asking not only for a hundred eventually but for 123 backup missiles for testing, et cetera. So we are talking about an awful lot of money. We are talking about, with superhardening, \$30 billion to \$40 billion plus.

That brings me to the second point. That is that it has not been denied—because it cannot be denied, because Secretary Weinberger himself told us 2 years ago—that if we put the MX missile in the same Minuteman silo, it will be vulnerable. It will continue to be vulnerable, whether it is hardened or superhardened, with whatever technology they talk about for the future which they do not have today. And they cannot tell us how much it will cost to superharden those silos, and they cannot give us an honest answer as to their survivability. It could be as low as 1 percent.

The MX will remain vulnerable, even with that high cost, and many of us contend, therefore, that this \$30 billion or \$40 billion will not add to the defense or the deterrent strength of this Nation. In fact, that \$30 billion or \$40 billion could be used for many other things regarding the defense of this Nation, whether it is to accelerate the mobile missile, accelerate the Trident, or to strengthen our conventional forces—things that make common sense, things that we know would work.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan. [Mr. HERTEL] has expired.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. RAY].

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for an inquiry?

Mr. RAY. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get the attention of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] and the gentleman from New York [Mr. STRATTON] and see if there is an agreement.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I thought we were going to be able to have an agreement, but I find out now that our request already is for 160 minutes, and I only have 120 minutes to divide tomorrow. There are 2 hours, for 120 minutes. So there is no way I can get the requests in now. I am trying to pare down Members and tell them not to take that long. I regret that I am not able to do what I thought I was going to be able to do. It is quite embarrassing to me because I told Members they could have time.

I really have not promised 160 minutes, but I have requests for 160 minutes.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to take further time from the time allocated to the gentleman in the well, but I did want to get an understanding as to whether the gentleman was going to take his unused time tomorrow or not.

Mr. BENNETT. I would like to use all the time tomorrow. It is not much. It is only 15 or 20 minutes, something like that.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, if we could reach an agreement, I think it would be desirable.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. RAY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Joint Resolution 180.

Mr. Chairman, it is my opinion that the Soviets do not want a nuclear conflict, but what they do want is to take America toward a neutral position.

Mr. Chairman, there are some people in this Congress who are helping that position out. The best way for them to accomplish this is to weaken NATO from internal conflict in this country and in Europe and to force America into a posture of not having a viable deterrent.

□ 1810

Now, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that a viable deterrent is the MX missile, that continued funding is also needed to continue that program now.

Without being too repetitious, I would like to remind the Congress that the MX program is a long pro-

gram, spanning 5 more years even under the President's plan and program; however, the particular vote faced on House Joint Resolution 180 has two immediate impacts; one on the negotiations line and one on the production line. One single vote may not show resolve or lack of resolve regarding a particular weapons system; however, the vote may indeed be interpreted as the beginning of a shift in direction if it is inconsistent with the trend developed over the past several years. That trend in needed modernization of U.S. strategic forces has been positive. An affirmative vote is needed to maintain the continuity of that positive trend.

The negotiations at Geneva are unlikely to obtain immediate results, as we are up against veterans who have been negotiating for years, who know how to delay and how to stall. Support for the MX missile from only the barest majority in this Congress will only tend to lengthen the negotiation process. If the continued procurement of the MX missile is now disrupted and at some later point in time if production must be restarted to reemphasize resolve and to create the military incentives for the Soviets to reduce their heavy ICBM forces, the cost will be much greater than if continued modest progress toward the goal is maintained.

A negative vote will not destroy the negotiations, as has been pointed out; but it will make negotiations for an effective arms control agreement substantially more difficult for the United States.

The committee recently heard from a group of Soviet specialists who indicated that the Soviet Government views negotiations, among other objectives, as a way to reduce the burden of Soviet military programs. Many programs in the Soviet economy are competing for the resources devoted to the Soviet military. Although they may never negotiate away the strategic parity they believe they possess today, they will seek to avoid expensive and extensive responses in the future.

The MX missile, Mr. Chairman, will make vulnerable the centerpiece of Soviet offensive weaponry, weaponry such as the SS-18 and the SS-19 and will create the need for the Soviets to respond with relatively expensive counter measures; for example, silo hardening, ABM, and more heavy missiles. Negotiations are another and less costly way for them to avoid many of these financial burdens. Unless the MX program proceeds, the Soviets will not be convinced that a response is required, as is the need to negotiate the issue.

Some say the Soviets have never expressed concern over the MX missile. The absence of Soviet expressions of concern regarding the MX, however, in my own opinion, can be explained in

several ways. They know how to respond when it is to their advantage to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Georgia has expired.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman two additional minutes.

Mr. RAY. They would probably respond when needed to do so by saying that the MX program has slipped, has been reduced, and has lacked strong support; the size of the deployment does not threaten to eliminate today's rough strategic parity. The Soviets do not want to show too much interest because they would then be asked to pay too high a price to reduce the threat posed by the MX missile. This does not mean that they are not concerned, however, only that they have not expressed that concern from within their closed society.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, let me say that the MX has been characterized as a sitting duck; but so are our heavy aircraft carriers and battleships, which are also characterized now as sitting ducks. Some believe they should never have been authorized, and other military installations throughout our land and Europe and NATO and the Pacific basin.

The MX position is one of deterrence and, quite frankly, I believe that if it fails, mobile missile and superhard silos will not matter.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield for a second?

Mr. RAY. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. KASICH. I think an important point as we are closing out the debate tonight should be made. There was an argument made over here and the gentleman from Georgia was here at the time about the amount of money we are spending on defense in this country. I think it ought to be pointed out that under the Presidency of John F. Kennedy, 50 percent of the budget of the United States went to defense, and under this President we have got about 26 percent of the budget going for defense.

Everybody is concerned, naturally, that we spend the money wisely, but I wish the gentleman would comment on that, the fact that John Kennedy was seeking to spend 50 percent of the budget of this country on defense, and we have people who would say we are spending too much today, when it is only 26 percent.

Mr. RAY. Well, I thank the gentleman for those comments. I totally agree with him.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Georgia has expired.

● Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this joint resolution that would release \$1.5 billion for the procurement of 21 operational MX missiles.

The argument being utilized to support this joint resolution is that our arms control negotiators need this to enhance their bargaining power with the Soviet Union. Such an argument elevates perception theory to a position of dominance that will fuel and drive the escalating arms race. Despite the widely held view that the MX missile is ineffective in terms of deterrence and retaliation, we are told that we must continue to fund this strategically flawed weapons system because a failure to do so would signal a lack of national resolve which would damage the military and diplomatic prestige of the United States of America. The open-ended theory that we must build and deploy even ineffective weapon systems or perceptions of the United States will suffer is nonsense. The Congress has supported the funding requirements of many weapon systems designed to assure the strategic defense of our country. We have weapons in our arsenal that can destroy potential adversaries many times over. The United States now has 9,000 strategic nuclear warheads in its arsenal. Our potential adversaries are well aware of our deterrent capabilities.

Nevertheless, to the advocates of perception theory dominating our defense policies, there can never be enough. To perception theorists the MX is vital, no matter its vulnerability to attack in Minuteman silos. This vulnerability means that this weapon system can only be useful as a dangerous and destabilizing first strike nuclear weapon. The MX cannot survive an attack and has no deterrent capability.

Even though the above is conceded by almost everybody, and is certainly known to our potential adversaries, we are told that we must still spend \$1.5 billion to provide this bargaining chip or according to the perception theorists we will be seen as weak. For psychological reasons we must open up the coffers. Ultimately, the full MX program will cost \$41 billion and provide 200 missiles. We are told by the administration that we must spend this money for a weapon system that is commonly called a turkey. This call to more Pentagon waste comes at a time when we are being asked by the administration to cut vital domestic programs in fiscal year 1986.

For example, cuts of: \$1.8 billion in our Housing Assistance Program; \$2 billion in rural housing programs; \$200 million in training and employment; \$2 billion in civilian agency pay for our Federal workers; and \$500 million in student financial aid to name a few.

Mr. Chairman, we are fast approaching a situation where we may have the most frightful defense in the world, but not a great deal to defend. We need an adequate defense, and we have one. We also have security needs at home. At a time when many of our citizens are suffering unemployment

due to the transition taking place in the international economy, with jobs being exported to cheap labor markets abroad, and at a time when we are being asked by the administration to freeze, cut, or eliminate the very programs designed to cushion our citizens through difficult times, we can ill afford a \$1.5 billion psychological bargaining chip for those defense advocates driven by perception theory. We must provide for an adequate defense of the United States. The MX does not do that and it will absorb scarce financial resources. Enough is enough.

I urge my colleagues to reject the joint resolution and the MX.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. STRATTON. The parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman, is, can the Chair advise us as to the amount of time remaining to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT], the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON], and myself.

The CHAIRMAN. The time remaining for today or the entire debate time?

Mr. STRATTON. Just today.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to advise the gentleman from New York that the gentleman from New York has 14 minutes remaining.

The gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] has 26 minutes.

The gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DICKINSON] has 13 minutes.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise. The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. RAY] having assumed the chair, Mr. NATCHER, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 180) to approve the obligation of funds made available by Public Law 98-473 for the procurement of MX missiles, subject to the enactment of a second joint resolution, had come to no resolution thereon.

□ 1820

YOUTH EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY WAGE ACT OF 1985—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 99-45)

The SPEAKER pro tempore, laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read and, together with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the Com-

mittee on Education and Labor and ordered to be printed:

To the Congress of the United States:

I am pleased to transmit to you proposed legislation entitled the "Youth Employment Opportunity Wage Act of 1985."

One of the Nation's most serious and long-standing problems is providing adequate employment opportunities for our young people. Even in times of great economic prosperity, unemployment remains a significant problem for young people, particularly young Blacks and Hispanics. The purpose of the draft bill is to make it possible for employers to expand job opportunities for young people during a period of special need—when young people are looking for summer jobs.

The proposal would permit employers to pay young people under 20 years of age, from May 1 through September 30, a wage of no less than either 75 percent of the otherwise applicable minimum wage or \$2.50 per hour, whichever is less. This bill provides protections so that adult workers or previously hired youth will not be adversely affected by the proposal. It prohibits the discharge, transfer, or demotion of any employee because of ineligibility for the youth wage and for the purpose of hiring an eligible youth and it provides penalties to assist in enforcement of this provision.

For many businesses, the existing minimum wage prices unskilled young people out of the job market. While some businesses can afford to hire unskilled youth and provide the training and experience expected to pay off in future productivity, such expectations are often unreasonable over a short summer employment span.

Studies over the past decade have repeatedly demonstrated that the minimum wage has reduced job opportunities for large numbers of our youth. This is particularly true for jobs involving considerable initial training. The restricted job opportunities for youth, especially minority youth, due to the minimum wage have contributed to the growing consensus on the value of a lower minimum wage for youth as a means of expanding their employment.

The concept of a youth employment opportunity wage has attracted a broad coalition of support. It has been endorsed by many organizations, including the National Conference of Black Mayors and organizations representing businesses that would provide jobs for these youth.

The proposal would enable employers to expand job opportunities for youth during the summer months. It would enable many young people to find jobs, earn money, and gain the experience and skills needed for future work and higher wages. The bill would

not diminish the opportunities for higher wages for those with job skills.

Because it provides for a demonstration period and an evaluation of the program, the bill should allay any doubts as to the ameliorative impact of the youth employment opportunity wage.

I urge the Congress to enact this legislation speedily.

RONALD REAGAN.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 25, 1985.

PRC POPULATION PROGRAM: A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

(Mr. SMITH of New Jersey asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to draw to the attention of Congress the crimes against humanity being committed by the People's Republic of China, and to introduce a resolution denouncing those policies.

In 1979, the PRC adopted as part of its population control program a policy of "one couple/one child." This policy supposedly protects the freedom of couples to make voluntary decisions concerning family planning, but, in reality, relies upon coercion, economic penalties, and forced abortions—often late in pregnancy—for refusal to comply with the program. In accordance with the program, the PRC Government has given sanction to family planning workers to enforce a "birth quota" system established for each community in the country. This repressive system licenses the workers to monitor a woman's menstrual cycle, dictate to couples if and when they may have their one child permitted under the policy, and take drastic measures—ranging from forced abortions to involuntary sterilization—to ensure compliance with the quota system.

Moreover, this policy has fostered an increasing incidence of female infanticide, particularly in rural areas where peasants regard a male child as vital to their economic well-being in retirement years. Except in a few token cases, infanticide has gone unpunished by the PRC Government, thus indirectly condoning the heinous practice.

Such atrocities against Chinese women and children have been documented time and again by State Department officials, reputable journalists, and social scientists. The specifics are recorded in the State Department's "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984," the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, PBS' "Nova" series, CBS' "Sixty Minutes" and other media.

On January 7, for example, the Washington Post carried part two of a

series of articles on the PRC's population control program written by its Peking correspondent, Michael Weisskopf.

Mr. Weisskopf's sobering insights should shock even the most committed proabortion member of this body. He writes:

Publicly, they claim to rely on the powers of persuasion and education, exercising a policy of voluntary consent * * *. But a closer and longer look reveals a very different picture. China to be sure is curbing its population growth, but its success is rooted in widespread coercion, mass abortion and intrusion by the state into the most intimate of human affairs * * *.

The Post's correspondent points out that—

Any mother who becomes pregnant again without receiving official authorization after having one child is required to have an abortion, and the incidence of such operations is stunning—53 million from 1979 to 1984, according to the ministry of Public Health—a 5-year abortion count approximately equal to the population of France.

Mr. Speaker, at this point I enter in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the article published in the Washington Post on January 7, 1985, and a Washington Post editorial published on January 10, 1985. I hope my colleagues will take the time to read these disturbing accounts.

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 7, 1985]

ABORTION POLICY TEARS AT CHINA'S SOCIETY (By Michael Weisskopf)

DONGGUAN COUNTY, CHINA—No government program has cut so deeply into Chinese society nor inspired such strong resistance in 35 years of Communist rule as the struggle to trim China's population.

Chinese leaders consider their policy of "one couple, one child" a fight for national survival, the chief prerequisite of modernization. Publicly, they claim to rely on the powers of persuasion and education, exercising a policy of voluntary consent. They point to declining birth rates and happy one-child couples as symbols of success worthy of the United Nations' first family planning award given jointly to China and India in 1983.

But a closer and longer look reveals a very different picture. China, to be sure, is curbing its population growth, but its success is rooted in widespread coercion, mass abortion and intrusion by the state into the most intimate of human affairs.

"The size of a family is too important to be left to the personal decision of a couple," Minister of Family Planning Qian Xinzong explained before resigning last year.

"Births are a matter of state planning, just like other economic and social activities, because they are a matter of strategic concern," he said. "A couple cannot have a baby just because it wants to. That cannot be allowed if China is to stabilize its population and keep it from doubling and redoubling as it might."

The one-child policy was launched in 1979 as the centerpiece of an ambitious plan to contain China's population at 1.2 billion by the year 2000. China now has a population estimated at 1,038,000,000—22 percent of humanity—and has just 7 percent of the world's arable land.

Loosely enforced at first, the policy was tightened in 1982 after population growth

rates began to climb. Since then, the state has strictly required intrauterine devices for all women with one child and sterilizations for one member of every couple with two or more children.

Cutting the growth rate of 1.15 percent in 1983—less than half the 1970 level—these regulations are credited officially with preventing millions of births yearly.

For all its statistical gains, however, the one-child policy is piling up heavy costs in broken lives and is tearing at the fabric of Chinese society.

China is a society dominated by peasants who live off the land and strive for big families as a matter of economic necessity—the more children, the more hands to till the soil. To them, birth control is a threat, which many actively counter. They hide pregnant women. They secretly remove IUDs. They falsify sterilization certificates. And they physically attack officials.

Every year, millions of Chinese defy authority and have more children despite jolting penalties—heavy fines, dismissal from jobs and loss of farmland, housing and economic benefits—that leave them farther behind in China's march to modernization. Yet at least one-quarter of the 15 million to 20 million babies born in China every year are unapproved.

Faced with strong popular resistance, Peking resorts to even stronger measures. To this struggle, it brings the full powers of a totalitarian state, operating without fear of political opposition. There is no check on official abuse, no outlet for human rights complaints and no forum for public debate of the policy.

What emerges from more than 200 interviews spaced over three years with officials, doctors, peasants and workers in almost two-thirds of China's 29 main subdivisions is the story of an all-out government siege against ancient family traditions and the reproductive habits of a billion people.

The story offers a glimpse of China usually hidden from foreigners but painfully familiar to most Chinese—a world of government-sanctioned infanticide, of strongarm sterilizations and of abortions performed at a rate as high as 800,000 a year in a single province.

It is a harsh milieu, in which houses are razed and valuables seized as the penalty for birth control violations, in which women are forced to wear intrauterine devices as the price of compliance.

While the policy works smoothly in many parts of China, local officials eager to please the central government often resort to excess.

THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILY PLANNING

Nowhere is this dark side of family planning more evident than in Dongguan, a bucolic patch of Guangdong Province in southern China. Here, abortion poses scoured the countryside in the spring of 1981, rounding up women in rice paddies and thatched-roof houses. Expectant mothers, including many in their last trimester, were trussed, handcuffed, herded into hog cages and delivered by the truckload to the operating tables of rural clinics, according to eyewitness accounts.

Dongguan had been engulfed by an intense birth control campaign known as "high tide," engineered by local officials to bring birth control offenders in line with the one-child policy.

In 50 days, 19,000 abortions were performed—almost as many as the county's live births on all of 1981.

Dongguan's "high tide"—details were confirmed in interviews here after initial reports in Hong Kong—dramatizes the least cited but most frequently observed form of birth control in China; abortion.

Any mother who becomes pregnant again without receiving official authorization after having one child is required to have an abortion, and the incidence of such operations is stunning—53 million from 1979 to 1984, according to the Ministry of Public Health—a five-year abortion count approximately equal to the population of France.

In 1983 alone, the number of abortions nationwide—14.4 million—exceeded the combined populations of the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia and Delaware.

Visits to rural south China produced evidence of more than five abortions for every birth in places such as Duan Fen commune of Guangdong Province.

Although abortion was criminally punishable as murder in China, as late as the 1950s, it is dispensed today without debate over moral questions.

"It's more humane to kill children before they are born than to bring them into a society of too many people," said Xu Fangling, a birth control official who helped direct the Dongguan campaign. "If you consider the serious difficulties overpopulation creates for people living today, the moral problem of abortion isn't too serious."

Nor is the timing of abortion usually a factor. Many are performed in the last trimester of pregnancy—100,000 in Guangdong last year, or 20 percent of the province's total abortions—and some as late as the ninth month. Officials say it often takes that long to get reluctant women to clinics.

Doctors normally terminate late-term pregnancies by injecting an herbal drug into the womb, killing the fetus and inducing labor—a kind of induced stillbirth. The dead fetus is usually expelled in 24 hours.

In the Inner Mongolian capital of Hohhot, however, hospital doctors practice what amounts to infanticide by a different name, according to a Hohhot surgeon, who would not allow his name to be used for fear of reprisal. After inducing labor, he revealed, doctors routinely smash the baby's skull with forceps as it emerges from the womb.

In some cases, he added, newborns are killed by injecting formaldehyde into the soft spot of the head.

"If you kill the baby while it's still partly in the womb, it's considered an abortion," explained the 33-year-old surgeon. "If you do it after birth, it's murder."

He said the practice began in 1981 after hospitals in Hohhot passed a new regulation banning births of second children except in the case of ethnic Mongolians, who are treated more leniently under a national minorities policy. For everyone else, he said, "the second child cannot come out alive. The doctor has the obligation to prevent it."

A doctor who ignores the regulation risks losing his job, he said. He estimated that hundreds of babies die this way in his hospital every year.

"You get used to it," said the surgeon, explaining how doctors react. Sitting in the corner of a coffee shop during the interview, he lifted a cup and said, "It's like drinking coffee. At first, it's bitter. But after a while you don't notice the taste."

"I've done it myself."

Similar practices have been reported from other urban centers. A former hospital patient in the northwest city of Urumqi said that she saw women in labor being wheeled into a large room marked "abortion ward."

A medical student in Canton who worked in a hospital gynecology ward in 1982 told foreign visitors that pregnant women were required to present birth authorization cards before admission to the delivery room. He said doctors who were under orders to abort all unauthorized pregnancies often strangled or smothered newborns.

While abortion is justified officially as a necessary expedient, its high incidence is considered an embarrassing breakdown of a system carefully crafted to prevent unplanned pregnancies.

China's family-planning work is backed by the full organizational might of the Communist Party, which extends its influence to every factory, neighborhood and village. Every Chinese belongs to a "unit"—workplace or rural governing body—and every unit has a birth control committee headed by party officials. These officials have enormous power over the lives of their charges. Almost all decisions require their approval—who earns bonuses, who gets housing space, who grows cash crops, who has a chance to study, who marries and who has children.

When Peking gave local party chiefs responsibility for family planning, it added a powerful lever to assure compliance. Then, to fortify the resolve of these officials, it added financial incentive. In most parts of China, local officials earn cash bonuses only if their units observe birth control limits.

With a financial stake in low births, officials put a high premium on prevention. They carefully plan new births for their unit, requiring written applications from any couple wanting to have a child and matching requests with quotas that trickle down from Peking.

The primary target of their work, however, is couples who already have two or more children. At least one parent is required by the state to undergo sterilization, and local officials use methods ranging from cash rewards to coercion to get those eligible to the operating table. Almost always the woman bears the responsibility.

Official statistics show a high level of success: 31 million women and 9.3 million men were sterilized between 1979 and 1984, totaling almost one-third of all married, productive couples in China.

A national sterilization drive last winter boosted annual sterilizations for 1983 to an extraordinary 16.4 million for women and 4.4 million for men, according to the Public Health Ministry—exceeding the total number of such procedures in the previous five years.

Most sterilizations in rural areas are done collectively in "high tides" organized by local officials to coincide with the visit of roving surgical teams who operate in improvised facilities or cold, austere clinics equipped with little more than board and bucket.

A roundup in frigid northern China near the Mongolian border illustrates how the process works.

The campaign, which was described by a participating doctor, began in November 1983, when officials from every commune in the county searched their records for women under the age of 45 who had two or more children. Then they broadcast their names over public loudspeakers and set dates by which each had to report to the clinic for surgery.

There was a warning to potential evaders: a loss of half of their state land allotment, a fine of \$200—equal to about a year's income—and a late fee of \$10 for every day they failed to report.

Several couples initially defied the warning but were quickly brought into line. Officials went to their homes, confiscated valuables, such as sewing machines and building materials, and threatened to sell them within three days unless they submitted to the operation.

The surgical team left in early January after completing its goal of 16,000 sterilizations in two months, according to the doctor.

It was an unusually successful campaign considering the intensity of opposition to sterilization. The very mention of a "high tide" has sent whole villages of eligible women into hiding. To head off a mass exodus last year in coastal Fujian Province, Fuquing County officials reportedly organized late-night "surprise attacks," hustling sleeping women from their beds to 24-hour sterilization clinics.

Another popular dodge is phony sterilization certificates. Couples buy falsified or purloined forms at high prices. When the woman gets pregnant, she pleads for leniency, claiming she was a victim of faulty surgery.

As resistance stiffens, however, so does the penalty for evasion.

When women in a Yellow River community of Henan Province fled in advance of a "high tide" last spring, Xiuwu county officials tore off roofs of their houses and knocked down walls with tractors, according to a Chinese medical staffer who witnessed the wrecking.

Female workers in the sleepy southern port city of Zhanjiang were docked their wages until they reported for sterilization surgery, according to factory hands there. Although 20 women at one candy plant stood their ground and were fired, most gave in to the financial pressure.

"Who dares to oppose the regulation?" asked a 34-year-old mother who had an operation she did not want. "I have three children. Can I afford to feed them without a job?"

Officials are no less forceful in dealing with one-child mothers. They are required by national regulation to have IUDs inserted after their first child is born and strictly forbidden to remove the stainless steel loops.

Other forms of contraception are permitted, including birth control pills and condoms, but statistics reflect the official preference for easier and more reliable IUDs: Of 124 million married women using birth control, 55 percent wear IUDs—69 million, which exceeds the total number of IUD users in the rest of the world combined.

AUTOMATIC IUD IMPLANTS

In some city hospitals, doctors automatically implant the devices immediately after a woman gives birth, often without informing the woman or seeking prior consent, according to a Peking gynecologist.

Official prodding substitutes for hospital efficiency in most places, however. Family-planning authorities call on new mothers to stress the need for contraception. There are follow-up visits to "educate" the woman until she possesses an IUD certificate, for which she gets a cash bonus and time off work.

Little choice is given in places such as rural Fujian, where women who refuse IUDs lose their right to grain rations and medical benefits for their first child, according to an overseas Chinese visitor.

Women fitted with IUDs in most of China regularly are shepherded into clinics for X-

rays to make sure of proper placing. Up to six times a year, they are stood before decades-old equipment to endure the kind of fluoroscopic examination discouraged in the West for fear of causing radiation damage to ovaries or fetuses. Frequent X-ray exams are considered necessary because of the high failure rate of IUDs, which are often inserted in factory-line fashion without concern for sizing.

Of greater concern to authorities is the problem of surreptitious removals. Women who had submitted reluctantly to IUD insertions pay charlatan doctors to extract them with homemade metal hooks. It is a common occurrence in rural areas, where the so-called "hook wielders" charge as much as \$25 for a home "operation," often undoing the family planning work of an entire village in a few days' time.

These "hook wielders" remain popular despite their record of disasters—hundreds of deaths and injuries reportedly caused by penetration of the uterus and intestines with unsterilized bicycle spokes or bamboo sticks.

For local officials who claim to run voluntary IUD campaigns, the reported incidence of such deviant behavior is contradictorily high: 80 percent of IUD users in some parts of Fujian had their loops removed in 1981; 10,000 extractions were reported in a single county of Sichuan Province between 1980 and 1983.

"These so-called doctors are swindlers who take advantage of the backward desire of peasants to have more children," said Sun Guoliang, vice chief of Sichuan's birth control office.

"There are women who were less than willing in the beginning to have the IUDs put in," he said. "Others may have been willing at first but changed their views after the swindlers told them the loops would make them sterile." In case of contraceptive failure or abuse, however, there are other controls built into the system.

Few unauthorized pregnancies can elude the tight supervision of birth control activists, a phalanx of female members of the party, Communist Youth League and Women's Federation who are deputized by local officials to monitor the reproductive lives of Chinese couples.

These activists, who often are referred to derogatorily as "mothers-in-law" for their meddling ways, each focus on a few couples in every factory, neighborhood and rural hamlet.

They know everyone's contraceptive method. They make daily house calls to remind birth control pill users to take their pills. They issue condoms on request, giving repeated instructions and insisting they be used "two at a time" or be inflated first to test for leaks.

The activists closely watch for signs of pregnancy—morning sickness, craving for sour food or swollen breasts—and cultivate informers to report on their neighbors or coworkers.

They keep detailed records of every woman's menstrual cycle, checking to make sure of regularity.

"If it is late, we wait four days," said Yu Caihua, an activist in Zhou Nan County of Shandong Province. "If the woman's period still doesn't come, we take her for a check-up."

MONITORING CONTRACEPTION IN THE WORK PLACE

Many factories around the country hang up blackboards listing each female worker's contraceptive measure and the day her

period arrives. The women are required to place a check mark next to their names after menstruation begins every month. If she fails to report on schedule, her boss will be asked why. The woman is then ordered to take a pregnancy test.

A positive test spells trouble for any woman who already has a child. She is urged to have an abortion, offered a cash bonus and time off from work as a reward. If she refuses, the pressure mounts.

This is where China's family-planning apparatus comes down with full force. It also is the breaking point for many Chinese.

First come the tactics of persuasion played out in what is known euphemistically as "heart-to-heart chats." Several activists visit the pregnant women at home to explain the need for population control. She is urged to have an abortion for the good of her nation, her community and her family. Husbands and mothers-in-law are recruited for the talks because they often pose the biggest obstacle to abortion.

If she holds her ground, the talks intensify. More officials enter the fray, sometimes eight or 10 at a time. They come for hours every day lecturing, cajoling, pleading. Eventually, the local party chief joins in and the tenor changes. Now the pregnant woman is criticized for resisting and warned of the penalty for unauthorized birth, which varies from place to place but can include loss of farmland, fines of up to \$1,000, firing from factory jobs, public censure and the denial of land, medical benefits, grain rations and educational opportunities for the unplanned child.

To increase the pressure for speedy abortion, the woman is charged a penalty, called a "talking fee," of \$2 per day in the rural suburbs of Qingdao in east China, according to peasants there.

In coastal Jiangsu Province, she is required to sign a "guarantee" promising to pay any penalty, according to family officials there.

Fines begin in the fourth month of pregnancy in factories of Shantou in east Guangdong, where both husband and wife lose 50 percent of their monthly wage—to be refunded if she finally has an abortion.

Party chief Huang Zhigao of Double Bridge Village in the southwestern province of Sichuan acknowledged the practice of "helping" pregnant women to the clinic if they refuse to go on their own.

As an example, he cited the story of a 32-year-old woman named Li who had a baby girl and became pregnant again in the hope of having a boy. After numerous visits to her home by "persuasion groups" proved unsuccessful, eight activists appeared at her doorstep one morning and told Li, then four months pregnant, "if you don't go to the clinic willingly, we'll take you," according to Huang.

"The woman struggled and started crying when they started taking her by the arms," recalled Huang. "She was dragged about 50 yards and finally gave in."

Activist Zhang Xiujuan, who was among those "helping" Li, said, "It took all of us to get her to the clinic."

Huang justified the episode as a necessary "administrative measure." He said Li and another woman who met a similar fate complained that they had been taken against their will, but "they were told there was no way out because they rejected our advice to go willingly."

The large number of Chinese who reject such advice every year indicates less aggressive enforcement or stronger resistance elsewhere.

Many pregnant women hide in the mountains or flee to a relative's village to escape official harassment, practicing what is colloquially known as "childbirth on the run." So many runaways reached the remote, northwestern province of Gansu that a regulation was passed directing local officials to "terminate within a limited time all unplanned pregnancies of women not in their home residential area," according to an internal document.

Those who stay home simply resist the official hectoring, usually passively. In numerous cases, however, the pressure becomes too much and explodes into violence. There have been attacks against the private gardens of activists in Sichuan and Anhui provinces. And there have been physical attacks against officials themselves—stabblings, clubbings and beatings, according to official news reports.

A Guangdong peasant named Wu Jingqu, who had two children, personally pulled out his wife's IUD and got her pregnant. When the deputy party secretary of his commune visited the couple and pressed the woman to have an abortion, Wu reportedly hacked him to death with a meat cleaver. Wu was executed.

A Shandong activist was hospitalized for two months after she was kicked in the groin and beaten with wooden staves by a man who objected to her urging a pregnancy test for his wife.

"Some peasants accept the idea of birth control easily and some don't, said vice chief Sun of Sichuan. "The activists have to do their work, and the peasants want more children. There are inevitable clashes."

For many peasants who are just starting to prosper under today's flexible economic policies and want more farm hands, the prospect of being fined for having children seems unjust. For local officials, however, the only way to stop unplanned births is to make them prohibitively costly.

At the Double Bridge commune, Huang decided to make a "negative example" of a 29-year-old woman named Meng who fled 200 miles to have her second child at an aunt's home. Huang, who lost his bonus because of Meng's clandestine delivery, took revenge when she returned. He stripped her family of half of the land given by the state for farming, fined her \$400—almost thrice her annual income—and denied her the right to grain and cloth rations for the second child.

To sharpen the sting, Meng was forced to make a self-criticism at a mass meeting. Standing before 100 peasants who sat on stools in the village warehouse, she endured what in Chinese terms is a painful loss of face.

"Since then, we haven't had an unplanned second birth," said Huang.

(Michael Weisskopf recently has completed a four-year assignment as Peking correspondent for the Washington Post, a period spanning the initial implementation of China's policy of "one couple, one child.")

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 10, 1985]

"ONE COUPLE, ONE CHILD"

The China series by Michael Weisskopf, the Post's correspondent in Peking for the last four years, illuminates the scope and type of measures the authorities there employ to limit their country's population. This is, for Westerners, a difficult subject. Many Americans, we would surmise, accept that the world's most populous nation must do something to cap and eventually trim the

growth of a population already estimated at over 1 billion. But while some of the means are what you could call extremely rigorous—education, propaganda, economic leverage, social pressure—other methods fall into the realm of the openly coercive and brutal: mandatory abortion, induced stillbirth, the strangling of the new-born. That the state actively sanctions and sponsors these means underlines the dilemma.

Having favored first three children and then two children per couple earlier in the 1970s, an alarmed government went to "one couple, one child" in 1979. The difference between two and one, it calculated, was the difference between reaching 1.54 billion people in the year 2052 and peaking at 1.05 billion in 2004.

Many Chinese, especially tradition-oriented peasants, have gone to strenuous lengths of resistance and evasion to have more than one child. Even among those willing to stop at one, however, tradition and individual preference have led many to want a son. What happens when the one child officially permitted turns out to be a girl? The saddest fact of all those recounted by Mr. Weisskopf is the short count of healthy baby girls. It is measured in the hundreds of thousands each year. The explanation for it is the practice of infanticide, the horrible response of desperate parents to the official edict. The government decries it, feebly.

It is sometimes suggested, in mitigation of reports like this one, that China can ill afford the ethical standards of more affluent societies and that its policy is not without its own considered and defensible moral basis: better that some suffer now so that a greater number will not suffer later. But it is not mere sentimentalism that produces a response of outrage to what is going on in China. A totalitarian state is using its immense resources to intervene crudely, often violently, in the most delicate personal choices of millions of human beings. In the name of modernization, the state is seeing to the death of live human beings. It is the kind of policy that puts a deep moral divide between the United States and the People's Republic, notwithstanding the cooperation they seek on more routine affairs.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, these reprehensible crimes against humanity cannot go unnoticed. My resolution denounces the PRC's policy toward their own women and children, and further calls upon the other nations of the world to reject similar inhuman practices in their own countries. The text of the resolution follows:

H. CON. RES. —

Concurrent resolution concerning United States policy towards the one-child-per-family program and forced abortion policies of the People's Republic of China

Whereas in 1979 the People's Republic of China adopted a one-child-per-family policy that purports to protect voluntary decisions by couples on matters relating to family planning, but in reality relies on coercion, economic penalties, and forced abortions (often late in pregnancy) for refusal to comply;

Whereas as a direct result of this one-child-per-family policy, the incidence of female infanticide in the People's Republic of China has skyrocketed to several hundred thousand deaths per year because couples, particularly those living in rural areas, regard a boy as vital to their economic well-

being and a source of financial security in retirement;

Whereas the one-child-per-family policy of the People's Republic of China makes use of a repressive "birth quota" system that empowers family planning workers to dictate to couples if and when they may have the one child permitted under the policy;

Whereas the People's Republic of China's family planning workers violate a woman's right to privacy by monitoring private details of a woman's life, including the onset of menstruation in order to track compliance with the one-child-per-family policy;

Whereas the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984 states with regard to the People's Republic of China, "Each province sets guidelines for the desired number of children to be born during the year. These guidelines are often translated into rigid quotas at the unit level [such as factories and communes]. Women must apply for permission from their unit to have a child. Although contrary to announced central government policy, many of those becoming pregnant without permission are reportedly coerced into having abortions, even in the later stages of pregnancy.";

Whereas numerous reports by social scientists and by journalists associated with the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Public Broadcasting System "Nova" series, and the Columbia Broadcasting System's "Sixty Minutes", and other media, have documented pervasive reliance by local People's Republic of China officials or forced for coerced abortion in order to achieve birth quotas for specified areas;

Whereas reports indicate that, as a result of the one-child-per-family policy, more than 54 million unborn children have been killed by abortion in the People's Republic of China;

Whereas the Department of State policy for the 1984 International Conference on Population stated that, "Attempt to use abortion, involuntary sterilization, or other coercive measures in family planning must be shunned, whether exercised against families within a society or against nations within the family of man", and the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child issued in 1959 calls for the legal protection of children before birth as well as after birth;

Whereas at the Nuremberg War Crimes trials, forced abortion was regarded as a "crime against humanity"; and

Whereas while "official" People's Republic of China policy forbids infanticide, prosecution has been virtually nonexistent except in a few token cases: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (with the Senate concurring), That the Congress—

(1) finds the one child-per-family-population control program of the People's Republic of China, with its reliance on forced or coerced abortion and resultant increase in female infanticide, to be violative of the human rights of the citizens of that country, constituting an ongoing crime against humanity;

(2) calls upon the Government of the People's Republic of China to cease immediately this repressive policy and respect the human rights of its citizens; and

(3) calls upon the governments of other countries to reject suggestions for the institution of such inhuman policies in their own country.

THE ROSE TARIFF EQUITY ACT OF 1985

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. PANETTA] is recognized for 5 minutes.

● Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Speaker, today I am reintroducing legislation to bring equity in the trade relations in the rose industry between the United States and the European Community. This legislation would align tariff rates on fresh cut roses with those imposed by the European Community in an effort to ensure the future economic survival of the domestic rose industry.

At present, the future vitality of America's rose producers is being seriously endangered by underpriced, underassessed foreign imports flooding our markets. From 1977 to 1982, imports increased from 10.3 million blooms to 94.1 million. In addition, 126 million roses were imported into this country in 1983 capturing 20 percent of the domestic market. The market share captured by imports increased to 24 percent in 1984 and is projected to corner 28 percent of the domestic rose market in 1985. Such growth in imports in this country will be devastating to domestic rose growers. Over the past decade, more than 30 percent of the domestic rose growers have been forced out of business. Without action to correct the present inequities, we can expect to see more departures from this industry.

One of the major reasons for the strong penetration of the domestic market by foreign rose producers is the very low import duty enjoyed by foreign exporters to this country. The European Economic Community imposes a duty three times as high as that imposed by the United States during the prime marketing season. In addition to the tariff advantage, major exporters of roses to this country enjoy competitive advantages resulting from unfair trade practices and subsidies.

Since 1977, domestic rose growers have repeatedly attempted to obtain relief through appropriate administrative channels. The unfair trade practices of rose importing countries have been well documented and upheld by the International Trade Administration and the Court of International Trade, but domestic rose growers still have been unable to secure a remedy to their problem. The only remaining avenue of relief is through legislation.

The legislation I am introducing today to align U.S. tariff rates on fresh cut roses to the same levels that are currently imposed by the EEC. This legislation will return a greater degree of fairness and equity in this industry and can help to prevent many of our Nation's rose growers from experiencing the fate suffered by domes-

tic producers of other cut flowers. Similar inequitable tariffs on carnations and chrysanthemums have pushed the foreign market share of these flowers to levels that are causing the virtual dissolution of the domestic industry for these flowers. We must act to prevent similar actions from taking place in the rose industry.

The bill I am sponsoring has the support of growers and wholesalers in the rose industry and will help prevent a demise of the domestic rose industry. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this legislation.

H.R. 1701

A bill to amend the Tariff Schedules of the United States to provide for rates of duty on imported roses consistent with those maintained by the European Economic Community on imports of roses from the United States and other nations

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) subpart G of part 15 of schedule 1 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (19 U.S.C. 1202) is amended by striking out item 192.18 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"192.14 Roses.			
	If entered during the period from November 1 of any year to May 31 of the following year, inclusive.	24% ad val.	40% ad val.
192.16	If entered during the period from June 1 to October 31 of any year, inclusive.	17% ad val.	40% ad val."

(b) Items 192.15 and 192.17 are redesignated as 192.11 and 192.13, respectively.

SEC. 2. The amendments made by the first section of the Act shall apply with respect to articles entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.●

A PITTSBURGH VIEW OF THE REAGAN BUDGET

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. COYNE] is recognized for 10 minutes.

● Mr. COYNE. Mr. Speaker, the budget submitted by President Reagan proposes that we continue our increases in military spending as we reduce or eliminate spending for certain domestic programs.

The revenue proposals in the budget would actually decrease the amount of funds the Government can raise in the next few years as we attempt to lower the deficit.

To follow the budget course recommended by the administration would be to saddle the Nation with economic problems on a scale nearly unthinkable just a few years ago. If we adopt the administration's recommendations, we can expect 50 percent more national debt than was incurred in all the years combined from the Presiden-

cies of George Washington through Jimmy Carter.

It is not emphasized often enough that should Congress agree to all of the President's budget suggestions for fiscal 1986, we can still expect a budget deficit of \$180 billion for that year, even as programs which have helped make our society more equitable are eliminated. The President has submitted an unbalanced budget to the Congress and has not given any indication as to how he would balance his budget in the next fiscal year.

How, we might ask, have we arrived at a situation in which large domestic spending cuts will leave us with such a huge deficit?

It is not because, as the administration suggests, we spend too much on domestic programs. Appropriations for social programs, including education, job training and employment, social services, unemployment compensation, food and nutrition, and other income security programs totalled \$96.7 billion in fiscal 1981. Outlays for these programs would reach only \$98 billion in the next fiscal year under the Reagan budget. Transportation, community and regional development, natural resources and environment, and energy program spending, which amounted to \$62.8 billion in fiscal 1981, would decline to \$49.8 billion in fiscal 1986.

The big budget increase in military spending, which has more than doubled since fiscal 1980. At this point, I would like to include in the RECORD a chart which shows military appropriations approved for the last 6 years, the administration's proposals for the next 5 years, and the percentage increase in spending for each of these years:

DEFENSE SPENDING

[Budget authority, dollars in billions]

Fiscal year	Amount	Percent increase over previous year (adjusted for inflation)	
		Before	After
1980	\$145.8	14.1	2.1
1981	182.4	25.1	12.7
1982	218.7	19.9	12.3
1983	245.8	12.4	7.9
1984	264.2	7.5	4.1
1985	292.6	10.7	6.0
1986	322.2	10.1	5.9
1987	363.3	12.8	8.1
1988	411.5	13.3	8.7
1989	448.9	9.1	4.9
1990	488.1	8.7	4.7

Source: House Budget Committee, President Reagan's fiscal year 1986 budget.

This increase, combined with the inequitable tax cuts approved by Congress in 1981, tax cuts which have meant a massive loss of dollars to the Treasury, is the basis of our current deficit problem. A recurring high deficit, of course, means an increase in interest costs the Government must pay when it borrows money. Unless we alter our current policies, we can expect the interest burden per capita to quadruple between 1980 and 1990.

The administration budget figures are especially disturbing because they are based on what could be termed a "best case scenario." That is, the assumptions are based on an economy in which there is high growth, low inflation, relatively low unemployment, and a declining interest rate.

What the administration fails to acknowledge as it puts together budget figures is that the recovery we are now experiencing, welcome though it is, may not be permanent. The current expansion will be 3 years old at the end of this year. Normal cyclical factors such as a waning of consumer and business confidence, rising consumer debt burden, and excess building of inventory during the second half of this year could precipitate a recession in 1986. The average peacetime expansion, it should be noted, lasts about 34 months. If the recovery should falter and unemployment rise, the deficit situation would worsen markedly. By some estimates, we can expect an addition to the deficit of about \$25 billion for each 1-point rise in unemployment. So it is conceivable that if the unemployment is a point or two greater than anticipated for fiscal 1986, a year in which the administration predicts unemployment will average 6.9 percent, we could increase the deficit by \$25 billion for each percentage point above the projection. We should recall that the administration has been seriously off the mark in the past when it came to forecasting unemployment. The administration budget for fiscal 1982 projected a jobless rate of 7.2 percent. As we are all aware, the jobless rate for that year turned out to be 9.7 percent.

What happens if we slide into a recession after the President's proposals to eliminate the Economic Development Administration, the Job Corps, urban development action grants, and general revenue sharing to cities are adopted? We know we will have a deficit of \$180 billion if we follow the administration's advice and eliminate many social programs. Should unemployment rise only 2 points above the administration's projections, as it did in fiscal 1982, we can expect an increase to the deficit of about \$50 billion in a period in which jobs programs have been cut back or eliminated. I see nothing in the administration's budget which addresses this all too real prospect.

When inflation is accounted for, real grants to State and local governments would be cut in half in budget authority from fiscal 1981 to fiscal 1986. Grants to States and localities would decline by 18 percent in the next fiscal year alone under the Reagan budget.

At this point, I would like to share with my colleagues my estimate of the impact of the administration's proposed budget reductions, with special

attention given to the city of Pittsburgh and the 14th Congressional District which I represent.

TRANSPORTATION

Funding for mass transit in fiscal 1986 would be reduced by 67 percent from fiscal 1985, from \$4.2 to \$1.4 billion. The President's budget would also eliminate the Discretionary Grant Program and prohibit the use of Federal assistance for mass transit operating expenses. A new formula capital assistance program funded by the 1-cent per gallon gas tax dedicated to mass transit, would mean an effective reduction of more than 58 percent in total capital assistance. The new budget also includes an increase in the minimum local match of capital costs from 20 to 30 percent.

Such reductions in aid for capital projects make it very unlikely that new transit systems will be built. Moreover, the aid reduction may result in a deferral of maintenance for aging facilities and equipment. Layoffs and plant closings in the bus and manufacturing sector are also probable. A projected loss of \$875 million in Federal operating assistance would force transit authorities to rely more on State and local funding or to reduce mass transit programs.

The Reagan budget reductions would cause the Port Authority of Allegheny County to lose immediately \$10.7 million in Federal operating assistance. This constitutes about 8 percent of the authority's income and could mean a combination of a 10-percent service reduction, a layoff of 230 employees and a fare increase of 25 cents. The Discretionary Grant Program slated for elimination provides revenue for transit facilities which affect the area's busways and downtown subway. Overall, adoption of the administration's budget proposal would halt plans to extend the Martin Luther King, Jr. East Busway, stage II of the light rail transit project and the Spine Line Rapid Transit Project between downtown and Oakland.

I would like my colleagues to be aware that the port authority in my district is already facing severe economic difficulty and could not possibly sustain a budget reduction of this proportion. The authority projects a deficit of \$6 million in its \$140 million budget by June 30 and is now preparing plans for a complete shutdown of the system by that date if new funds are not secured to lower the existing deficit.

STUDENT AID

The new budget proposes a \$2.3 billion reduction in student financial assistance and guaranteed student loans. A cap on aid would limit a student to no more than \$4,000 in Federal assistance per year. The interest rate on guaranteed student loans, now set at 8 percent, would be tied annually to a rate determined by 91 day Treasury

bill. Students from families with adjusted gross income in excess of \$25,000 would not qualify for such programs as Pell grants or subsidized work-study job programs. This change in the law, if enacted, would affect approximately 1 million students. Families with adjusted gross income above \$32,500 would qualify for federally guaranteed loans but would be ineligible for other subsidies. At this point, it is worth noting that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had 267,221 guaranteed student loans outstanding in fiscal 1984, about 8 percent of the national total. At the University of Pittsburgh, 21,000 students in a university population of 36,000 receive some form of student aid. The median family income of the student population is \$28,951. Student aid cutbacks on a scale such as those proposed in the fiscal 1986 budget would have a serious impact on public universities such as the University of Pittsburgh.

FOOD ASSISTANCE

A \$550 million reduction in the school lunch and breakfast program in next year's budget could mean that 8,000 to 10,000 schools, and 5 to 6 million children, would be forced out of the program.

Funding for the Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children would be lower in the next fiscal year than it is this year. This funding reduction comes from the removal from the rolls of 100,000 women and children who now receive benefits. Limitations on program funding mean that only 3.1 million of the more than 9 million now eligible actually participate in the program. The short-term savings realized by these cuts will be more than offset by the eventual cost of caring for children who become ill because of poor nutrition.

In addition, next year's budget includes a freeze on food stamps. This program, which has been cut \$7 billion over the last 4 years, serves approximately 1.08 million in Pennsylvania. Nationally, about 20 million of an eligible population of 35 million use food stamps.

Of special concern to Pennsylvanians, especially the thousands of long term unemployed, is the failure of the administration to include in the budget a provision, as recommended by the President's Commission on Hunger, which allows for more flexible eligibility rules. Under current rules, rigorously applied assets tests force many unemployed to sell personal property to qualify for food stamps. Unemployed people in very distressed areas are often unable to sell personal property for anywhere near the fair market value. This only adds to economic hardship for these individuals.

The administration also proposes to eliminate two programs which support the efforts of emergency food providers: the Temporary Emergency Food

Assistance Program and the Emergency Food Distribution and Shelter Program. Each program provides aid to private sector organizations to assist the hungry. This action comes at a time when, according to a 1984 U.S. Conference of Mayors study, two out of four cities surveyed experienced increased demand for emergency food in 1984.

Let us consider for a moment the seriousness of the hunger problem in Allegheny County. According to the Hunger Action Coalition, requests for emergency food assistance increased substantially last year. From July to December 1984, the coalition aided 5,057 households, or 13,422 people, and only 3 out of 10 of these individuals had been served before. Approximately three out of four of the heads of households assisted were under age 65. The overwhelming number served were under age 61. More than half the people assisted were on food stamps but were unable to make ends meet.

HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

The administration proposes a 2-year moratorium on additional Federal assistance for low and moderate income housing.

New budget authority for housing for fiscal 1986 would be \$499 million. This compares with the \$10.8 billion in budget authority for housing Congress approved in 1985. The reduction this year would be more than 90 percent.

The housing moratorium means that in the next 2 years there would not be an increase in housing units under the section 8 existing program, the section 202 Elderly and Handicapped Housing Program, Public and Indian Housing or in the new, highly promising rental rehabilitation and development grants. Further, the administration proposes a rescission of \$253 million in public housing authority operating funds.

In the area of community development, the administration would reduce the multipurpose Community Development Block Grant [CDBG] Program by 10 percent, thereby reducing the fiscal 1986 authorization to \$3.125 billion. The CDBG allocation formula would also be revised so as to reduce effectively by 23 percent allocations to cities with populations of \$50,000 or more. The Urban Development Action Grant [UDAG] Program, funded this year at \$440 million, would be eliminated, as would the Economic Development Administration, authorized this year at \$226 million.

The effect of these urban cutbacks would be felt immediately in Pittsburgh. A 23-percent CDBG reduction would mean that public streets, lights, and bridges would deteriorate further and rehabilitation of aging housing would not take place. Every \$15,000 reduction in CDBG funds means one more home will go without necessary

rehabilitation. In Pittsburgh last year, the Home Improvement Loan Program provided 1,379 below market rate rehabilitation loans to homeowners for a total of over \$8.8 million. Of the 1,495 individual housing units rehabilitated, 811 benefited low- and moderate-income homeowners. Under the Forgiveness Loan Program, which makes rehabilitation loans for up to 20 years at an interest rate of 3 percent to homeowners with family income of \$9,000 or less, 188 loans were made in 1984 for a total of \$2 million. In addition, it is worth noting that every \$10,000 lost in CDBG money used for economic development means the city loses the ability to create or retain two jobs. Construction and rehabilitation of bridges, of course, will be deferred or canceled.

If the administration succeeds in eliminating UDAG, the hard-won revitalization of what has been rated America's most livable city will be challenged. UDAG's have been an important component in making the city more livable. A UDAG grant for the city's Northside, for example, provides low-interest loans to homeowners. Other UDAG's have been essential to downtown revitalization. At this point, I would like to include in the RECORD a chart which lists the UDAG's received by the city of Pittsburgh, the amount of private investment generated by UDAGs, and the number of jobs created:

UDAG GRANTS TO PITTSBURGH 1978-1984

Project	Action grant	Private dollars	Jobs created
Northside revitalization	\$8,100,000	\$26,400,000	144
Parkway Center Mall	4,626,000	17,350,000	1,200
Giant Eagle Market Center	4,150,000	24,065,218	417
Silver Lake industrial park	215,000	739,000	20
Gateway Clipper	1,055,000	4,010,000	140
Four Station Square complex	4,847,000	26,098,747	600
Lemington Home	1,130,733	4,274,529	87
South Aiken offices	990,000	3,678,447	60
Convention Center Hotel	21,000,000	107,083,190	1,510
1000 California Avenue	460,000	1,839,102	58
Allegheny International/Stanley	17,000,000	108,279,000	1,185

JOB CORPS

The administration would eliminate the Job Corps in fiscal 1986. This is a program which provides remedial and skill training to low-income young people aged 16 to 22. Some 40,000 youths use the services of this excellent program at 107 training centers throughout the country.

I believe the skills learned in the Job Corps serve the graduates well in a market in which roughly 40 percent of their age group is unemployed. Not everyone, of course, has a job waiting upon leaving the corps. Neither do many graduates of college. But the Job Corps gives its participants, 90 percent of whom dropped out of school, a base upon which to build.

The elimination of the Job Corps would have widespread effect in Pittsburgh. Since 1972, more than 7,000 youths have participated in programs

at the Pittsburgh Job Corps Center, a center which now assists 340 corpsmembers. The local economy benefits from more than \$4.5 million a year in Job Corps Center funds which are spent on staff salaries, corpsmember stipends and goods and services.

VETERANS BENEFITS

The fiscal 1986 budget would limit free health care for veterans of all ages with non-service-connected disabilities to those with incomes of \$15,000 or less or to those in certain other limited categories. Those eligible for free health care would include veterans with a Veterans' Administration compensation rating for treatment of non-service-connected disabilities; former prisoners of war; veterans exposed to certain herbicides or atomic testing; VA pensioners and veterans of World War I, the Spanish-American War or the 1916 Mexican border war. The \$15,000 cutoff would be adjusted for those with more than one dependent. Veterans above the limit would pay their own expenses, up to a defined limit. The limit would rise as the veteran's income increases. When expenses exceed that limit, the veteran would be eligible for VA medical treatment.

Reductions of this sort will be a distinct hardship for the 837,000 veterans who reside in the western Pennsylvania VA district. While the overall number of veterans in the district will decline by 9 percent by 1990, the number aged 65 or older will rise from 11 percent of the veteran population to 26 percent in the same period.

SMALL BUSINESS

The end of the Small Business Administration (SBA), as proposed by the administration, would mean a halt to low-interest Federal loans to new and existing businesses.

Nationwide, SBA outlays for fiscal 1985 assistance to 21,500 businesses are expected to total \$726 million. In western Pennsylvania, the SBA had 3,312 outstanding loans totaling \$131 million as of December 1984. In the same fiscal year, the western Pennsylvania SBA office provided 310 loans for a total of \$40 million and is credited with aiding in the creation of more than 2,000 area jobs.

Several SBA programs slated for elimination are of particular interest to northeastern cities such as Pittsburgh. Section 503 development companies, section 7(a) regular small business loans, small business innovation research activities and SBA management assistance are among the programs which have demonstrated their usefulness. More than half of the section 502 money spent in fiscal 1984, for example, went to businesses in the Northeast and Midwest.

GENERAL REVENUE SHARING

The administration budget would end general revenue sharing [GRS], a

local government assistance program budgeted this year at \$4.567 billion.

An abrupt termination of GRS funds would be a blow to thousands of hard-pressed local governments. For roughly 6 out of 10 towns with populations of 10,000 or less, revenue sharing is the only Federal grant these localities receive. City and county governments rely on the revenue-raising ability of the Federal Government to help meet local needs in such areas as education, police, fire, and health care. Local governments in Pennsylvania receive \$219,033,000 in GRS funds, nearly 5 percent of the national total.

When there was similar talk of eliminating GRS 2 years ago, I commissioned a study to determine the impact such an action would have on the 14th Congressional District of Pennsylvania. The report shows that the city of Pittsburgh uses all of its GRS funds for public safety. Police services receive 62 percent of the funds, and firefighters receive the balance. Without the funds, the city would have to raise taxes or lay off public safety officers.

The manager of the borough of Coraopolis pointed out the importance of the \$90,000 in GRS funds the borough receives when she said that: "If these moneys were eliminated, one additional solution to millage increase would be bankruptcy."

The borough secretary of Millvale, where GRS funds make up about 7 percent of the budget, said that any reduction in the revenue-sharing allocation would be catastrophic.

In Stowe Township, where many of the residents are elderly on fixed incomes, the manager noted that the end of revenue sharing would force the township to raise taxes. This would, of course, increase the existing burden on elderly residents.

HEALTH PROGRAMS

Next year's Reagan budget would reduce Medicaid benefits by establishing a fixed cap on payments to the States for Medicaid services and would change the present system of a Federal match for State expenditures.

The proposed fiscal 1986 cap of \$22.8 billion is \$1.3 billion below the level needed to maintain current services to the approximately 22 million low-income persons covered by Medicaid. Under current rules, once a State establishes eligibility criteria in accordance with Federal guidelines, all individuals who reside in the State are entitled to services and the State is entitled to Federal matching funds. With the proposed funding system, each State, regardless of the number of people who meet the eligibility requirements, would receive a fixed amount of money. No new funds would be available to cover an increased number of people needing care, such as the elderly or unem-

ployed. Of the people who now receive Medicaid, 14 percent are age 65 or over, another 14 percent are adults in families with dependent children. While children account for a relatively large portion of recipients, they are responsible for only 12 percent of Medicaid spending. The elderly are the beneficiaries of 37 percent of Medicaid spending. The blind and disabled account for 35 percent.

The administration also proposes to cut Medicare by \$22.6 billion over 3 years. Beneficiaries would bear 31.4 percent of this cut. A 1-year freeze on payment rates to various health care providers would mean that reimbursement rates to hospitals would remain at the present level. The freeze on payments to doctors would extend through December 1986. The monthly premium for coverage under part B, which pays for physicians services, outpatient hospital care and lab tests, would increase. The premium, which now covers 25 percent of program costs, would cover 35 percent of costs by 1990. This would mean an increase in the monthly patient premium from \$15.50 in 1985 to \$34 in 1990.

Beginning in fiscal 1987, the administration would index the part B deductible to the annual national increase in medical costs. As a result, the part B deductible, not \$75, would rise each year. The proposal would also delay initial Medicare eligibility until the first day of the month following an individual's 65th birthday. Coverage now begins on the first day of the month in which a birthday falls.

The freeze proposals, since they are limited to health services provided by Medicare, could encourage cost shifting to non-Medicare patients. This may lead to a situation in which doctors and hospitals take cost-cutting shortcuts in treating Medicare beneficiaries.

The fiscal 1986 budget would also freeze funding for four health block grants at this year's level. Created in 1982, these block grants, for maternal and child health services, community health centers, alcohol, drug abuse, and mental health services and preventative health programs, have been sharply reduced even as demand for services remains high. The proposed funding for alcohol, drug abuse, and preventative health programs would be below levels of fiscal 1981, and maternal and child health services would be only slightly above the fiscal 1981 level.

AMTRAK

The funding for the National Rail Passenger Corporation, or Amtrak, would end in the administration's fiscal 1986 budget. The Amtrak funding level for this year is \$684 million. In addition, the administration proposes no funding for the northeast corridor improvement project.

Without Federal assistance for the railroad, States and localities will be forced to come up with the money necessary to operate railines. In many instances, this will mean the elimination or drastic curtailment of less-traveled routes and the resulting loss in jobs for employees who work on these lines. In Pittsburgh, three commuter trains would be affected immediately by a shutoff of Amtrak funds. These trains connect the city to Chicago, New York City, and Washington, DC.

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

A 5-percent cut in salary is slated for all Federal employees in the fiscal 1986 budget for a projected savings of \$1.8 billion. The administration also plans to cancel the January 1986 cost-of-living increase, limit future COLA's, and cut early retirement benefits. Reductions such as these would lower the morale of Federal employees and this, most likely, would lead to an exodus of the best managers and workers from the Federal Government.

In conclusion, I should point out that the fiscal 1986 budget which the administration sent to the Congress last month represents a philosophical statement. I have outlined some of the ramifications of following that philosophy. The adoption of this budget would, I believe, have a serious detrimental effect on our cities. Further, we should understand that the Chief Executive has failed to carry out his responsibilities by submitting a budget out of balance by \$180 billion.

It is now up to the Congress to make the decisions on the budget which have to be made. I hope that we act in a compassionate manner which assures assistance to those who need it while making sure the Federal Government operates in a fiscally responsible manner.●

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. HENRY) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material):

Mr. TAUKE, for 60 minutes, March 27.

Mr. TAUKE, for 60 minutes, March 28.

Mr. FRENZEL, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ROTH, for 30 minutes, March 26.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. STRATTON) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material):

Mr. PANETTA, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ANNUNZIO, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. COYNE, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. MONTGOMERY, for 60 minutes, March 26.

Mr. GAYDOS, for 30 minutes, March 26.

Mr. GAYDOS, for 30 minutes, March 27.

Mr. AuCOIN, for 60 minutes, March 27.

Mr. AuCOIN, for 60 minutes, March 28.

Mr. AuCOIN, for 60 minutes, March 29.

Mr. AuCOIN, for 60 minutes, April 1.

Mr. AuCOIN, for 60 minutes, April 2.

Mr. SCHEUER, for 60 minutes, April 4.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. HENRY) and to include extraneous matter):

Mr. COURTER in four instances.

Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut.

Mr. FRENZEL in seven instances.

Mr. CONTE.

Mr. DANNEMEYER.

Ms. SNOWE.

Mr. DORNAN of California in five instances.

Mr. HYDE in two instances.

Mr. CLINGER.

Mr. WHITEHURST.

Mr. KRAMER.

Mr. WOLF.

Mr. McKERNAN.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. STRATTON) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. COYNE.

Mr. MONTGOMERY.

Mr. FAUNTROY.

Mr. LUKEN.

Mr. FRANK.

Mr. MURTHA.

Ms. KAPTUR.

Mr. SIKORSKI.

Mr. CLAY.

Mr. RANGEL in two instances.

Mr. JACOBS.

Mr. ANDERSON in 10 instances.

Mr. GONZALEZ in 10 instances.

Mr. BROWN of California in 10 instances.

Mr. ANNUNZIO in six instances.

Mr. JONES of Tennessee in 10 instances.

Mr. BONER of Tennessee in five instances.

Mr. COELHO.

Mr. GRAY of Illinois.

Mr. MOAKLEY.

Mr. FEIGHAN in two instances.

Mr. ADDABBO.

Mr. FASCELL.

Mr. DARDEN.

Mr. FLORIO.

Mr. MANTON.

SENATE BILLS REFERRED

Bills of the Senate of the following titles were taken from the Speaker's

table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. 630. An act to provide for the payment of rewards to individuals providing information leading to the arrest and conviction of persons guilty of killing or kidnapping a Federal drug law enforcement agent; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

SENATE ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

The SPEAKER announced his signature to an enrolled bill of the Senate of the following title:

S. 689. An act to authorize appropriations for famine relief and recovery in Africa.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 6 o'clock and 24 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, March 26, 1985, at 11 a.m.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

846. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a report stating the extent to which the stated soil and water conservation programs and policies are met in the budget, pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 2006(b) (H. Doc. No. 99-43); to the Committee on Agriculture and ordered to be printed.

847. A letter from the Acting General Counsel, Department of Energy, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize appropriations for the Department of Energy for National Security Programs for fiscal year 1986 and fiscal year 1987; to the Committee on Armed Services.

848. A letter from the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend section 178(c) of title 10, United States Code, to modify the method of selection of Directors of the Henry M. Jackson Foundation for the Advancement of Military Medicine; to the Committee on Armed Services.

849. A letter from the President and Chairman, Export/Import Bank of the United States, transmitting a statement to the Congress with respect to a proposed transaction of more than \$100 million with Columbia, pursuant to the act of July 31, 1945, chapter 341, section 2(b)(3)(i) (88 Stat. 2335; 91 Stat. 1210; 92 Stat. 3724); to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

850. A letter from the Auditor, District of Columbia, transmitting a report entitled: "Escheated Estate Fund Review," pursuant to Public Law 93-198, section 455(d); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

851. A letter from the Secretary of Health and Human Services, transmitting the 1984 edition of "Health, United States," which is compiled by the National Center for Health Statistics, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health, pursuant to PHSA, section 308(a)(2)(A) (88 Stat. 368; 90 Stat. 387); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

852. A letter from the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, Department of

State, transmitting copies of international agreements, other than treaties, entered into by the United States, pursuant to 1 U.S.C. 112b(a) (92 Stat. 993); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

853. A letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to facilitate the adjudication of certain claims of U.S. nationals against Iran, to authorize the recovery of costs incurred by the United States in connection with the arbitration of claims of U.S. nationals against Iran; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

854. A letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Trading With the Enemy Act to authorize ex gratia payment to Switzerland in accordance with agreement; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

855. A letter from the Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality, transmitting an evaluation of activities under the Freedom of Information Act, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(d); to the Committee on Government Operations.

856. A letter from the Senior Vice President, Federal Land Bank of Columbia and Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Columbia, transmitting the annual report of the Farm Credit Retirement Plan, Columbia District, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 9503(a)(1)(B); to the Committee on Government Operations.

857. A letter from the Acting Assistant Attorney General, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to provide for the recovery by the United States of the costs of hospital and medical care and treatment furnished by the United States in certain circumstances; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

858. A letter from the Acting Assistant Attorney General, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to provide for interim designation of U.S. attorneys and U.S. marshals by the Attorney General; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

859. A letter from the Science Adviser to the President, transmitting notice that the science and technology report and outlook will be delayed, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 6615(a); to the Committee on Science and Technology.

860. A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Weather Modification Reporting Act of 1971, as amended, to authorize appropriations to carry out the provisions of the act for fiscal years 1986 and 1987; to the Committee on Science and Technology.

861. A letter from the Under Secretary of State for Management, Department of State, transmitting the fourth annual report on the implementation of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, pursuant to Public Law 96-465, section 2402 (a) and (b); jointly, to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Post Office and Civil Service.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. BROOKS: Committee on Government Operation. Report on oversight plans of the

Committees of the U.S. House of Representatives (Rept. No. 99-25). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. MONTGOMERY: Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Report of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs pursuant to section 302(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Rept. No. 99-26). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House in the State of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X and clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Ms. OAKAR:

H.R. 1699. A bill to establish certain restrictions on the transportation of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel; jointly, to the Committees on Public Works and Transportation, Energy and Commerce, and Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. FRENZEL:

H.R. 1696. A bill to make permanent the existing temporary duty-free treatment for certain wools finer than 46s; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H.R. 1697. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow noncorporate shareholders of foreign sales corporations the same deduction for dividends received from such corporations as is allowed to corporate shareholders; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. SHARP:

H.R. 1698. A bill to amend the Energy Policy and Conservation Act with respect to the strategic petroleum reserve by requiring testing of drawdown and distribution of the reserve; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. SHARP (for himself and Mr. DANNEMEYER):

H.R. 1699. A bill to extend titles I and II of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. ACKERMAN:

H.R. 1700. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to guarantee loans made to veterans for the purchase of residential units held by cooperative housing projects; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. PANETTA:

H.R. 1701. A bill to amend the Tariff Schedules of the United States to provide for rates of duty on imported roses consistent with those maintained by the European Economic Community on imports of roses from the United States and other nations; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mrs. BENTLEY:

H.R. 1702. A bill to protect and promote the American merchant marine by shipping U.S. mail exclusively aboard U.S.-flag vessels; jointly, to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service and Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. BONKER (for himself and Mr. SOLARZ):

H.R. 1703. A bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to reauthorize the activities of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. CLINGER:

H.R. 1704. A bill to include the offenses relating to sexual exploitation of children under the provisions of RICO and authorized civil suits on behalf of victims of child pornography and prostitution; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota:

H.R. 1705. A bill to establish in the Department of Labor a Federal Boxing Commission to prescribe and enforce fair labor standards applicable to the conduct of professional boxing and to impose certain other requirements relating to professional boxing, and for other purposes; jointly, to the Committees on Education and Labor and Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. GARCIA (for himself, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. BIAGGI, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. MURPHY, and Mr. RICHARDSON:

H.R. 1706. A bill to encourage State and local governments to increase investments in distressed areas by permitting such governments to negotiate reductions in their regulatory burdens with the Office of Management and Budget; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. GRAY of Illinois:

H.R. 1707. A bill to repeal the contemporaneous recordkeeping requirement and certain other recently enacted provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. LEHMAN of Florida:

H.R. 1708. A bill to amend section 502 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to permit members of the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board to continue to serve until a successor has qualified; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. MONTGOMERY:

H.R. 1709. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to increase from \$35,000 to \$50,000 the maximum amount of life insurance coverage provided under the Servicemen's and Veterans' Group Life Insurance Programs and to extend eligibility under the Veterans' Group Life Insurance Program to members of the Individual Ready Reserve and the Inactive National Guard; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. ROYBAL:

H.R. 1710. A bill to remove maximum hiring ages and mandatory retirement ages for selected Federal employees not covered by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; jointly, to the Committees on Post Office and Civil Service and the District of Columbia.

By Mr. UDALL (by request):

H.R. 1711. A bill to authorize appropriations for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for fiscal year 1986 and fiscal year 1987; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. BOEHLERT:

H.J. Res. 202. Joint resolution designating the week of April 14, 1985, through April 20, 1985, as "National Medical Laboratory Week"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma:

H.J. Res. 203. Joint resolution commemorating March 25, 1985, as the 60th anniversary of the United Oklahoma Bank; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. JEFFORDS:

H.J. Res. 204. Joint resolution to designate May 1985 as "Very Special Arts U.S.A. Month"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. SOLARZ (for himself and Mr. SOLOMON):

H.J. Res. 205. Joint resolution to provide for the designation of July 19, 1985, as "National P.O.W./M.I.A. Recognition Day"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. WAXMAN:

H.J. Res. 206. Joint resolution to designate the week of July 25, 1985, through July 31, 1985, as "National Disability in Entertainment Week"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. SOLARZ (for himself, Mr. LEHMAN of Florida, Mr. YATES, Mr. GREEN, and Mr. GARCIA):

H. Con. Res. 98. Concurrent resolution authorizing the rotunda of the U.S. Capitol to be used on April 18, 1985, for a ceremony commemorating the days of remembrance of victims of the Holocaust; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. HUGHES:

H. Res. 113. Resolution to amend the Rules of the House of Representatives to establish additional conditions with respect to official travel of members and employees of committees; to the Committee on Rules.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mrs. HOLT:

H.R. 1712. A bill for the relief of Gregory Wayne Cote; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LUJAN:

H.R. 1713. A bill for the relief of William P. Smith; to the Committee on Armed Services.

ADDITIONAL SPONSORS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions as follows:

H.R. 12: Mr. MORRISON of Washington, Mr. MACK, Mr. KANJORSKI, Mr. SHAW, Mr. APPELEGATE, Mr. WAXMAN, Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska, and Mr. DIOGUARDI.

H.R. 43: Mr. WILSON, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. FUSTER, Mr. FOLEY, Mr. EVANS of Illinois, and Mr. MCCURDY.

H.R. 52: Mr. MICA, Mr. LEWIS of Florida, Mr. BOLAND, Mr. FRANK, Mr. CONTE, Mr. MACKAY, Mr. FASCELL, Mr. SKELTON, and Mr. JENKINS.

H.R. 193: Mr. ANDERSON.

H.R. 208: Mr. HAYES.

H.R. 359: Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. DOWNEY of New York, Mr. WEISS, Mr. TALLON, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. DERRICK, Mr. ROYBAL, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. GALLO, Mr. FUSTER, Mr. DARDEN, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. MINETA, Mr. SABO, Mr. ECKERT of New York, Mr. SUNIA, Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. RAY, Mr. BEVILL, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. FRENZEL, Mrs. HOLT, Mrs. BYRON, Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. SPRATT, Mr. DAUB, Mr. RAHALL, Mrs. LLOYD, Mr. BERMAN, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. LELAND, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR., Mr. FAZIO, Mr. WALGREN, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. HORTON, Mr. STARK, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. FROST, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. BEDELL, Mr. WHITLEY, Mr. RITTER, Mr. WOLPE, Mr. MILLER of California, Mr. WHEAT, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. FISH, Mrs. KENNELLY, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. VENTO, Mr. HATCHER, Mr. BRYANT, Mr. LA-

FALCE, Mr. SCHEUER, Mr. MORRISON of Washington, Mrs. ROUKEMA, Mr. FRANK, Mr. CHANDLER, Mrs. BENTLEY, Mr. HAYES, Mr. GRAY of Illinois, Mr. BARNARD, Mr. MANTON, Mr. GEKAS, Mr. WISE, Mr. MCCOLLUM, Mr. NEAL, Mr. CHAPPELL, Mr. SILJANDER, Mr. THOMAS of Georgia, Mr. HUGHES, Ms. OAKAR, and Mr. GINGRICH.

H.R. 428: Mrs. BOGGS, Mr. BOULTER, Mrs. BYRON, Mr. STENHOLM, and Mr. THOMAS of Georgia.

H.R. 479: Mr. BLAZ and Mr. PACKARD.

H.R. 480: Mr. BLAZ.

H.R. 521: Mr. LEHMAN of California and Ms. KAPTUR.

H.R. 539: Mr. EVANS of Illinois, Mr. HOPKINS, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. KANJORSKI, and Mr. CAMPBELL.

H.R. 585: Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. DERRICK, and Mr. BORSKI.

H.R. 644: Mr. ROYBAL, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. YATRON, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. FISH, Mr. MORRISON of Washington, Mr. AKAKA, and Mrs. BENTLEY.

H.R. 646: Mr. APPELEGATE and Mr. BOEHLERT.

H.R. 782: Mr. BERMAN, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. BATES, Mr. RIDGE, and Mr. STARK.

H.R. 930: Mr. FUQUA and Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois.

H.R. 1021: Mr. YOUNG of Alaska.

H.R. 1109: Mr. GINGRICH, Mr. THOMAS of Georgia, Mr. FISH, Mr. SWINDALL, and Mr. YOUNG of Florida.

H.R. 1123: Mr. BARTLETT, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. GREEN, Mr. LEHMAN of Florida, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. SABO, Mr. STANGELAND, and Mr. WATKINS.

H.R. 1142: Mr. ZSCHAU.

H.R. 1287: Mr. SEIBERLING, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. BERMAN, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. LUKE, Mr. HUGHES, and Mr. BATES.

H.R. 1324: Mr. MILLER of Washington, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. SLATTERY, Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. PORTER, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. BEILENSON, Mrs. SCHNEIDER, Mr. MCKINNEY, and Mr. SENSENBRENNER.

H.R. 1359: Mr. WORTLEY and Mr. CHANDLER.

H.R. 1397: Mr. DE LA GARZA.

H.R. 1425: Mrs. BOXER.

H.R. 1473: Mr. CHANDLER.

H.R. 1475: Mr. RANGEL.

H.J. Res. 10: Mr. GREGG, Mr. WAXMAN, and Mr. JEFFORDS.

H.J. Res. 37: Mr. HOWARD and Mrs. JOHNSON.

H.J. Res. 41: Mr. HYDE and Mr. BLAZ.

H.J. Res. 101: Mrs. HOLT, Mr. MONTGOMERY, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. BLAZ, Mr. LIVINGSTON, Mr. RICHARDSON, and Mr. KRAMER.

H.J. Res. 127: Mr. SUNIA, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. PURSELL, Mrs. HOLT, and Mrs. COLLINS.

H.J. Res. 133: Mr. BURTON of Indiana.

H.J. Res. 144: Mr. BARNES, Mr. BERMAN, Mrs. BOXER, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. DARDEN, Mr. FUSTER, Mr. GREEN, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. MCGRATH, Mr. O'BRIEN, Mr. ROE, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. WAXMAN, and Mr. WEISS.

H.J. Res. 171: Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. SAVAGE, Mr. BORSKI, Mr. ADDABBO, Mrs. JOHNSON, Mr. HENRY, Mr. LUNDINE, and Ms. KAPTUR.

H. Con. Res. 50: Mr. SEIBERLING and Mr. CONYERS.

H. Con. Res. 69: Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. FIELDS, and Mr. CHANDLER.

H. Res. 12: Mr. DONNELLY, Mr. STUDDS, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. DIOGUARDI, Mr. RINALDO, Mr. BORSKI, Mr. SEIBERLING, Mr. LUNDINE, and Ms. KAPTUR.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

64. By the SPEAKER: Petition of the Department of Labor, State of North Carolina,

relative to the establishment of a National Center for Applied Technology and Skills; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

65. Also, petition of the Association of Pacific Island Legislatures, Agana, GU, relative to Compacts of Free Associations; joint-

ly, to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Interior and Insular Affairs.

66. Also, petition of the Association of Pacific Island Legislatures, Agana, GU, relative to nuclear waste dumping; jointly, to the Committees on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and Interior and Insular Affairs.